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HEARING  
ON  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013  
AND  
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
PROGRAMS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING  
ON  
**BUDGET REQUESTS FROM  
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND,  
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,  
AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

HEARING HELD  
MARCH 7, 2012



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**FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 7, 2012.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON,  
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The Committee will come to order.

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from the Commanders of U.S. Central Command, General James Mattis; U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral William McRaven; U.S. Transportation Command, General William Fraser. Thank you all for being with us today.

Much has changed since we last received testimony from your respective commands. We have withdrawn all forces from Iraq; continued to disrupt Al Qaeda and target its senior leadership around the world; the President has begun the withdrawal of the surge forces in Afghanistan; tensions with Iran continue to increase; and a new defense strategy has been released that demands increased power projection and a more globally balanced, agile, and persistent Special Operations Force.

Still, even more significant events are on the horizon. Reports in the press continue to speculate that the Administration may be prepared to announce an additional withdrawal of forces and a change to an advisory strategy for Afghanistan in advance of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] summit in Chicago in May.

I see little strategy in such a plan, if it exists; but rather a political calculus that will ultimately protract the war in Afghanistan, increase casualties, and further erode confidence among our allies and credibility among our adversaries.

Meanwhile, Iran is showing little willingness to curtail its nuclear program, in spite of the tightening brace of economic sanctions imposed at the insistence of Congress.

Although the Supreme Leader may not yet have made the decision to build a nuclear weapon, time is running out for Iran to responsibly join the international community.

I agree with the recent recommendations of the Bipartisan Policy Center task force on Iran, led by former Senator Charles Robb and retired General Charles Wald, including their warning that the United States must immediately shift to a triple-track strategy: diplomacy, sanctions, and visible, credible preparations for a military option of last resort.

But let me be clear. This isn't casual talk of war. A nuclear Iran is a serious problem that the Commander in Chief should be discussing with the American people and our allies every day. And it must be confronted with all elements of national power, not simply an outstretched hand.

As for Special Operations Command, I alluded to the changes envisioned by the new defense strategy. SOCOM [Special Operations Command] is truly being asked to do more, with less. The Command's budget was modestly reduced, but it is expected to continue its 5 percent growth rate for the next 3 years.

Furthermore, all signs point to a heavy demand signal for our Special Operations Forces in U.S. Central Command where more than 80 percent of all deployed Special Operations Forces are right now.

In Afghanistan alone, Special Operations Forces will continue to be stretched dangerously thin as conventional and enabling forces draw down.

Although only 8 percent of the total force in Afghanistan, Special Operations Forces are increasingly leaned on at the local level through the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs, and at the national level, with ongoing counterterrorism and direct action missions in conjunction with our Afghan partners.

And now, with the potential to have a new three-star SOF [Special Operations Forces] General or Flag Officer at ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] command levels, I am increasingly concerned that our Special Operations Forces may be forced into an overburdened role if our conventional forces withdraw too fast and without a sound transition to the Afghan National Security Forces.

Finally, we speculated last year what might happen should Pakistan close supply routes to Afghanistan, and now we know.

TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] has been doing incredible work to make sure that our troops in Afghanistan continue to get what they need in spite of the current downturn in U.S.-Pakistan relations.

Looking forward, TRANSCOM will be challenged to provide their—the lift and prepositioned stocks necessary to fulfill the vision laid out in the new defense strategy.

It seems to me that an increasing emphasis on the Asia-Pacific, and an increasingly maritime theater in the Middle East, will demand more lift, refueling, and prepositioned assets—not less.

Yet the President's budget request reduces our capacity in each of these areas. This topic warrants further oversight by this committee and I look forward to your testimony on these matters and more.

Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all three of you gentlemen for being here this morning and for your great service to our country.

Central Command, Operations Command, Transportation Command—three critical components of our entire national security strategy, I think this will be a very informative hearing. I look forward to your testimony and your answers to the questions of the members.

In CENTCOM [Central Command], we seem to have, you know, not quite all of the world's problems gathered in one place but I am sure, General Jim Mattis, it seems like that at times. It is certainly a very challenging area.

For our committee, Afghanistan continues to be job one and that is where our troops are actively engaged in a war.

We want to make sure the strategy is working there and that we have a plan going forward, and then most importantly, we are providing everything that you need to make sure that our troops can do the job and the task that they have been given in that critically important region.

But certainly, Afghanistan is not the only issue. We are curious to hear how the relationship with Pakistan continues to impact what is going on in Afghanistan and the larger problems in the region.

That certainly has been a very problematic relationship. You know, the classic “can't live with them, can't live without them” situation, but I am mindful of the fact that we need to try to maintain whatever relationship we can with Pakistan.

It is a dangerous part of the world. But whatever help we can get from them, we need; and where we can't get help, we need to figure out what we have to do in order to meet the national security challenges that we have in that region.

But all of that adds up to the fact that we cannot simply walk away from Pakistan. We need to find a way to make that relationship work and your insights on that would be very helpful to this Committee.

As the Chairman mentioned, there are other problems in the region, in Syria and in Iran. So overall, it is a very challenging command that you have and we thank you for your leadership.

Admiral McRaven, we thank you for everything SOCOM has done.

It is been an amazing set of accomplishments over the course of the last few years—most notably of course, taking out Osama bin Laden with an incredible precision and talent that was just—that was exactly the way I think the Special Operations folks envisioned the development of SOCOM.

You know, way back in 1980 when we first started to rethink what we need in the Special Operations Force, it was, you know, just an incredible accomplishment. We thank you for that, but certainly not the only one.

All across the globe, Al Qaeda is on the run and in trouble because of the pressure that our military and our Intelligence Serv-

ices are putting on them, and SOCOM is, I like to say, is at the tip of the spear on all of that.

It is been an incredible string of successes and without a doubt, it is contributed to the fact that we have not had an attack here in the U.S.

If you are a member of Al Qaeda whether you are in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, wherever, you are forced to spend the bulk of your time wondering when a missile might come down on you from nowhere.

And I got to believe that makes it vastly more difficult to do what you are trying to do and we thank you for that great leadership, and we also want to thank Admiral Olson and some of the other predecessors.

A plan was put in place, 5 or 6 years ago to grow the Special Operations Forces to meet the very challenges that we saw.

I guess I would disagree with the Chairman a little bit here, you are not doing more, but less—you are doing more with more. It is just that the more that you have to do, perhaps, outstrip the more that you are getting in terms of supplies and you are doing a great and we appreciate that.

And also, most importantly, you know, there was concern when all of these started because the quality of the Special Operations Forces is critical. We don't simply—you can't just pick people up off the streets and make them into special operators.

And you guys have done an amazing job of training them and making sure that as the Force has grown, the quality has been maintained. So, we thank you for that and we look forward to hearing from you how we can continue to support your efforts.

And of course, none of this happens without Transportation Command. That is how all the troops, the equipment gets to where it needs to be and win.

The complexity of your job, General Fraser, is something I don't think most people appreciate and you have done it amazingly well. We have had incredible supply chains, incredible ability to get, you know, our troops the support they need when they need it.

You know, obviously, the two challenges are the ones that the Chairman mentioned: one, how do we continue to provide the supplies in Afghanistan that we need given the challenges in Pakistan? You have done an amazing job of making that work and I want to hear more about how that is going.

And then as we do lay out the new strategy with the new set of equipment that is going to be provided for over the course of the next decade, how does that fit into your long-term plans? What do we need to do to make sure the strategy works?

I will again emphasize and thank all of you—all participated in the strategy review. It was a comprehensive approach to look at our national security needs and say, "What should the strategy be?"

We have had a debate on this committee and I suspect we will continue to have debate about what role the shrinking budget played in that strategy? Was it the strategy that drove it or was it the budget that drove it? I would say, obviously, it was a little bit of both.

Every strategy, every development in this situation had to at least partially factor in the resources available to implement it. I think taking the approach that you all did which was, let us look at the strategy, figure out what we need to do, and then take another look and say, "How can we make this work within this budget environment?" was the exact, right approach and the strategy that has been laid out makes sense.

I wish we had more money, wish we had more money for a lot of things. We are having a big debate right now about passing a transportation bill here. And the big debate there is we don't have enough money to do what people would like to do.

We are going to have many challenges in many areas but our physical situation is what it is. It is incredibly important. We cannot be a deterrent nation forever. Deficits can in fact explode to the point where they jeopardize our national security so that has to be at least part of the conversation.

And I think the national security apparatus in our country did a really good job of looking at those confined resources and still coming up with a strategy that meets the national security priorities of this Nation.

I thank all of you for doing that. I look forward to your testimony. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General Mattis.

**STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER,  
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND**

General MATTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the committee. And thank you for this opportunity to discuss the U.S. Central Command region.

I have submitted a written statement and request it be accepted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

General MATTIS. It is my privilege to appear today alongside two admired leaders, Admiral Bill McRaven and General Will Fraser. Special Operations Command and Transportation Command had been key enablers to our operations in Central Command and I am grateful for these officers' personal support.

Let me begin with what I see today in the Central region. The Arab Awakening is manifesting differently in each country.

While we may hope for and certainly will firmly support efforts for more democratic government, the awakening's origins are not necessarily a rush for democracy. Rather, this awakening stems from breakdown in the social contract between governments and their people.

Unjust or unresponsive regimes have fallen or are in the throes of falling, as is the case in Syria. However, the transition to a democratic government is never easy as we see in Egypt. Further, it is not clear what the resulting governments across the region will look like.

Challenges remain beyond the promise of the Arab Awakening. Iran and its surrogates continue to orchestrate violence worldwide

as evidenced by its plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington, D.C.

Iran represents the most significant regional threat to stability and security. Its reckless behavior and bellicose rhetoric have created a high potential for miscalculation.

While we have made security gains in the fight against terrorists, the threat remains. Al Qaeda and associated groups continue to kill innocents from the Levant to Yemen and are adapting in the face of U.S. pressure.

While we maintain our pressure on the enemy, we are nesting our military efforts inside four broad U.S. diplomatic objectives for the region: first, we support each country's political reform to adapt at their own pace; second, support for economic modernization to provide the people ownership of their future; third, a renewed pursuit of Middle East peace, recognizing the status quo is simply not sustainable; finally, we stand firmly with our friends and we support regional security, territorial integrity of sovereign nations and the free flow of commerce.

As the Military Commander for the Central region, my overarching goal is to prevent another conflict. We seek to deter those with hostile intent. And should deterrence prove unsuccessful, we provide military options to the President.

As our President has said, our strong presence in the Middle East endures and the United States will never waver in defense of our allies, our partners or our interests.

The military challenge will be determined how we retain a sustainable presence and operational flexibility in a physically constrained environment.

Although we are withdrawing ground forces from the region, we are not withdrawing our support for long-time allies and partners, nor are we pulling back our commitment from a region that too many times has taken a commitment of American blood and treasure to restore stability.

Through a persistent military-to-military engagement, our troops reassure our friends and temper adversary intentions.

Security cooperation activities such as foreign military sales; international military education and training; security force training; and multinational exercises are cost-effective means for building our friends' defensive capabilities, allowing us to operate in consort with allies and friends and to rapidly respond in times of need.

A sustained joint presence with a pronounced naval character supported by embarked troops, agile Special Operations Forces, strong aviation elements and an expeditionary Army and Marine Corps, demonstrates our joint commitment to our allies, underwrites regional stability, familiarizes our forces with the theater and builds partner abilities to protect themselves, all while providing timely response to crisis.

There are some other key-needed capabilities that we have. We need improved counter-IED [Improvised Explosive Device] efforts even now for all the effort we have put into this.

We need them to protect our troops from a pervasive threat that extends well beyond Afghanistan; information operations and voice programs to counter adversary information; and recruiting on the

Internet; improved ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] assets that enable us to locate an elusive enemy; and intelligence expertise to support deployed elements.

We also need specific resources that are vital to the Afghanistan campaign. Coalition support funds, the Commander's Emergency Response Program, Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund and reintegration authority enable us to meet urgent humanitarian and infrastructure needs of a population that is increasingly today secured by its own forces we have been building and training for the Afghan Security Forces Fund.

In conclusion, I appreciate the essential resources you provide which enable us to carry up the strategy assigned.

We ask only for what we need and what we request is critical as we carry out the transition in Afghanistan and continue on course to achieve our desired strategic end state there by December 2014 as laid out at the NATO conference in Lisbon.

Thanks to Congressional support and thanks to the sacrifices of our military families, our forces represent America's awesome determination to stand by our friends, maintain regional stability and defense of our values and our interests.

I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Admiral McRaven.

**STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN,  
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

Admiral MCRAVEN. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and represent the extraordinary men and women of the United States Special Operations Command.

It is an honor to command the world's finest special operations force, a force serving side by side with our broader military and interagency teammates. And I am proud to appear today with my friends and teammates, General Jim Mattis and General Will Fraser.

With your permission, sir, I will submit my written posture statement for the record and open with some brief remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Admiral MCRAVEN. This morning I would like to provide you an overview of SOF's role in addressing our Nation's ongoing and emergency—emerging security challenges.

Secretary Panetta recently outlined how he viewed the future joint force. He called for low-cost, lean, technologically advanced, agile, responsive, innovative, efficient and effective forces able to address a variety of challenges and adversaries.

As I read those characteristics, I am struck at how accurately they described your Special Operations Forces and what we bring to the military arsenal.

Special Operations Forces have had a tremendous impact on our Nation's security and never more so during the last 10 years of war. Since 9/11, our force has doubled in size, now at 66,000. Our

budget has tripled and a number of SOF-deployed forces have quadrupled to meet the emerging demands.

However, even with that growth, our \$10.4 billion budget in fiscal year 2013 still comprises only 1.7 percent of the total DOD [Department of Defense] budget. Simply put, SOF remains relevant, in high demand, and offers unparalleled return on the Nation's investment.

As we evaluate today's rapidly evolving strategic landscape, it is clear that the demand for Special Operations capability will remain high.

Our near-term focus is on weighing the current fight against violent extremism. First and foremost, we will sustain our efforts in Afghanistan in support of ISAF by continuing the application of SOF's direct and indirect approach.

The direct approach, lethal and precise, continues to degrade extremist leadership and their facilitation networks. The indirect approach, which I believe offers the greatest opportunity for victory, builds security and governance through efforts such as the Village Stability Operations and the development of Afghan security forces.

Both the direct and indirect approaches continue to have daily positive impacts on ISAF strategy. Our sacrifice and effort in Afghanistan has been tremendous and we continue to make this our highest priority.

In addition to our efforts in Afghanistan, we also strive to maintain persistent presence globally. Today, U.S. Special Operations Forces are in 78 countries around the world supporting U.S. policy objectives.

In the Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe and other regions, SOF's unique skills, cultural knowledge and ability to work with partners creates effects far above our relatively small numbers.

All of these international engagements are done with the complete support and the approval of their respective geographic combatant commanders and the chiefs of mission.

In addition to our focus on winning the current fight, I am committed to strengthen in our support to the geographic combatant commanders via reinforcing and enabling their theater Special Operations Commands.

As you know, the Theater Special Operations Commands are subunified commands of the GCCs [geographic combatant commands] and provide the regional commanders his Special Operations capability.

As a force provider for those SOF capabilities, USSOCOM will ensure theater Special Operations Commands have the human capital, the capability and the SOF expertise to meet the GCC's requirements.

Another important aspect of SOF's utility to the GCC's is our ability to partner with other national SOFs.

Since the establishment of service, Special Operations Forces in the 1960s and then USSOCOM in 1987, our relationship with our allied partner forces around the world has strengthened each nation's SOF and each nation's ability to deal with their own security problems. We must continue to build these relationships wherever possible.

To win the current fight and strengthen our support to geographic combatant commanders, it will be necessary to ensure our force and their families remain strong.

My predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, established the task force to examine the fraying around the edges in our SOF community. We confirm that a decade of war coupled with a consistently high demand signal for SOF has exerted a physical and emotional stress on our force and families.

I am committed to taking care of our people with the best support we can provide. I have put a general officer and my command Sergeant Major in charge of preservation of the Force and families.

They are empowered to implement innovative solutions across the SOCOM enterprise to improve the well-being of our warriors and their families.

In conclusion, the demands for SOF will not end in the perceivable future. With your strong advocacy, we will continue to sustain a world class Special Operations capability thereby providing the Nation a decisive edge in addressing the challenges that affects us today and will undoubtedly emerge tomorrow.

It is an honor to appear before you today as a commander of the United States Special Operations Command. You can take pride in what the men and women of Special Operations are accomplishing around the world each and every day.

Thank you for your continued support and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in the Appendix on page 78.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General Fraser.

**STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF,  
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

General FRASER. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of this committee, it is my distinct privilege to be here with you today representing the United States Transportation Command.

We are a Total Force team of approximately 150,000 men, women, military and civilians dedicated to deploying, sustaining and then returning home our Nation's most precious resource—our men and women in uniform.

United States Transportation Command is a lean, dynamic organization which plays a critical role in supporting our Joint Force around the world.

I am indeed honored and privileged to be joined here today with my good friends, General Jim Mattis and Admiral Bill McRaven.

During 2011, the United States Transportation Command added a new Command—the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command led by Rear Admiral Scott Stearney.

We added it to our component command leadership team which is comprised of Air Mobility Command led by General Ray Johns; Military Sealift Command led by Rear Admiral Mark Buzby; and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command led by Major General Kevin Leonard.

Over the last month, I have witnessed firsthand the spirit and the ingenuity of our subordinate commands during my travels

throughout the United States, Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Pacific, and Antarctica, just to name a few.

This year has been particularly challenging as our team of Active Duty Guard; Reserve civilian servants, merchant mariners and commercial partners; maintained an unusually high operations tempo supporting combat operations, sustainment efforts, humanitarian relief and crisis action responses, both at home and abroad.

These efforts from the evacuation of Japan following the devastating earthquake and tsunami; to supporting the warfighter in Afghanistan; to our withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011; were all made possible by the amazing United States Transportation Command professionals who are committed to ensuring our Joint Force maintains global logistics dominance.

As we enter a very challenging physical environment, focusing on capabilities which are needed for the 21st century as defined in the President's defense strategy, our challenge is to continue to find fiscally responsible efficiencies to deliver the required capability for the combatant commanders.

The United States Transportation Command strongly supports this transition and will remain focused on supporting our forces around the world. This will not be an easy task. The new strategic guidance requires a military that is smaller and leaner, while at the same time, being more agile, flexible, and ready.

Having an integrated distribution system will be important to our Nation. And the United States Transportation Command will meet the challenges of this new environment. We will continue to build our relationships with the interagency and with other non-governmental organizations, commercial and international partners.

Together, we will ensure our Nation's ability to project national military power and be able to confront other national challenges anywhere and anytime.

Since taking command last fall, I have been amazed to see the unique capabilities that are inherent in the Command and I could not be prouder of the United States Transportation Command team and our partners.

No one in the world can match our Nation's deployment and distribution capability, and the foundation of this enterprise is the enthusiasm, the dedication and efficiency of the United States Transportation Command team.

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith and all the Members of this committee, I want to thank you for your continued superb support of the United States Transportation Command and all our men and women in uniform.

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. I do ask that my written statement be submitted for the record. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the Appendix on page 101.]

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Thank you for your statements.

General Mattis, I mentioned the report of the Bipartisan Policy Center in my opening statement. I would like to get your thoughts

on their recommendations in the context of asking about your satisfaction with our ability to respond to an Iranian scenario.

The BPC [Bipartisan Policy Center] emphasized the United States must be clear that we are willing to prevent a nuclear Iran which includes making visible and incredible preparations for U.S. military options including maintaining two carrier-sized groups and deploying an additional mine countermeasures squadron to the area; conducting broad exercises for the regional allies; prepositioning U.S. military supplies; and augmenting the credibility of the Israeli prep by bolstering its ability—its capability to strike around Iran’s program.

They suggest that if such pressure fails, the U.S. should consider quarantining refined petroleum imports into Iran and ultimately to be capable of an effective surgical strike on Iranian nuclear and military facilities.

What is your assessment of these recommendations?

General MATTIS. Chairman, I read the report and I believe that I have the forces to include some of the specific forces that they outlined in the report. I also have significantly more forces than they highlight.

We are conducting with our allies, partners, friends in the region, numerous exercises, quiet in many cases, but they are very obvious to our friends across the water.

As far as prepositioning of equipment, I have prepositioned equipment in place for Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines and I think we are in a very credible position in terms of offering the President’s options should they need to exercise them.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you satisfied with your current authorities to respond to an Iranian crisis?

General MATTIS. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Admiral McRaven, your request for fiscal year 2013 is \$10.4 billion, which is approximately \$100 million less than the fiscal year 2012 authorized levels. As I said in my own opening statement, you are truly being asked to do more with less since the size of your force will continue to grow to 71,000 by fiscal year 2015.

Where are you assuming the most risk in your budget request?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, fortunately, the fiscal year 2013 budget took care of Special Operations pretty well, as you know.

When you take a look at where we took our cuts, where we recommended our cuts to the Secretary and to the President, was in our light submersible program, which we have kind of postponed. But we have additional submersible programs that frankly will cover down on that capability. And, we have delayed some of our nonstandard aviation.

So, I am very comfortable with the fiscal year 2013 budget as it stands now. Sir, I think, again, it has done a good job of protecting the critical capability that SOF brings to the military arsenal particularly our people.

As you mentioned, sir, we will grow to 66,000 this year and if the budget slope stays as per ramp-up to 71,000 by fiscal year 2015.

The CHAIRMAN. Since your Force relies heavily on all of the other Services, how are the cuts to the Services—the other Services impacting on your overall growth and operational readiness?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I would say it is a little too early to tell. Those cuts have come in place this year but we will see that service degradation over time. What I will tell you, though, is that the service chiefs and I talked pretty routinely.

They understand that Special Operations is not Special Operations without the support of the Services and I get fantastic support from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

So, both the personal relationships I have with the Service Chiefs and the professional relationships between SOCOM and the Services, I am very confident that we will do fine as the Services draw down a little bit.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We haven't—as we get into the Subcommittee hearings and markups, we will find out better what these cuts, what these impacts will be across all the different programs.

I doubt that we just take the President's budget and rubberstamp it but we will be going through all of these things at those levels and that will give us better information as we move forward.

General Fraser, in response to the budget cuts and the new defense strategy, the Air Force plans to retire 27 C-5As, bringing the total strategic lift to 274. The Air Force will also retire 65 C-130H1s and divest all of the program 38C, 27J aircraft reducing our tactical lift force structure to 318.

What is the required strategic lift to meet our current wartime requirements?

General FRASER. Chairman, thank you very much. The planned reductions are reductions that I support based on analysis that we have done.

As you know, we completed Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 but that was based on a different strategy and a different requirement in different scenarios. We now have a new strategy.

We have evaluated that strategy and taken a look at the force structure that has been proposed with the strategic lift and are comfortable that it is manageable and we will be able to support it as far as the combatant commander requirements go.

I would also note though that this is a more modernized force. When I look at the strategic airlift, the piece of this, this is principally about our outsized and oversized cargo. And the requirement there and what they are reducing to will actually enable us to have greater capability and capacity.

And, what I am saying is with a modernized C-17 ERF, Extended Range Force, coupled with 52 C-5Ms which are modernized C-5Ms, actually give us more capability and capacity in the sense that we are able to support the scenarios in which we are given against.

The A models are less mission-capable. They can't carry as much. They are also only meeting a mission capability rate of about 55 percent. The Ms are going to be about 75 percent. And that is what

we are looking forward to in the future with greater capacity and capability.

I give you a real world example. The A models are not able to do the polar overflight. The M models can, and they can carry a load of over 100,000 pounds. You cannot do that with the As.

So there is an efficiency. There is a capability. There is a capacity there that will enable us to still meet the requirements.

The 130s you mentioned are also in the same boat, in the sense that it is going to be a modernized force. It is going to be an optimized legacy force of Hs, also a greater number of Js that they have laid the C-130Js that they have laid in.

And so, that will enable us to be able to accomplish the mission of the inner theater lift. Also, we will still be able to accomplish the role of dedicated support to the Army.

The requirement there is approximately 48 to 50 aircraft and can be accomplished with the C-130 aircrafts. So I am very comfortable with what they have laid in back by the initial analysis we have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Ranking Member Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mattis, in Afghanistan, there are, you know, a couple of troubling reports coming out in terms of dealing with President Karzai on the issues.

Number one, their insistence on us returning, you know, all prisoners to them that we have captured, on that issue, and then, the issue of night raids which I will be curious about Admiral McRaven's comments on that, as well, and it is always been a real challenge in Afghanistan, you know, having a reliable partner in the Afghan Government.

They certainly have their challenges. President Karzai has said many things that make it more difficult, but you are very familiar with.

So I am just curious on those two issues, in particular, but then on the broader issue of how you see our partnership with Afghanistan, which obviously is so critical to the success of our effort.

How is that going and what impact you think that should have on our strategy depending on how those two issues and some of the other conflicts are resolved? And I will be curious on both General Mattis and Admiral McRaven's comments on that.

General MATIS. Congressman, the desire of President Karzai to have sovereignty over his country is one we fully support.

The reason we are there is to stand up his military-to-military reason and to enable—support them in standing up a government that can meet the needs of their people and ensure Afghanistan never becomes again a haven for the kind of attacks on our country that we sustained back in 9/11.

Certainly, there are very difficult issues that we have got to sort out between us. His desire for sovereignty mirrors our desire for Afghan sovereignty—timelines, how you do it, the devil is in the details, so to speak, that is where we come into some of the discussions that when they get portrayed publicly, showed that there are different equities involved here.

With that said, with Ambassador Crocker and General Allen there representing us, knowing that we have got some very prac-

ticed and long-term allied leaders there in Minister Wardak, Minister of Defense; and Minister Bismillah Khan, Minister of Interior.

At the working level, we are working through these issues. They are difficult issues. These are two that cut to the very heart of their self-image. We understand that and we are seeing an increased Afghanization of the night operations, for example. And this is exactly consistent with where we want to go and where President Karzai wants to go.

They are also, I must add, they—the military activities that are generally least apt to have any civilian casualties, which is why we are very adamant that we must continue these to throw the enemy leadership off-balance while doing the least possible harm to any of the Afghan people.

But overall, after 10 years of war and the stresses that come from that, I think we are in relatively good shape.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, thank you.

Admiral McRaven, your own comment on that issue.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. I will echo General Mattis' comments on night raids. It is an essential tool for our Special Operations Forces to be able to have the ability to conduct night raids.

The enemy invariably will bed down at night which makes them that much more targetable. As General Mattis mentioned, also what happens is the rest of the village bed down—beds down at night, so consequently, the potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties is much less.

What we have done is we have really Afghanized our night raid approach, really for over probably about the last 9 to 10 months. We have made a very concerted effort. The Afghans are in the lead on all our night raids.

They are the ones that do the call outs, asking the people to come out of the compounds. They are the first ones through the door. They are the ones that do all of the sensitive side exploitation.

So this is really the common Afghan heavy lead on the night raids. But we continue to recommend, from a SOF perspective, to General Mattis, General Allen and Ambassador Crocker, that we continue the night raids.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I have more questions. But, I had the opportunity to meet with all of you so I want to give my colleagues a chance. I will yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for being here.

Admiral McRaven, the new strategy from the Administration talks about a greater emphasis on Special Operations Forces. And in the past, you have talked about a global SOF network, rebalancing our SOF forces around the world.

There are some press reports that there are plans under consideration to give you some greater flexibility in moving Special Operations Forces around the world. I think there maybe some misunderstanding about that.

Can you describe what the plan is under consideration?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Congressman. I am happy to set the record straight on this.

Every 2 years, the Pentagon goes to the staffing process of looking at the unified command plan which lays out the missions, responsibilities of the combatant commanders. Additionally every year, we look at the forces four which takes a look at the assigned forces to the combatant commanders.

So USSOCOM is involved in those processes, and right now, that is kind of internal Pentagon deliberations. We have not even briefed this to the Chairman or the Secretary yet so I think it would be a little bit inappropriate to get too far out ahead of them.

Having said that, one of the things I would like to make clear is that all of our recommendations ensure that we coordinate with the geographic combatant commanders that we get their approval before any forces are moved—SOF forces are moved from the continental United States or from one geographic combatant command to the other.

We also make sure that anytime we go into a foreign nation, the chief of mission, the Ambassador, has to approve the movement of Special Operations Forces into that nation.

So as we go through these deliberations internal to the Pentagon, those two pieces—the geographic combatant commander's equities and the chief of mission's equities—are always being considered, and we would never recommend, and I would certainly never recommend that we circumvent either of those.

Mr. THORNBERRY. General Mattis, based on your understanding, does this seem like a good idea to you?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. My recommendation would be to support Admiral McRaven's initiative. I have no reservations about it, but again, it is very premature. I have not formally even submitted that recommendation, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, let me—speaking of press reports, let me try another one out on you.

There have been press reports that there is consideration, at least somewhere in the Administration, of taking all the Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and switching them to a Title 50 hat. And so, that way, we can pretend that they are not there in some way.

And, General Mattis, I suspect you have seen the story to which I refer. Is there any consideration of a plan like that?

General MATTIS. None whatsoever, Congressman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, take it back from a little less sensational. There are also concerns that, as the numbers of conventional forces go down in Afghanistan, that our Special Operations troops will be asked to do more—take up those missions or maybe even increase.

And so, I have some concern that, as we draw down numbers perhaps for political reasons, that we are going to stretch our Special Operations Forces more and more expecting more of them.

What can you tell us about this ratio of SOF forces to conventional forces and how that interplay is expected to go in Afghanistan?

General MATTIS. I would make a couple of points, Congressman.

First, Special Operations Forces forte has to do with working with indigenous forces advising and assisting them. So, as we stand up using our conventional and Special Forces, the Afghan se-

curity forces, they are the ones who will carry more of the load. The Afghan forces will.

But we do not want to simply pull the training wheels off. We don't want to pull off the people who have been called in, close air support for them, and say, "You are on your own."

Special Forces will pick up more of that, certainly. But it is in percentage because as the number of our general purpose forces draws down towards 20 under 2014, when we pull them out, we will still need the advisers there.

And I think that is where the interpretation is coming that more is going to be demanded of the Special Forces. I don't see it that way. I see them continuing their traditional role and the Afghan Forces, more will be demanded from them, and they are doing more each year now.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral McRaven, can you just briefly comment—you are all going to do whatever you are asked to do, but do you not require some level of conventional forces to help—as a means of support for your folks to do their job?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir, we absolutely do. And, I think when you look at the current strategy for Afghanistan and General Mattis and General Allen and I talked frequently about this, there is an understanding that there will have to be some conventional force capability, remains to be seen how much capability, but there will need to be some capability as the forces remain—as our forces remain in Afghanistan.

We have—I think, SOF brings to the fight, our strengths is our core capabilities for counterterrorism, for COIN—counterinsurgency—and for security force assistance.

Having said that, things like route clearance packages, some of the big ISR requirements, some of the CASEVAC [Casualty Evacuation] and MEDEVAC [Medical Evacuation], these are provided by the conventional forces.

So, we will still need to have that capability regardless of what is left in terms of the SOF Force in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for your service.

General Mattis, there has been a recent report that Ambassador Crocker in the classified cable expressed concern about the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan and their impact on our ability to continue to be effective in Afghanistan, my question is, would failure to eliminate the Taliban safe zones in Pakistan, is that a showstopper for us in our operations and our efforts in Afghanistan?

General MATTIS. No, Congressman. It is not. And if I were sitting here 2½ years ago, I would probably be asked with the enemy, the Taliban, move it against Islamabad only 60 miles away in Swat Valley.

This is—these havens have just become a penalty, both countries—that is recognized in both countries. And today, as you know, the Pakistan Army has thrown the Taliban buck back up into the mountains.

They continue to fight. They fight—fought this week. They continue to take casualties in this fight and I—the havens that are

there in some of those areas exist because the Pakistan Army is stretched.

Now we do have a problematic-at-times relationship with Pakistan. But that does not prevent us from working it and there is a lot of common ground that we use—that we operate off of together against this enemy.

We don't have 100 percent common ground about it, but it is not a showstopper.

Mr. REYES. Okay. Thank you.

Admiral McRaven, in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, it indicates a shift to the Asia-Pacific or an emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region. How does this impact our Special Ops Forces, given the fact that we have been mostly focused for the last 10 years in the Iraq-Afghanistan theaters?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Thank you, sir.

SOF Forces have had a longstanding partnership with many of our allies in the Asia-Pacific region starting from Korea, and the Philippines, in Thailand, in Singapore. And, we expected those relationships will continue, if not get stronger, as time goes on.

I would tell you what I think, SOF's benefit to this new strategy is that we can uncover down with security force assistance in areas where the conventional forces may not be fully engaged such as South America, Africa, other regions where we have applied less capability over the years.

So, SOF can be an enabling force in other regions as the larger conventional force shifts its emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region.

Mr. REYES. Thank you.

General Fraser, the great majority of equipment that is moved by TRANSCOM goes by sea using ships that are operated by the Military Sealift Command, which is a component of TRANSCOM.

For ships operating in maritime security programs, what do the potential cut backs mean, would that put the companies out of business? Will that force them to mothball and what kind of impact would be felt in that area?

General FRASER. Congressman, thank you.

The entire command is certainly dependent upon our commercial partners. This is both for air, as well as for sealift.

You specifically addressed sealift. We are doing a lot with our commercial partners with respect to sea as we have shipped more goods sustainment via ship. And then also, before the Pakistan border was closed down, we would take it to Karachi, and then we would truck it in.

The flexibility that we have with our commercial partners, though, is that when the border shut down, we were able to redirect these ships and then use their network to go to other ports, offload the sustainment supplies, offload unit cargo, store it and then fly it in.

We call this multimodal—by taking it by sea, taking it to a port and then, further onward movement, taking it in by air.

As we look to the future and we see the drawdown in Iraq already, it is having some impact because we are not doing as much by sea.

And we have recently gone and booked the last ships that are necessary to bring out the cargo that was brought out of Iraq. And,

we look forward to getting that back. But we will be doing less in the future as we move to change the size of the force, also in Afghanistan.

Our commercial partners are aware of that. It is going to be going down and they need to plan accordingly.

Mr. REYES. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I want to thank all of you for your service to our country and for being with us today. I know each of us which we could spend more time talking with you and picking your brains with the experience and knowledge that you have.

General Fraser, thank you for taking time. I know how busy your schedule is but to meet with us and talk about readiness needs even in addition to this hearing today.

General, we know that you are the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command and just looking at the nature of that command, it is a single manager for global air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, and a fancy way of basically saying, "You have got to get the assets to our combatant commanders when they need them."

Mr. Reyes mentioned the fact that, with the new strategy we have, at least a renewed focus or additional focus in the Asia-Pacific area and one of the big concerns there is our new air-sea battle concept and how that may play out.

One of the things that we have also heard is the Navy has proposed, as you know, a reduction in their prepositioned operating stocks, and the same time, the fiscal year 2013 budget is talking about a reduction in strategic lift.

So my first question is, has TRANSCOM done an analysis or an assessment that you could provide to the committee that would show that you could meet the needs of the combatant commanders if you have a simultaneous reduction in those prepositioned stocks, and in a reduction in the strategic lift?

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman.

And, specifically of course, have we done that analysis on the maritime preposition and the answer to that is no.

I know there is a requirement out there. I know that the Navy and the Marines together are taking a look at this based on the direction that they have in the fiscal year 2012, in the AA [Authorization Act] language.

I look forward to that report and the certification from DOD, and then, we will take a look at it.

Mr. FORBES. And, General, my follow-up question is, you may not be even able to answer this but, don't we—aren't we starting to get the cart before the horse from some many of these things?

Because it looks like to me that before the Navy would propose this reduction in our prepositioned stocks or before we would include in the budget that we are going to have a reduction in the strategic lift that we would have done an analysis by the major command that is going to have to get those assets there.

And I don't know if you can even explain, maybe it is something that is not explainable but wouldn't it that make sense to do the

analysis first and say, “We can still get the assets to our combatant commanders before we make these recommendations and include them in the budget”?

General FRASER. Congressman, we continue to take a holistic look on how we would provide support to whatever geographic combatant commanders requirements might be as we look forward to the future whether it is propositioned stocks, whether it is actually providing a sealift in order to get supplies there once we have indications and warning, whether it would be by sea or it be by air. We have done some initial analysis in looking at the strategic lift based on very sound analytical work that was done in MCRS 16 [Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016] and comfortable with the strategic lift reduction.

Mr. FORBES. And, general, again, please understand I am not putting this on you, you have to play the cards you are dealt. I am just asking this question even in that holistic look we have had, there hasn’t really been an analysis in that holistic look that we can still meet the requirements of our combatant commanders if we have a simultaneous reduction in our strategic lift and a reduction in those preposition stocks. Is that accurate?

General FRASER. Sir, we are going to continue to evaluate this and take a holistic look. We have a lot of capacity within our commercial sealift partners too, as well as our craft partners, the civil reserve air fleet and that capacity that we have, we continue to adapt to the needs of the combatant commanders in order to meet that. I will give an example, where our craft partners stood up and gave us more capacity—

Mr. FORBES. And, General, I don’t want to cut you but we only—

General FRASER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Have 20 seconds left but wouldn’t it be fair to my question that we haven’t done the analysis though to make sure we can meet those combatant commanders’ needs if we do both the reduction and preposition stock and strategic airlift?

General FRASER. I have not specifically done that scenario. I have done the scenarios which I have been asked to look at, Congressman.

Mr. FORBES. And thank you, General, for your work. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, gentlemen. I thank you all for being here this morning and I commend you for your leadership over your respective commands in what we all know are very challenging times.

I wanted to turn again to the issue of Afghanistan. I oppose President Obama’s initial request for supplemental funding for the surge for an additional 30,000 troops because I had questions about our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan that I felt went unanswered.

And I still believe we could do everything right in Afghanistan a challenge in itself but if Pakistan, a very uncertain ally, did not do his part, our efforts in Afghanistan would be seriously undermined.

And while the Defense Department should be congratulated for establishing a time line and benchmarks for success, I believe this time line is overwhelmingly dependent on the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces.

So, General Mattis while I am pleased that the Afghan National Security Forces have taken the lead in seven areas representing more than 25 percent of the population, I remain concerned, as I am sure we all do by the repeated incidents of Afghan soldiers turning their guns on coalition forces.

According to a January 17 article in *USA Today*, since 2005 more than 50 ISAF troops have been killed and 48 wounded by Afghan troops. This attack on NATO advisers in the Afghans' own Interior Ministry 2 weeks ago was particularly alarming, since presumably anyone allowed inside would have the highest clearance levels.

I would echo the comments of one senior Afghan general who said these attacks are "A nightmare that refuses to go away." These horrific incidents create mistrust and frustration between NATO personnel and their Afghan counterparts.

And in a visit last year to Afghanistan I met with one of our young soldiers and such an incident had just taken place and he talked about the very chilling effect it had. It certainly undermines a partnership that is key to furthering our strategy to eventually transfer responsibility over to the Afghan security forces.

So, can you tell me what kind of vetting procedures we have in place today for Afghan security personnel; how do we, for example, address challenges such as the fact that is common for Afghans to go only by one name, making the vetting process as challenging?

And in the aftermath of this recent attack, are any of these procedures being modified?

General MATTIS. Yes, Congresswoman, they are being modified. The vetting procedures are not precluded by the single name, for example, we get statements from village elders who know the young men and ask if they are men of good character, they don't have psychological problems, the kind of things that would be known by local leaders, not by a screening test that would be imperfect in a country where literacy is so low.

We have unprecedented cooperation from the Afghan authorities on this issue; you are quite right, they see it too as a nightmare that they have got to stop. On the point I would make is the Afghan security forces, ma'am, are not defined by these occasional tragedies.

We have tens of thousands of Afghan boys fighting alongside us. We have our Special Forces sleeping alongside them at night, and our partner conventional forces going on patrol alongside them. And while these tragedies show that treachery in war is something that has always existed, it does not define the organization at all.

More Afghan boys have died as the result of this sort of thing in a society that has been turned upside down by the Soviets some decades ago and a Kalashnikov culture found its way inside that society.

Violence has become too often the norm. That is one of the things we are trying to turn back. But in Afghanistan right now, it has not stopped us in our tracks that over our strategy, of course we

are taking prudent measures and of course we are adopting those measures.

Ms. TSONGAS. I have a follow-up question, the same *USA Today* article reports that since the later part of 2011, military commanders in Afghanistan no longer make public the number of allied troops killed by Afghan soldiers and police. Obviously, when there is a very visible incident, we are aware of it.

Can you talk about the rationale for this change in policy and if we have run out of time, I will take it for the record.

General MATTIS. There is no change, ma'am. We notify Congress, we notify the Department of Defense, we notify the families on every case where there is a casualty whether it is an accident or what we call a green on blue what you are asking about enemy KIA [killed in action].

You know, this killed in action, that article is not correct. We notify all of our chain of command and the families when we take casualties.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for your service. And as I begin, General Mattis, I want to thank you for explaining the relationship that our troops have with the Afghan security forces.

My former National Guard Unit, the 218th brigade of South Carolina led by General Bob Livingston, worked very closely in helping train the army-trained police units. And they really developed at appreciation of their Afghan brothers, so it is an aberration as you explained of what has occurred.

I am really grateful, just 2 weeks ago I was on the House Democracy Partnership delegation with Congressman David Dreier and we visited Pakistan. And I was very pleased, we had a very warm meeting with the Prime Minister, the Chief of the—the Chairman of the Senate, also the Interior Minister.

It was very positive. And then, that is such an important country for mutual agreements to be working together. So, what is the status of our resuming relationship with the Pakistani Army and Military?

General MATTIS. Congressman, you know, in a couple of weeks I will be flying back out there but the bottom line is following the tragedy that occurred on the cross-border fires in late November, the parliament troop under consideration a—an investigation into what had happened and a determination of what sort of relationship they want with us in the future.

Now, Congressman as you know, this has been a challenging, it is a crucial relationship but it has been a challenging relationship and it has been prone to recriminations on both sides but the bottom line is that this is a critical relationship, as complicated as it is, and they have just come out of support of reconciliation in Afghanistan, that is a first, by the way, the Prime Minister made the public statement here a little over a week ago.

And I think that we are on track to start recovering some of the ground lost under some of this incidents that have occurred.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I appreciate it is for the mutual benefit of the people of Pakistan, Afghanistan and America, also security for India having a stable Pakistan is my view.

Another country that has truly impressed me is Bahrain, and I have visited there and was very happy to find out that our countries have had a relationship over a hundred years, with the country of Bahrain establishing hospitals and of course the Fifth Fleet, Admiral, we are very proud over 50 years.

And so many Americans just do not know that we have had such a long-term association and partnership and I would like for either one of you to explain why Bahrain is important for U.S. security interests.

General MATTIS. First Congressman, it is my only main operating base in the region. That is the only one that I have for central command in the entire Middle East region. And I think when we look at the necessity for the international community to carry its responsibility for security in the Gulf area, that base becomes absolutely fundamental to our foreign policy, to the world's economy and to the stability we are trying to maintain.

And Bahrain has shown, we know they have had some problems over the last year. They have shown they can learn from their mistakes and I think they have earned our support.

Mr. WILSON. And I am really grateful, I represent Hilton Head Island and my first visit to the Persian Gulf States, including Bahrain, I felt like I was seeing Hilton Head on steroids. And it has really been frustrating to me, so many people in America feel like people in Middle East want to evolve back to the 14th Century and that is not true. So, thank you for your efforts there and Admiral, the SOF capabilities are so important to our country.

What is the status of our working with our allies? Are they keeping up, particularly NATO?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, they are. Back in 2006 with the support of NATO, we established the NATO SOF coordination center which several years later became the NATO SOF headquarters which it is now.

The U.S. is the framework nation for the NATO SOF headquarters. We have a three-star U.S. General that is the NATO officer in charge of that SOF element. They do an absolutely magnificent job.

About 250 some on folks on the staff there, they provide a lot of the training and the education for somewhere in the neighborhood of the 22 NATO SOF and NATO alliance countries that are part of that SOF alliance.

Just to give you an indication when the—in 2006, when we stood up a NATO SOF coordination center, they were about 300 NATO SOF members in Afghanistan, now there are over 2200 NATO SOF in Afghanistan.

And while I can't make the direct linkage, I can tell you that by coming together as a NATO SOF element at the NATO SOF headquarters, there was a sense of commitment, there was a sense of understanding at the SOF level and what needed to be done.

We have a number of courses that we train and that we teach there at the NATO SOF headquarters that teach to the NATO

standards. So, when these folks do deploy forward, we are very, very confident at that capability.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you Mr. Chairman and gentlemen thank you for all that you do for this Nation.

A couple of questions, General Mattis, in your testimony there was no information about the contingency fund for Afghanistan, perhaps that is for a later hearing but could you tell us what is the potential expense for 2013, 2014 and beyond.

General MATTIS. Congressman, I will have to take it for the record, it is a critical fund for what we are doing there in terms of our counterinsurgency campaign but I need to get specifics for you, I don't want to give you general ballpark figures, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 127.]

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, I certainly would appreciate that and I suspect the numbers are pretty large.

General MATTIS. They are, sir, and they are in my testament for the appropriations committee but I didn't think to put them in your—I will correct that.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you and I would appreciate that. Admiral McRaven, you have sufficient ISR assets to carry out the tasks that you have discussed here and in your written testimony.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we do. We are very well served by our ISR assets that we get both from the SOF ISR capability and from the conventional support. So, for example, in Afghanistan—but I don't want to talk specific numbers of orbits here—suffice to say, we are very well resourced with ISR.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Some of those ISR assets are being retired.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, none of the ISR assets that I use currently are being retired.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think we have information that some are going to be retired, some of the platforms that are operating out of Beale Air Force Base, for example.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, the—I used primarily the MQ9s, the MQ1s and then we have a large fleet of manned aircraft, small manned aircraft. Those to the best of my knowledge, the orbits are not going away.

I will continue to get the orbits that I need whether or not the individual platforms are being modified such as the MQ1; that I will have to get back to you on, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please do. And I would like some specific information on how those assets are used in the Horn of Africa.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sure.

Mr. GARAMENDI. And Congo.

Okay, back to you General Mattis, a recent *New York Times* article indicated that there may be some discrepancy in the reporting of the success or failures in Afghanistan.

Are you familiar with that article?

General MATTIS. Not in particular, sir. I have read articles alleging that sort of thing but I don't—sir, we are very confident that we given a rigorous analysis when we make our assessments of

how we are doing there. And just the fact we have been so reluctant over many years to say that we were on the right track.

And now, we can ensure right down to the district level how it is going. It shows the detailed rigger that we have put into this and we don't assess it simply from an episodic role.

We talked to the sergeants and the captains on the ground. We talked to the Afghans on the ground. We are very confident that we have got as good as an objective and subjective melded together assessment can give us.

Mr. GARAMENDI. So, therefore, we should have confidence in the information that we receive from the Department of Defense.

General MATTIS. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay and my questions end there. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and your commitment.

General Mattis, over the past several years, I have tried to focus my attention on the Afghan narcotics trade as a major source of funding for the insurgents.

In 2006, General James Jones, then the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, stated, "The Achilles heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem." He went on to state, "I think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates, is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, anything to bring chaos and disorder."

In 2012, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime published a study showing that the opium production rapidly increased in Afghanistan from the period of 2006 to 2010.

And gentlemen I have shown you this chart before, this is a chart from CRS [Congressional Research Service] that basically expresses that period. It shows the peak; I am fond of folding this chart in half because it shows that what we are dealing with is a spike that exceeds the—what is the historical level of production of previous periods.

So, we saw from that period a nearly doubling of production. In a recent correspondence with General Allen, he told me that, "The narcotics trade and its linkage to the insurgency contribute to regional insecurity, corruption, volatility in the rule of law and the stagnation of economic development."

General Petraeus agreed that it was a serious problem, noting that the trade financed roughly one-third of the Taliban's funding. In an attempt to confront this issue. I have discussed this issue with you, General Mattis, President Karzai, General Petraeus, General Allen and the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], just to name a few.

And in response to my question on this issue last year, you stated, "The U.S. Government and other international partners including the Afghans are reducing poppy cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan. Our intra-agency counternarcotics strategy supports a comprehensive set of actions to reduce opium productions."

This strategy includes a public information campaign, good performance initiative, complimentary efforts in law enforcement and

justice capacity within the narcotics police, Afghanistan's specialized unit such as DEA sponsored national in addiction and special investigative units and collaborate work with USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development].

I compliment you on your leadership on these efforts as they appear to have had success. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, April 2011, winter poppy assessment demonstrated a decrease in 2011 poppy production.

Further in correspondence with General Petraeus last year, he told me that his forces, "Have seen a 48-percent increase in, excuse me, a 48-percent decrease in opium production in the first quarter of 2011 and that they saw a 341-percent increase in drug seizures compared to the same period a year ago."

So, I can hold up this new chart and which I also fold in half which shows that the spike downward. And if you fold it in half and look at that period that we were concerned with, you can see that we have once again return to a lower level that is more historic.

And the chart that General Petraeus says has shown the spike of the seizures of the drugs have had a huge impact. Okay, now, while I find these trends reassuring, I am concerned that the premature drawdown of U.S. and ISF forces in Afghanistan may reverse this trend and allow the insurgence to regain this lucrative source of funding.

Now, General Mattis are we still pushing these programs to the degree that you indicated in your response that we received in August or are we still seeing the same positive results?

Do you anticipate that these positive results will continue as we draw down our forces? Does the Afghan army have the capacity to address these counternarcotic efforts?

And if this administration ignores the advice of its combat commanders, what do you anticipate happening to the counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in the future, can we continue to see this lower level of poppy production? General.

General MATTIS. Congressman, this is an intimate part of going after this insurgency and I would agree with the one-third of their funds were coming, we are sure, from the poppy trade. So, we have got to get our handle on it.

Also, this criminal patronage network that is funded by the various drug producing, whether it would be the facilities, where they refine it, the network that gets it out of the country and the return, the money coming back in that then poisons all the local people who see the lucrative nature of this and so they are drawn away from legitimate crops and this sort of thing.

This is all having a rot effect on Afghanistan. The result is that we stay unrelenting in our pursuit of this criminal patronage network whether it is specific to the Taliban or it is simply a feeder into the Taliban. It is still part of our targeted enemy.

We have also got a much stronger international effort going on right now and that grows each year, this is a regional problem, as well as an Afghanistan problem. So, the answer is that we will create an Afghan National Army, Afghan national police that has this capacity if we continue on the track we are on right now. Yes, sir.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Admiral McRaven, as you know this much speculation about timing and nature of drawdown, in Afghanistan, including the possibility that we will shift to a model with substantial special operation forces remaining in the country would be subordinated to the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and operate under title 50 authority, as they did for the bin Laden raid is and this has been reported in the Associated Press on March 3rd, as coming from high-level Pentagon officials which I assumed to be one or all of you all.

Is my assumption correct and are these reports true?

Admiral MCRAVEN. No, sir. The reports are false. We have no plans right now to put Special Operations Forces under title 50 in Afghanistan.

Mr. JOHNSON. So, no plans at the present but assuming that did become operational at some point in the future, it would raise complex oversight questions and if such a plan was put into effect, at what level of specificity would the Department of Defense be required to report such use of Special Operations Forces under CIA command to this committee?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, all I can tell you is right now, we have no plans to do that. Now, the Special Operations Forces work routinely with the Intelligence Community and we do occasionally partner or we do partner with the CIA.

And occasionally, we will put SOF operators with the CIA in very small numbers as required; that oversight goes through the normal CIA oversight channels. So, whatever SOF personnel are assigned to the CIA, then the committees will have full visibility over those personnel and those measurements.

But right now, again, there are no plans, absolutely no plans right now to put Special Operations Forces under title 50 in Afghanistan either now or for the future that I am aware off.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, there is nothing that would ban such a plan from being implemented at this time. But let me ask the question this way Admiral: Is the military required to report to this committee specific operations conducted by Special Operations Forces under CIA command?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I can certainly talk about specific incidences but I would prefer to do that in a more closed session, if we could.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I am not looking at specific instances. I am just looking at generally policywise. Is there any requirement that you know of that would require you to report specific operations to this committee, to the House Armed Services Committee, as opposed to the Intelligence Committee?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. Sir, what I can tell you—

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Actually the Defense Department would not be required to report to the Intelligence Committee but would it be required to report to the House Armed Services Committee?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, if it is an intelligence operation then it is reported to the Intelligence Committee. So, if it is under CIA as an intelligence operation, then it is reported to the Intelligence Committee.

If it is under title 10 and it is a special operation mission, then it is reported to the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. JOHNSON. This and of course, the House Armed Services Committee does have budgetary authority over the Special Operations Command but apparently, there is no restriction on special ops being able to pass off if you will, the operational authority for special operations and its forces to the Intelligence Community which is more than just the CIA.

No restrictions on that and thus if that happens then there is no report that is required—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Committee and thank you and we do we get—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith and I get briefings at a higher level of what they do.

Mr. JOHNSON. There is no way that we can or no requirement that the committee as a whole in a secret session if that is what it require—requirement that we—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson, we can talk to you about that after.

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Mattis, Admiral McRaven and General Fraser, thank you so much for joining us today. Thank you for your leadership and leading the best military the world has ever known. We deeply appreciate that.

Admiral McRaven, I want to begin with you and looking at where we are in Afghanistan with the pending drawdown on conventional forces and looking at the redirection or refocusing strategy where SOCOM's manning, their budget, their operations roles are going to increase.

It appears highly likely that SOCOM's presence—Special Operating Forces presence in Afghanistan is going to continue past 2014. With that being said, we know that enablers have to be there to support our Special Operations Forces.

We know today with conventional forces there, there is a pretty robust number of enablers there and a depth of enablers there. My question is this, going forward as conventional forces are drawn down, who will be the enablers for our special operators there in the theater?

Are there going to be enough special operators? Are they going to have the depth necessary to make sure special operators have all that they need in those particular circumstances?

And I am going to lead that into another question and turn it over to you. General Mattis had stated previously that the insurgency remains both resilient and capable, so we must remain vigilant and resolved as our gains are reversible.

The fear is that as conventional forces draw down and our special operators have more tasks there in theater that they get spread too thin, and that they don't have that support group, those enablers there.

The question is are we getting to a point where we are asking our special operators to do so much in a time where we know, the Taliban is going to be pretty active in seeking out where weakness

is, not just with the Afghan forces but seek out where weaknesses may be in our forces as the support forces for the Afghans.

Can you tell me, are we putting ourselves in peril with the situation we are putting our special operators in and specially based on General Mattis' comments?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sure, Congressman and first, I will address the enablers issue. Special Operations Forces deploy with a certain set of enablers, primarily our ISR requirements and a lot of our helicopter lift and some of our internal CASEVAC capabilities.

So, we are fairly robust when we deploy. Having said that as you pointed out, we do rely quite a bit on the Services there for things like route clearance packages, if we are moving from point A to point B.

The Services do provide some additional helicopter assault forces and some additional ISR. So, as the forces begin to draw down, we will be in constant dialogue with the General Allen, General Mattis, and our ISAF partners to ensure that the right level of enablers are there.

And we have been having these discussions for quite some time, recognizing that the President has already made the decision to move down to 68,000 on the U.S. side. So, I am pretty comfortable that we are having good discussions on this and that all the right folks understand what our requirements will be as we stay in Afghanistan to 2014.

On the issue of the fact that the insurgency will remain resilient and capable, it is worth recognizing that as we ramp up to about 352,000 in terms of the Afghan National Security Forces, that force will take on the bulk of the fight against the insurgency.

On the SOF side, as you know, we are training the Afghan commandos, the Afghan Special Forces. We have Afghan partner units and then, of course, our local police, the NATO SOF folks are training a lot of folks as well.

So, as we look at the drawdown occurring, the expectation and I think a very real expectation, is that our Afghan partners will step up as we provide them increased capability and they will be able to take a lead and do the job himself.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. That is going to lead me into the next question. You talked about the challenges and the role of our special operators play. I know that there are two critical missions there, the village stability operations and also training the Afghan Local Police.

With special operators, they will be making up about 8 percent of the force as there, as this transition occurs and we are putting more and more emphasis on the Afghans to be able to take up some of these responsibilities, hoping that they are able to assume then our conventional forces leaving.

It seems like to me there is more focus and there is much more pressure on our special operators that if things don't go as planned with the Afghans, both local police and the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces].

Where does that leave your special operators? In other words, if they are placed in a situation where things starts to decay a little bit, is the capability there with them only being 8 percent of the total force structure that are there now and then they are going to

carry a much greater share of the load, under what probably is going to end up being some pretty challenging scenarios.

Can you tell me where you feel they will be? Are they going to be properly supported? Are we going to make sure that we are not asking too much of them in that situation?

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the time has expired, if you could submit that to the record please.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 127.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of you and your very challenging positions that you hold.

I want to just follow up very quickly on the sustainment issue because I know that, you know, the American public certainly understands that the Afghanistan Government is not able to support their military monetarily now and probably not into the distant future.

Where do you see those resources coming from, the international community as a whole has been providing those with us in the lead, do you see that being sustained and if not, how are we going to sustain the rest of the military?

And I think just to that, the NATO enablers and the issues around logistics from on the score of one to five, I guess, where do you see the logistics capability now and their ability to maintain their own logistics, but going down the line even some of the infrastructure that has been put in?

General MATTIS. Congresswoman, as the President stated, we are not going to abandon Afghanistan in 2014, so it begs the question how we are going to sustain this in the long term, so Afghanistan does not again become a haven for the kind of attack we took on 9/11.

I think the international community will have to sustain a fairly robust aid network going into Afghanistan but at the same time, Afghanistan is starting to get some economic vitality showing up from extraction industries and other, an education system that is going to turn out people directly employable to do things that are more than just subsistence farming.

Certainly, agriculture has a great potential to create more wealth; at one time, as you know, Afghanistan exported food outside exporters. I think too that logistically, we have put in place logistics schools for the military, so they can maintain the military infrastructure and equipment we are giving them.

All of this is in its nascent stages of course because we have to start from such a low starting point in the country where literacy and any kind of governmental organization was totally lacking.

So, it is going to be difficult. I think the international community will have to continue but it will taper off too as inside Afghanistan, some degree of an economic basis actually gets started, gets rolling there.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. If I could I am just going to switch to Syria because I want to give you a time to respond to that as well. Could you comment on the security of the Syrian chemical weapons, what do we know about that? What can you share with us?

General MATTIS. In open session, ma'am, we think the chemical weapons are secured right now. We have seen no indications of use against their own people at this point but it is something that we are keeping a very, very close eye on.

Mrs. DAVIS. Could you comment as well on the security situation in Syria and how it affects Iran; how that landscape might change if in fact Assad stepped down or was removed from office.

General MATTIS. Well, when Assad goes, ma'am, and he will go, I don't know if it will be next month or it will be some or a longer period of time when he goes it will be the most significant strategic setback for Iran in 20 years.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. That is as much as you would like to share this time?

General MATTIS. Well, the thing is, ma'am, I think the situation, the tragedy that is unfolding there and Assad's willingness to use force and a lot of force against this people would certainly—it is convincing me the situation probably is going to get worse there before it gets better.

And it is going to take some kind of an international, regional solution.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. And finally, just if you could comment on leveraging the expertise and the capabilities of others, of all of our men and women who were serving obviously, there have been tremendous changes in the role of women as they have been engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And there is a report that suggests that women can serve in many more positions. I know that the Services are looking at some physical standards that would affect them.

How—what would you like us to know about that role and how you see it changing? We are continuing to train women in their role in Afghanistan and yet we are also looking to exit. But how do you see that continuing to engage women in a very different role when they played in the past?

General MATTIS. Ma'am, as the combatant commander, I can just say that the Armed Services, Army, Navy Air Force, Marines have given to me men and women who are superbly trained.

I think we have got it about right in terms of the employment of the women. I don't have any demands signal to go one way or another. I think the Services are giving me what I need at this time.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired. Dr. Heck.

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for your service, as well as for the service of those that you command.

General Mattis, as you yet stated a little bit early that you expect that it is going to be the Afghan National Security Forces that will kind of seal the operational void as we draw down.

But yet recent data reveals that of the Afghan National Army units assessed, only 36 percent are effective independently or with purely advisory support, that only 44 percent of the Afghan National Police battalions assessed were similarly effective.

So, how confident are you that the Afghan National Security Forces will be capable to assume that responsibility?

General MATTIS. Congressman, I am relatively confident. It is hard standing up an army in the middle of a fight against an enemy that even goes after women and children.

Creating an ethical force under those conditions is a challenge, but what we have found, for example, we wanted to be at 352,000 by October, to have them at full strength finally.

We are going to be there within 60 days. Afghan boys are willing to fight. We want them to fight right. We want them to fight well. And certainly, there are challenges standing up these units in putting them right into combat.

We learned that in World War II and Korea in our own army. But at the same time, I am relatively confident that this is on the right tract.

Dr. HECK. Thank you and then, Admiral McRaven, the fiscal year 2013 budget request decreases funding for the undersea mobility programs 62 percent from \$68 million to \$26 million.

Given the current and aging fleet of SEAL [Sea, Air, and Land] delivery vehicles and the fact that we have significant capability gaps in that area, what are some of your concerns with this funding decrease and how is it going to impact our ability to contribute to the anti-access, area denial mission areas?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you. I have taken a hard look at our undersea mobility program and actually as we went through the budget drills for fiscal year 2013, I felt we could assume a little bit of risk in our light submersible program recognizing that we have recommended a medium submersible program that we think we will cover down on that gap as you talked about for the area of denial piece.

So, I think with the current SEAL delivery vehicles we have and we have some modifications that we are making to those, along with the recommended budget that will include the medium submersible program but that gives us the capability we need within naval special warfare.

Dr. HECK. Thank you, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. [Presiding.] Thank you. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry, and thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.

General Mattis, there is starting to be some growing voices about airstrikes—U.S.-led airstrikes in Syria and you in your testimony talked about how challenging that country's situation is for our military.

I mean, looking last year in terms of Odyssey Dawn, I mean, our military did a magnificent job, sort of coordinating with NATO. You know, an operation that at least superficially would seem to be similar.

I just wonder if you could maybe talk a little bit more about what you see as the challenges because certainly it is on the talk shows every Sunday lately.

General MATTIS. Congressman, each operation is unique, of course, and we have to be careful about templating an operational approach to a unique situation.

Our challenge in Syria is that with Assad's willingness to murder his own people, we are in a situation where we sense we have to do something to stop this.

I provide options to the President. I can just tell you that options such as working with the Syrian opposition, we would have to perhaps get a little more fidelity, so we know who exactly we are working with and then look at the end state we are trying to achieve and come up with regional partners, the best in international partners, the best possible way to go forward.

I think right now, the effort to bring increasing diplomatic and economic pressure on the Assad regime are exactly the right way to go.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, thank you. I am glad that you at least stated clearly that, you know, the situation is intolerable and we can't just sort of watch. I mean, we got to do more than that but—and certainly, you know, hopefully this other tools are going to effect some change there.

In your testimony regarding Pakistan, again, you sort of articulated support for some of the assistance that we are still providing there.

And, you know, I have to share with you that I have been at VFWs [Veterans of Foreign Wars posts] lately where, you know, staunch, pro-military veterans come up to me and rather angry about the, you know, the events that we saw unfold in Abbottabad and what, I think, most people think was clearly a situation that the Government there was aware of.

Admiral Mullen's testimony regarding the Haqqani Network's connections to Pakistani intelligence and the question is posed to me at these meetings, like why are we providing any support for this government?

I thought maybe, you know, I got a couple of minutes left on my time here, you could articulate for people who again, are not hostile to your mission but really question, you know, what is the value here.

General MATTIS. Congressman, the questions are valid.

The point I would make is in this, it is a very challenging but a crucial relationship that we maintain with Pakistan. I have looked at the evidence, and I do not believe anyone in authority was aware that Osama bin Laden was in Abbottabad.

And I am not reluctant to say what I think. I am rather well-known for saying what I think.

I don't think that they knew about it. We are going to have to sustain a workable relationship and, for example, along the border, there is collaboration going on. Now, it is not complete and it is not at the level we want.

There are disagreements on some aspects of who is the enemy and who is not. And over years, some of this has shifted below both of our feet, but the threat that the enemy projects is a threat to Pakistan, as much as it is to Afghanistan.

The Pakistan military has taken a lot of casualties. They probably have lost more people in this war than NATO combined has lost. So, my point would be that we continue to search for the common ground.

We fight in many cases in a collaborative way. I could not have gone in, in 2001 to southern Afghanistan, absent Pakistan's support. I would not have—I needed their support.

So, it has not been perfect by a long sight and certainly, we have got to overcome some of the recriminations from both sides that have characterized the relationship.

I think in the long term, the shared requirements we both have to address this situation will find us more common ground that we can work from.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

I want to try to get a question to each and every one of you.

First of all, General Mattis, when you look at your SOCOM AOR [area of responsibility], what is your assessment of the resulting unintended consequence of going to no credible, no viable, no military presence—U.S. military presence in Iraq?

General MATTIS. Congressman, in Iraq we now have a State Department-led effort. I have a Lieutenant General there with an Office of Security Cooperation, with several hundred U.S. military but even a larger number of contractors who help on bringing in the equipment that they have purchased, training them on that equipment.

We are also working around the region, for the regional militaries to invite the leadership from the Iraqi military to countries exercises around the region, so we get them out of their pariah status.

We have pretty good relations. We have very good relations because of the years we spent fighting together and we are going to try to sustain those. So, we don't take those kinds of costs that could come from the lighter footprint.

Mr. WEST. Thank you very much.

Admiral McRaven, one of the privileges I had was to command a battalion in Iraq in 2003; as a matter of fact my XO [executive officer] is sitting right there but now Colonel Rich Root, you know, one of the key tasks that we had was to provide an outer cordon for special operations direct missions that were going on.

And that is one of my concerns and I think you heard that here and talk about their relationship between conventional forces and special operations forces. So, is that going to be a consideration as we draw down? I understand we are working very well at the VSO [Village Stability Operations] programs, working well with the Afghans special operations commando units.

But I think there is still as a comfort of the Special Forces, elements having an American conventional force that can provide some type of security or outer cordon.

So, will we make sure we consider that as we go through the drawdown leading up to 2014?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we will absolutely consider it and again, General Allen and General Mattis and I have these discussions quite frequently about what is the right balance between the SOF element out there and the conventional forces.

And you are probably happy to know, we actually have two conventional battalions that are assigned through the SOF elements out there, helping with the VSO program and they have been very successful at that.

So, as we move forward in recognizing what that balance is, as the numbers draw down will be crucial, but I am happy to say that the dialogue is very strong. And I am very comfortable that as we move forward in that direction, we are going to get that right balance.

Mr. WEST. Good and General Fraser, as we look at this 21st-century battlefield and the enemy is always going to be in tough spots and it was very difficult for us to get to.

Are we looking at logistical and transportation networks that enable us to be a little bit more expeditionary, so that we don't have to come and depend upon questionable countries such as Pakistan?

Because I think that, you know, we talked about last time when you were here General, the littorals and how we can, you know, deploy and get into these areas without having a big logistical footprint.

So, is there some move we can look to see in that in TRANSCOM?

General FRASER. Absolutely, Congressman.

We take a look at that from an en route infrastructure perspective and where we have access. And I am very pleased with a recent report that we have completed called the "En Route Infrastructure Master Plan" that we put in; it is a global look where we are going to have access, where we need to make investments, and where we need to partner.

And I think as we go forward and continue to exercise and work with the ground component commanders in their exercise program, this will both trust and build confidence, also build partnership capacity. And potentially, maybe the opportunities to get engaged in other airfields, other seaports, other things of this nature, but I am confident that we have got a solid plan, it is a balanced plan too.

Mr. WEST. Very well, and gentlemen please give all your soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines my best. Thank you very much and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORBERRY. Mr. Kissell.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome all of you today and especially to Admiral McRaven, I would like to recognize your previous headquarters of being at Ft. Bragg, the justified center of the universe as we would refer to it.

General Fraser—some while back, we got word from our Air National Guards that somebody wanted the C130s and that was diverted and I just wonder with our airlift change in capacities, do our Air National Guard folks need to worry about their C130s again?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Congressman, I don't have any of the specifics that you are referencing there. I know that the Air Force is taking a look and has a proposed bed-down plan with respect to all of their assets.

And I can't pass up this opportunity to thank and appreciate all the contributions that all the guardsmen and the reservists provide to us. So, we are a Total Force and we in TRANSCOM are the recipients of that on a day-to-day basis and very much value their contributions.

Mr. KISSELL. If something happens, where they should be worried, give us a heads-up on that one, please.

General Mattis, we had a—recently some situations in Afghanistan resulting from how certain materials at a prison was handled. And I had some conversations with somebody who talked about that one of the good things coming out of that, is the Afghan army took the lead in kind settling that situation and that there is a commission including some of the people from the religious part of Afghanistan to investigate and see what happened. And also towards the long-term effect if any—kind of where does this situation stand now?

General MATTIS. Congressman, it was a very unfortunate, inadvertent mishandling of the religious materials, but the performance of the Afghan security forces—disciplined, restrained—was pretty magnificent under these kind of stresses when you are actually having to stand against your own people.

It is a tough situation, they were in a word magnificent in carrying out their duties and standing with us and restoring calm.

Right now, there are three investigations under way; one is by the U.S., since there are certain orders that we give in SOF's that we insist on. We have to look at our own culpability and were any of our procedures, our commanders' orders violated.

One is by a joint Afghan NATO senior officer, general officer commission, and one was by the religious folks there. In all three of these, two of them have reported out—the joint one, and the religious one—and the U.S. investigation is still under way at this time.

Mr. KISSELL. And Admiral McRaven, also someone that you guys were talking about the night raids—it was pointed out to me recently that one—that President Karzai has problems with this, the rank-and-file population in Afghanistan welcomes them because it gets rid of bad guys.

And you were talking about how we are training special forces for the Afghans, so they can take the lead but I also have heard that we are—have recently asked for Afghan ladies to become trained special forces, so they can be involved in this.

I just wonder if you can expand a little bit on what the general view from the Afghan population is toward night raids and toward this specialty of asking ladies to become involved.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you. On the night raids, when I was there over the past 3 years as one of the commanders of one of the SOF units there, we routinely brought in governors, Afghan governors, and we brought in some of the senators and we brought in some of the parliamentarians to talk to them about how special operations conducted their missions within Afghanistan.

And I will tell you across the board, after we had those discussions with the Afghan senior leaders and they had an appreciation of how we did things, how small the civilian casualty rate was, they came away with a much greater appreciation.

And I would say at that point in time, I myself felt comfortable that they understood the value of night raids. And sometimes for political reasons, they will tend to use the night raids, kind of against us in order to gain some political leverage within their province, their district, et cetera.

But having said that, my sense in talking to most of leadership and up and down the chain of command, the Afghan chain of com-

mand, is that there are reasonably supportive of night raids, particularly when it takes out a high-value individual that is creating problems in their region with minimal civilian casualties which is what we try to do every time.

In terms of the females, sir we have a U.S. female cultural support teams much along the line of the Army and Marine Corps female engagement teams. They have been very, very successful.

We are working with the Afghans now to see if we can get Afghan females to take on that role of being able to talk to Afghan female to Afghan female. And we hope that that program will take root and be as successful as some of our other female engagement programs.

Mr. KISSELL. Of course, again, thank you gentlemen and I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thank you for being here today.

General Mattis, kind of playing back off what the Chairman started off in terms of his conversation, with you—that you have got some reprogramming requests and to the committee relative to Iran area of operation.

Can you visit with us about what you are trying to strengthen and that what are the changes there that are driving these reprogram requests?

General MATTIS. As you all understand Congressman, I keep a very weather eye on this situation with reference to Iran. As we look at anything that is revealed in terms of their capabilities, we are looking to see if there is something new coming out.

And in the couple of cases, they brought up capabilities either faster than we anticipated and these are relatively minor, refocusing our effort; in other words, there is no significant area where I have got to come in and say we have got a big problem here, there are just areas I want to make certain we maintain our edge.

And each of those cases are justified in detail and I can discuss those with you; I would prefer to discuss those in your office with you, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. When was the last time we did a missile defense test in that area with our Gulf partners. Have we done one?

General MATTIS. Routinely and within the last 30 days, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. Alright. I was in Abu Dhabi recently and the Patriot battalion commander there that was training the Abu Dhabi's was jealous of their I guess, block three or whatever you call the system—he said, that is better than what he has in his normal duty station.

Admiral McRaven, Allen West may have touched on this a little bit, last October I was in Kunduz at a village stability operations area and we were working with local Afghan National Police—local Afghan Local Police, driven or led by a SOF—or an army A-team and the limitations you see and they had—they were augmented by non-SOF forces.

Limitations seemed to be that the A-team had to lead each of these areas. Have you looked at expanding the—in other words,

can we get to all of the villages that need to have this done, by the time the clock runs out, and are you looking at ways of moving some of that mission, maybe out of the direct A-team folks to a broader military—to make sure we get it all done in time?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, when we started the village stability program almost 2 years ago now and then, the Afghan Local Police program which is one of the security components of the village stability program, we mapped out each individual site that we were looking to grow to. General Petraeus came in and actually asked us to expand that, which we did.

So they have done some very, very detailed analyzes looking at where every ALP [Afghan Local Police]/VSO site ought to be. And we are moving along a very good azimuth to get to all those sites in time.

What we do, it takes really about 18 to 24 months from the time that an ODA [Operational Detachment Alpha], Special Forces ODA comes in to an area, gets together with the tribal leadership, gets the shura, gets the approval of the villagers, get the linkage to the MOI [Ministry of Interior], gets the Afghan Local Police funded and we are in a position where we are confident that then we can provide oversight.

So part of the plan is establishing the Afghan Local Police units and then when they are fully capable of standing on their own two feet, the Special Forces folks kind of move on to the next site but provide oversight and overwatch to that particular ALP site.

So as we grow from our current 11,000 up to approximately 30,000 folks, ALPs, that will be part of the scheme maneuver. So we will always have a Special Forces officer NCO [non-commissioned officer] or a special operations operator, a Navy SEAL or Marine Special Operations officer NCO, providing either direct support or overwatch with our Afghan commandos and Afghan special forces folks as well.

Mr. CONAWAY. Is the—and maybe speak a little bit to the post period when we are mostly gone. Are there plans in place to train the Afghans to do that overwatch and also expand that policy, as well as I guess, “police the police” on a going-forward basis once we are no longer there looking over their shoulder?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, the Afghan commandos and the Afghan special forces have been integral to everything we are doing on the ALP program. So the expectation is if we were to depart in 2014, then the Afghan commandos and the special forces will be able to take up that role and provide the oversight necessary for the ALP program.

Mr. CONAWAY. And you are confident that we have got enough capacity and time between now and 2014 to get to that 30,000?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, to get to that 30,000, yes, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Gentlemen, thank you all for your service. Appreciate it. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry. And good afternoon, gentlemen. I want to thank you for your important and dedicated service to our country. General Fraser, I have a couple of quick questions for you and it is good to see you again today.

As you are well aware of the President's initiative to increase our force presence in the Asia-Pacific region, can you share with the committee the strategic significance of Guam in your global en route infrastructure and how critical will it be for the future stability and the growth of this region?

General FRASER. Thank you very much and good to see you again too. The global look that we have taken is certainly something that is going to be important to us as we look forward to the future because we don't know where the next call will come, whether it is a humanitarian response or it is responding to a crisis of some other nature.

As we take a look at the Pacific and what we have out there, there is a number of things that I feel confident that we will be able to capitalize on and one is our commercial partners and the access that they have, be it through seaports or airfields and things of this nature which will enable us to support the large region in the Pacific.

Also, as we have discussed the other day, when I take a look at the importance of Hawaii, but also of Guam, it is going to be a vital link as we look forward in the Pacific and the ability to get access and to forward-deploy our forces there. So Guam is vital to us as a link in the Pacific.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. How does the budget support USTRANSCOM for their strategic imperatives such as increased focus on the Asia-Pacific region and investments in new technologies or infrastructure?

General FRASER. We are very well supported as we work through our transportation working capital fund, but also if I would refer back to our en route infrastructure plan that we have, we have a process by which we are able to evaluate the en route infrastructure and then balance that against both CONUS [Continental United States] and OCONUS [Outside the Continental United States] requirements.

We feed that into a process, not only through a global look, but also with our combatant commanders and with the Services to garner that support and we are very well serviced.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General. And I know I have time left but I am going to yield back. I did visit with the general yesterday. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORBERRY. Thank you. Mr. Gibson.

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say that I think organizing this hearing with the Central Command, the Special Operations Command, and Transportation Command has been productive. I think the written testimony, unfortunately I missed the opening remarks, but I read the written testimony and the dialog here, I think, today has been very informative.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service, for leadership. Admiral McRaven, let me just start by saying, I strongly support what you are doing. I think the initiatives that you are taking are making our country safer, talking particularly now about (?) and other matters that you have ongoing. And also want to commend the coordination that you are doing with the regional combatant commanders to bring this about and tell you that the

field trips that I have taken recently have really highlighted a burgeoning capability that I really am optimistic about going forward.

I did note that the interagency capacity and teamwork there is—it appeared to me largely through personalities and through informal arrangements. All the more commendable where we are today but concerning just from a systemic standpoint looking, I would hope at some point, towards codification or solidification somehow of some of the things that you are doing that I saw on field trips.

And so, as you know, Admiral, we asked for a study or the committee asked for a study. I am just curious to know, I want to get out in front of this. I know it may be part of other studies that you are doing but curious to know the timeline for completion of that study to share with the committee and if you had any remarks you wanted to make on this.

And, Mr. Chairman, of course, I know you are tracking. This is a study with asking the admiral for his thoughts on organization within the command. Thanks.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Thank you, Congressman. First, I will address the interagency issue. As you point out, we have tremendous relationships with the interagency across the board. And I think this really began to develop as a result of 9/11 and while we have always had special operations, always had an enduring relationship with the intelligence community and with law enforcement community, 9/11 really kind of solidified that and today we are probably at the peak of that.

I look around just for USSOCOM alone. I have got somewhere in the neighborhood of 300 interagency folks that are assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command from all of the agencies. And that partnership is crucial to us.

So regarding the study, as you point out, we are in the process of completing that and we will forward that when the time comes. I am—you know, again, I am very satisfied with USSOCOM and the current organizational structure writ large. However, as every new commander comes in, there are small tweaks on making inside the headquarters.

And as you point out, my long term intent is to be able to provide as a force provider, the finest forces I can to the geographic commanders and to the chiefs of mission as required. And with the support we have gotten in this year's budget, I think we are well poised to do that.

Mr. GIBSON. Very well. Thank you for that and I look forward to receiving the study.

General Fraser, as you pointed out earlier in some of your responses that the mobility study that we have is based on 2009. It certainly predates the current change in direction in our strategy. And having experienced firsthand the underresourcing of strategic lift for a mission and I am referring here for the earthquake response for Haiti in January of 2010, certainly a lot going on then, surging Afghanistan and get all that. But we are all products of our experience. And so I come with some trepidation when I see how we are preparing to move forward with regard to strategic lift.

And so I come at this with a question that says, have we modeled this and what are the plans in terms of simulations and exercises to validate the assumptions that were made for reduction in stra-

tegic lift. And in the planning that you have done, what assumptions were made in terms of leadtime. I mean, we have had over the last decade and even going back to when I was a young lad, I mean, 1990, we had leadtime and we were able to move, equipment and people and there is no guarantee that we would have that if we really needed it.

And of course we have provisions to civilian aircraft but that would depend on the situation on how permissive it would be to use that. So I am certainly interested to hear your response to these.

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman. The analytical rigor that went in to the mobility capabilities study is still valid and it is something that we have taken and then done some analysis from in order to support the further reduction of strategic airlift. And that is how we come to the conclusion that we do that we can support the Air Force and their position with the oversized outsized cargo lift capabilities of the C17 and also the C5.

With respect to Haiti, of course there were a lot of different things that created the challenges that we had with Haiti. You had a single runway there, and you didn't have a taxiway so you would max out the ability on the ground right away. You had a lot of international support. There was a lot of coordination necessary.

We couldn't get the port open right away, so there were a lot of other variables associated with it. So it was not just the strategic lift piece, because we did have capacity and we also had the ability to fly shorter-legged aircrafts such as C130s or other things to get capability in there to support that operation. The analytical rigor needs to be done again to take a look at what the requirements are as a result of a change in the strategy.

Mr. GIBSON. And are there plans for that in the coming year to model, simulate, exercise in some way so that we get a finer level of confidence?

General FRASER. Sir, we are always evaluating and we have an organization that does that.

Mr. GIBSON. Okay, thank you very much and thank you, gentlemen. I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral McRaven, the study to which Mr. Gibson referred was due March 1st. Do you have any idea when we might get that?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we will get it to you absolutely as soon as possible, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Mr. Runyan.

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and your service to our country.

All my questions are actually for General Fraser. Dealing a lot with the—with craft and our service there with obviously we had testimony in front of this committee from the Air Force, other members of the Air Force that stated that were really flying the blades, quote—"flying the blades off" the 47 referring to Chinooks.

And even our strategic airlift fleet has dramatically exceeded its program records. Since 2002, C17s exceeded their program by over 103,000 hours and C5s have exceeded theirs by 151,000 according to this committee's research.

Can you explain to the committee how Air Mobility Command can overfly these levels nominally for training purpose when craft carriers could have been cheaper, reduce the tremendous recapitalization costs that we will soon face and have enabled the American carriers to reinvest in more in fuel-efficient aircraft to support the Department.

General FRASER. Congressman, thank you very much. And first I would comment that I have not seen those hours that you specifically referenced there. I know that as a result of the surge and as a result of other no-notice requirements with respect to our strategic airlift, they did overfly the plan—the flying hour program.

I thought it was by about 6 percent and maybe by about 30 percent total overflying that—but that was due to other requirements. Other requirements such as the surge, such as the other things that they were asked to do.

Oversized, oversized cargo is not available in the craft. It is not a requirement. And so therefore, it is not available and it was necessary from an organic perspective in order to satisfy their requirements to overfly those programs, so it is not available in the craft.

We depend on the craft for cargo, as well as packs and we continue to do that and are very much appreciative of what they do. Example is how fast they are able to turn to give us expert capacity. When we were asked to bring the troops home from Iraq before the holiday period, they provided additional capacity to us and we were able to accomplish that mission ahead of schedule.

So I very much appreciate what our craft partners do for us. As we do look to the future, there are concerns as they see a downturn in the Government business, if you please, they are having to take a look at their business models, as they move to the future and shift more of the business to the commercial side by relying on the military to provide that income that they have been dependent upon here in the past. They have already started to see that with the downturn in Iraq.

Army is moving to 9-month deployments. So there will be lesser rotations as far as R&R [rest and recuperation] programs and things of this nature so there would be less business in that area which is just another example. But we are continuing to talk with the CEOs [Chief Executive Officers] and they are planning for the future.

I am encouraged and I do very much appreciate what the industry has done to modernize their fleet. About 80 percent is now modern aircraft; more fuel-efficient, can carry more, can go further and we are deeply appreciative of that because it is a savings to all of us.

Mr. RUNYAN. And I just wanted to point that out because I mean, obviously one of the biggest craft carriers, Global Aviation, has declared bankruptcy as we speak. And I want to point out to you also that the Air Force over the last 5 years has spent \$2.2 billion on strategic airlift on foreign noncraft carriers also.

So it is something where you take care of your own a lot of times. And I just wanted to make sure that you are aware of that and any actions you can do to help, you know, maximize the craft of our United States flagged aircraft would be greatly appreciated. So thank you.

General FRASER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RUNYAN. I yield back, Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Appreciate it. Admiral McRaven, I have got one last question for you. I noticed in the bios of the witnesses today that General Mattis had included the college from which he graduated. And even General Fraser is willing to admit that he is a graduate of Texas A&M. But I didn't see that on your bio. You are not embarrassed by your alma mater, are you, sir?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I am absolutely not. I am a proud graduate of University of Texas.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. I just recommend a little staff follow-up on some of that perhaps.

Admiral MCRAVEN. We will do.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you all seriously for being here, for your service to the country and for all of those who serve in your commands for their service. We appreciate it. And with that, the hearing stand is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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**A P P E N D I X**

MARCH 7, 2012

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MARCH 7, 2012

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**Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon**  
**Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services**  
**Hearing on**  
**Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget**  
**Requests from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special**  
**Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command**  
**March 7, 2012**

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from the Commanders of U.S. Central Command, General James Mattis; U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral William McRaven; and U.S. Transportation Command, General William Fraser. Thank you all for being with us today.

Much has changed since we last received testimony from your respective commands. We have withdrawn all forces from Iraq; continued to disrupt Al Qaeda and target its senior leadership around the world; the President has begun the withdrawal of the surge forces in Afghanistan; tensions with Iran continue to increase; and a new defense strategy has been released that demands increased power projection and a more globally balanced, agile, and persistent Special Operations Force.

Still, even more significant events are on the horizon. Reports in the press continue to speculate that the Administration may be prepared to announce an additional withdrawal of forces and a change to an advisory strategy for Afghanistan in advance of the NATO summit in Chicago in May. I see little “strategy” in such a plan, if it exists; but rather a political calculus that will ultimately protract the war in Afghanistan, increase casualties, and further erode confidence among our allies and credibility among our adversaries.

Meanwhile, Iran is showing little willingness to curtail its nuclear program, in spite of the tightening brace of economic sanctions imposed at the insistence of Congress. Although the Supreme Leader may not yet have made the decision to build a nuclear weapon, time is running out for Iran to responsibly join the international community. I agree with the recent recommendations of the Bipartisan Policy Center task force on Iran, led by former Senator Charles Robb and retired General Charles Wald, including their warning that the United States must immediately shift to a “triple-track strategy: diplomacy, sanctions, and visible, credible preparations for a military option of last resort.” But let me be clear—this isn’t “casual” talk of war. A nuclear Iran is a serious problem that the Commander in Chief should be discussing with

the American people and our allies every day. And it must be confronted with all elements of national power, not simply an outstretched hand.

As for Special Operations Command, I alluded to the changes envisioned by the new defense strategy. SOCOM is truly being asked to do more, with less. The Command's budget was modestly reduced, but it is expected to continue its 5% growth rate for the next 3 years. Furthermore, all signs point to a heavy demand signal for our Special Operations Forces in U.S. Central Command where more than 80% of all deployed Special Operations Forces are right now.

In Afghanistan alone, Special Operations Forces will continue to be stretched dangerously thin as conventional and enabling forces draw down. Although only 8% of the total force in Afghanistan, Special Operations Forces are increasingly leaned on—at the local level through the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs (VSO/ALP), and at the national level with ongoing counterterrorism and direct action missions in conjunction with our Afghan partners. And now, with the potential to have a new three-star SOF General or Flag Officer at ISAF command levels, I am increasingly concerned that our Special Operations Forces may be forced into an overburdened role if our conventional forces withdraw too fast and without a sound transition to the Afghan National Security Forces.

Finally, we speculated last year what might happen should Pakistan close supply routes to Afghanistan, and now we know. TRANSCOM has been doing incredible work to make sure that our troops in Afghanistan continue to get what they need in spite of the current downturn in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Looking forward, TRANSCOM will be challenged to provide the lift and prepositioned stocks necessary to fulfill the vision laid out in the new defense strategy. It seems to me that an increasing emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and an increasingly maritime theater in the Middle East, will demand more lift, refueling, and prepositioned assets—not less. Yet the President's budget request reduces our capacity in each of these areas. This topic warrants further oversight by this committee and I look forward to your testimony on these matters and more.

**Statement of Hon. Adam Smith**  
**Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services**  
**Hearing on**  
**Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget**  
**Requests from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special**  
**Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command**  
**March 7, 2012**

I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, and General Fraser. We appreciate your time and look forward to hearing your thoughts on the budget requests for your respective commands.

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, while maintaining our focus on the Middle East and other emerging threats.

With the drawdown in Iraq and the ongoing transition to Afghan lead for security in Afghanistan, our presence in Central Command will be changing. While we being the process of ending involvement in ground combat in Afghanistan over the next several years, new challenges will emerge and old challenges continue to intensify. Iran's nuclear program, the Arab Spring in Egypt, the recent conflict and strife in Bahrain, the civil war in Syria, ongoing terrorism in Iraq and other places, and the problems of Yemen, to name a few, all present significant challenges to the United States and our allies. I look forward to hearing from General Mattis how his command is postured to respond to those challenges and how he sees that posture evolving over the next several years.

It is appropriate that United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has fared well in the President's proposed budget. We have relied heavily upon them in the years since September 11th, 2001, and we will continue to do so in the future. It is critical, therefore, that our special operations forces are fully resourced. Part of that task is to provide some respite to a force—and their families—that has operated at an incredible pace for so long. To that end, their ranks are scheduled to grow slightly over the next few years and that will help. Nevertheless, we can expect them to play an even larger role in Afghanistan as we withdraw our conventional troops, and we will reorient many of them to complement the President's new strategy as we shift attention to the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, in the effort to face a growing global counterterrorism challenge, we must not overlook the critical role they play in countering weapons of mass destruction.

With the closure of the five major ground routes through Pakistan for moving equipment into and out of Afghanistan, United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) will continue to face major challenges toward ensuring the safe, efficient, and affordable transport of critical warfighting materiel and supplies. I

will be interested to hear how TRANSCOM is managing these challenges and what efforts are being made to further develop the Northern Distribution Network through central Asia. Of course, all this is occurring at the same time the Air Force is reducing its airlift fleet, both for strategic and tactical airlift, so it is important that we understand the implications of these reductions, both on the ability to respond to worldwide events and to meet homeland Title 32 mission requirements. On the strategic side, we know that capacity exists in the private sector through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, or CRAF, and I would be interested to hear how effectively TRANSCOM is using those assets.

Again, thank you all for your time and I look forward to hearing your testimony.

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STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

COMMANDER

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

7 MAR 2012

**I. Introduction**

In over 30 years of supporting U.S. forces in the Central Command area of responsibility (AOR), I have never witnessed it so tumultuous. Change is the only constant and surprise continues to be the dominant force in the region. Across the AOR at large, both opportunities and challenges exist. The USCENTCOM AOR encompasses the world's largest energy reserves, yet also some of the most crucial and vulnerable chokepoints. It is home to a rich array of cultures, religions and confessions; but also tainted by radicals, violent extremists, malign networks and state-sponsored agents and unconventional proxies who seek to violently exploit those differences. These problems are coupled with systemic challenges of poor governance, a large youth demographic bulge and insufficient economic opportunity, and the social construct between governments and their people breaking down in numerous places.

USCENTCOM is postured to address these challenges, while working closely with the Department of State and other agencies to promote peace and stability. The USCENTCOM AOR remains of great strategic importance to other world powers and is vital to many of America's most enduring national interests. The historic transformation underway throughout the region requires extensive U.S. engagement. We must see this Awakening for what it is, not for what we wish it to be: the Awakening reflects a breakdown in the social contract; it may or may not embrace democracy as a result of the understandable unrest.

The defense of our interests in the AOR comes at a grim cost. Over ten years of war in this theater have cost us precious casualties, including more than 612 killed and 8,251 wounded since I took command in August of 2010. At the same time, it has also brought out the best of our all-

volunteer force and produced a generation of elite leaders as your troops proved themselves the equals of previous generations of combat veterans who answered their country's call.

## **II. Strategic Landscape**

### **Arab Awakening**

While the Arab Awakening will manifest differently in each country, it is important that we see what is happening in its true context: while we may hope and support efforts for more democratic governments, its origins lie in the breakdown of that social contract between governments and their people. Unjust or unresponsive regimes have fallen or are in the throes of falling as is the case in Syria. Of all the uncertainties associated with this ongoing movement, one thing is certain – the region is never going back to what it was. The Arab Awakening continues to impact countries across the region and the world with an uncertain future and redefined political landscape. Popular calls for more responsive government continue to move at different paces and it is too early to discern its final stage. Our ability to respond demands unprecedented flexibility and balancing of national interests.

Though coalition efforts succeeded in supporting the rise of a new Libya, Syria is unraveling in disarray. Additionally, working closely with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the U.S. contributed to the ongoing transition of power in Yemen; however, violence continues to plague that country, some of it fomented by Iran and much of it fomented by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). While transformation is underway across the region as a result of the Arab Awakening, malign efforts by other regional actors – particularly Iran – to influence the ultimate outcome represent perhaps the greatest immediate and long-term threat to regional stability. As

Egypt continues its transition to a fully-functioning democracy, our bilateral relationship is likely to face challenges along the way, as evidenced by the tension that has resulted from the NGO raids and their aftermath. We must adapt our military approach and stay steadfast to our values as we remain engaged in the region. We will be pragmatic, principled and proactive. We must be prepared for all contingencies in case of crisis, but there is reason for optimism despite some pessimistic forecasts.

#### **Middle East Peace**

It should come as no surprise that the lack of a sustainable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a preeminent flame that keeps the pot boiling in the Middle East, particularly as the Arab Awakening causes Arab governments to be more responsive to the sentiments of their populations. The inability to resolve tensions between the state of Israel and the Palestinians imposes a heavy cost on our activities in the AOR, and is raised in almost every meeting I have with key leaders in the region, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula and Levant. A peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians would facilitate more public, robust support by regional partners for U.S. initiatives, bolster regional collaboration and remove fertile ground for extremism and resentment to flourish. We owe it to the next generation to do everything possible to solve this vexing issue that gives so much fuel to extremist ideology.

#### **Non-State Threats in Under-governed Areas**

Our terrorist adversaries are networked and globalized, not bounded by geography, rules or specific organizational or hierarchical lines. They operate in the shadows of under-governed spaces and safe havens, and remain ever determined to harm us, our allies and innocent civilians

around the world. The successful targeting of Al Qaeda leadership has weakened the organization from a morale perspective as well as a command and control standpoint. Yet there is a resiliency as the threat morphs and other franchises arise that must be met by more than military power alone. We must focus on undercutting ideological extremism in order to reduce its attractiveness to disappointed peoples.

Although we have achieved substantial success against the terrorist threats we face in the AOR, the global threat is not stabilized, and is in fact evolving. Years of activity have allowed Al Qaeda to syndicate relationships with other violent extremist organizations as, for example, we have just witnessed with respect to Al-Shabaab. There are strong indications of resilient and possibly stronger Al Qaeda elements emerging in locations outside of Iraq and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Iraq, too, will be challenged to hold Al Qaeda at bay. These same organizations also seek to exploit the turmoil and foment regional tensions amidst the Arab Awakening. We must remain vigilant as Al Qaeda attempts to reconstitute and consolidate in areas more hospitable to their pernicious activities. In short, this fight is not over.

At the same time, Iran poses the single greatest threat to U.S. interests and to our friends and stability in the region, and poses a global threat through its world-wide proxy network as recent attacks have demonstrated.

#### **Naval Presence**

With the withdrawal of our last troop units from Iraq, excluding our men and women in the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, and as we continue to draw down in Afghanistan and

transition operational lead to the Afghanistan National Security Forces, our ground-based troop presence across the region is decreasing. However, as the President has stated, “our strong presence in the Middle East endures... and the United States will never waver in defense of our allies, our partners, or our interests.” The question then becomes, how do we maintain our presence with a light footprint?

To accomplish this, the USCENTCOM AOR will assume an increasingly maritime character with special operations forces (SOF) and strong air enablers. Naval forces – with embarked troops – provide presence and a cost efficient means of rapidly projecting power in a crisis to execute contingency operations. Sustained naval presence and response forces provide a lighter “footprint” on the ground, and are vital for reassuring our partners, deterring those with malign intent and tempering destructive actors from fermenting trouble in our region.

The maritime environment also permits freedom of action unfettered by international boundaries and agreements. However, the stacked Iranian threats in our AOR of ballistic missiles, long range rockets, mines, small boats, cruise missiles and submarines demand stronger naval presence and capability to protect vital sea lines of communication. I view with concern efforts to decrease our naval presence and capability when our volatile AOR and the threats of the future are increasingly maritime. Demands on our naval forces will only grow in the future; I anticipate that we will need more maritime missile defense, anti-fast attack craft capabilities, amphibious ships and mine-countermeasure capability, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Maintaining a credible naval force covered by sufficient aviation combat power is essential for demonstrating our enduring commitment to regional partners, building trust and

relationships and rapid projection of power in a crisis. We are working to address our near-term capabilities and I am grateful for the Committee's strong support.

**Fiscal Realities**

We are entering a period of increased national fiscal austerity. This reality may force us to do less in the region; however, we will not do it less well and the quality of our performance will remain the best in the world. Our strategy starts with what we determine the Armed Forces must be capable of doing, bounded by a clear articulation of the objectives – or “ends” – we seek to achieve in the region. Our approach and posture are predicated upon several national-level documents, chief among them the National Security Strategy and the newly published Defense Strategic Guidance. We seek to match our regional ends with our methods – or “ways” – and our resources – or “means” – and determine how to mitigate risk. Key to our success is making grounded projections into the future rooted in hard-learned lessons from our current conflicts and which provide an operational shock absorber when the inevitable surprises present themselves – and to do so while ensuring we are responsible stewards of every dollar allocated.

Specific to USCENTCOM and its components, we operate austerely according to our needs, not our wants. We prioritize our efforts to leverage the expertise and capabilities of others. My headquarters structure is expected to decrease 30% over the next five years. We are rigorously reviewing every contract and we intend to increase our effectiveness while we excel in meeting efficiency goals. General Allen and his team are doing detailed, commendatory work in scrubbing requirements to pursue an Afghan-right approach and provide cost-savings back to the

Department as demonstrated by the return of \$1.6 billion in the FY12 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund request last fall.

While new Strategic guidance prioritizes the Pacific region, we remain committed to our strategic interests in the Middle East. We will stand by our friends and partners in the region and that is not going to change. Our military approach will necessarily evolve and adapt and our partners will become even more important as we work to ensure regional security and stability. Our efforts in the Middle East reflect a multilateral coalition-building approach with traditional allies in the region and we fight alongside the largest wartime coalition in recent history in Afghanistan. We have forged key partnerships throughout the Gulf region both bilaterally and through the GCC. These efforts promote cost-sharing, and in fact, directly contribute to U.S. economic interests through security assistance purchases.

As we work to maintain the cohesion of the coalition and our momentum in security operations in Afghanistan, it will be necessary to include those critical and unwavering partners who stand by us but who would not be able to participate without some training, sustainment and reimbursement support from the U.S. These efforts would not be possible without the resources and funding you provide. To that end, your support for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program and Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund provides key tools we need to build capacity for a successful transition. I also appreciate your attention to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and reintegration authority – key, flexible tools in accomplishing this part of our mission.

**IV. Strategic Priorities, Vision and Approach**

The 2011 National Security Strategy identifies four broad, enduring American interests as:

- *The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners*
- *A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity*
- *Respect for universal values at home and around the world*
- *An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.*

Our overarching goal is to support U.S. objectives through peaceful means and to prevent conflict. However, in the case of impending conflict, my job is to provide the President feasible military options. Throughout history, not being militarily prepared for operations and contingencies has never proven a reliable path to keep the peace. Therefore, we are and will remain prepared to respond to crises, deter and prevent war and ensure military readiness and flexibility. USCENTCOM's vision for the AOR is *a region where improved security leads to greater stability and where regional cooperation helps to isolate and counter those who would use violence in pursuit of their goals.*

USCENTCOM's strategic approach is to build and maintain a robust and flexible force posture that promotes regional stability through relationships with key allies and partners. We will accomplish this by consistently conducting military-to-military engagements – which builds trust – and by promoting security cooperation with partners, while retaining the right to self-defense and force protection. Additionally, events do not occur according to the neat lines and areas of responsibility we draw on the map of the world. Security challenges posed by piracy, violent

extremist organizations and criminal elements based in the Horn of Africa impact operations in the USCENTCOM AOR. Broadly, the challenges in our AOR are not isolated, and most solutions require extensive collaboration with our allies within and beyond USCENTCOM's boundaries. In the future, it will become increasingly important to invest in building relationships and the capacity and capability of our partners to respond to emerging challenges.

The United States has the power to both inspire and intimidate. Going forward, we will emphasize the power to inspire. A major component of inspiring is building relationships through a diplomatic approach. Strengthening our relationships with allies, forging greater collaboration with international partners and ensuring effective coordination within our own government will continue to hallmark our approach. Exceptional U.S. civil-military partnerships among USG interagency actors like those forged these last ten years are the gold standard that must be sustained in all our endeavors. In that regard, I applaud Secretary Clinton's QDDR initiative, which is strengthening in unprecedented ways interagency collaboration to achieve USG objectives.

USCENTCOM military efforts will continue to firmly nest with and buttress diplomatic efforts. A good start point is four principles of our foreign policy in the Middle East. *Support for peaceful democratic change; at their own pace:* for every nation must ultimately incorporate the will of their people that we are watching unfold across the region with the Arab Awakening. *Support for economic modernization to bring the benefits of economic progress to the wider population:* so more people have a sense of hope and ownership. *Renewed pursuit of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace to achieve a two-state solution:* because the status quo is not

sustainable. As Harvard professor C.H. McIlwain said in 1937, “the preservation of the status quo is a solution that can satisfy none but the contented and just now most men are not contented”. *Our own enduring stake in regional security and territorial integrity: to check mischief of malign actors and reduce terrorist threat to all nations.*

Using these four principles as our guideposts, USCENTCOM will work toward five broad strategic objectives in the AOR. *We will promote common interests in order to enhance stability and security as we defeat violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that threaten the U.S. homeland, our overseas interests, or U.S. allies. Importantly, we will counter the proliferation, acquisition, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We will support Department of State’s broader diplomatic objectives by assisting in setting the conditions that will enable representative government and prosperity. Lastly, we will prepare U.S. and partner forces to respond to emerging challenges.*

Through persistent military engagement, USCENTCOM will maintain a presence in the region to protect vital interests, prevent future conflict, ensure access in the event of a crisis and invest in future regional security. Acknowledging each country's unique circumstances, we will advance our strategic objectives through a tailored approach by seeking a nexus of common interests and identifying common ground with partners that puts us on a trajectory for shared, long-term benefit. Trust and harmony of effort among partners are what counts when the inevitable crises strike: Our fundamental premise is every country has something to contribute through strong regional relationships to strengthen our collaborative efforts. Numerous nations in the region trust us – making our presence and pursuit in building enduring military relationships all the more paramount.

Military-to-military engagements serve as vital connective tissue in our relationships with partners and allies as the U.S. seeks to respond effectively to the Arab Awakening, while continuing to pursue regional stability and security. USCENTCOM seeks to build partner capacity and competencies – developed through training, professional military education, foreign military sales, bilateral and multi-lateral agreements and exercises. Building partner capacity is the long-term solution to reduce costs on the U.S. and to defend our interests in a fiscally constrained environment. The result is competent partners – technically and tactically capable of taking lead on issues of mutual interest – having as much at stake as we do. Years of nurturing our military-to-military relationship with Jordan and United Arab Emirates contributed to the mutual trust and interoperability necessary for their support of Libyan operations. The Egyptian military, while not perfect in its leading of the transition, has performed more responsibly than anyone would have presumed. Without years of assistance and partnership with the U.S., this would not have been the case. When you compare the Egyptian military’s actions with the events continuing to unfold in Syria as the Syrian military continues to ruthlessly use lethal force with impunity against the Syrian people – the value of properly constructed, ethical military-to-military engagement is clear.

#### **V. Review of the AOR**

The primary threats to these interests from those with hostile intent are: state-based aggression; non-state actors / violent extremist organizations (VEOs); weapons of mass destruction; and some combination thereof. Each of these threats is in play across this dynamic AOR.

There is only one state in our AOR actively seeking to destabilize the region and actively fomenting violence – **Iran**. The combination of Iran’s potential nuclear weapons aspirations, defiance of international obligations and norms, employment of proxies to attack others around the world to include U.S. forces, and regional hegemonic goals make Iran the single greatest threat to regional stability – and to the security of the United States – in the Central region. Iran and its surrogates foment much of the malign activity across the AOR. From active attempts to exploit the Arab Awakening, to working to undermine and subordinate the democracy in Iraq, to supporting the Asad regime in Syria, to heightening Shiite-Sunni tensions, to active support for Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran’s activities are motivated by its hegemonic ambitions, despite its growing regional and international isolation. An Iranian decision to develop nuclear weapons will have a destabilizing effect on the region and could motivate its neighbors to proceed with their own nuclear development programs. Iran’s well-established pattern of deceit and reckless behavior has progressively increased the potential for miscalculation, and is the primary catalyst pushing the region toward an arms race or armed conflict.

While the fight against violent extremism continues in **Afghanistan**, military progress is undeniable. The ISAF Campaign Plan is succeeding; even while progress and violence coexist. While significant risks remain and development of the Government of Afghanistan’s economic and governance capacity is a persistent challenge, we continue the effort to neutralize the enemy in Afghanistan while transferring the lead for security to Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) which has made great strides in growth, quality and effectiveness. The Afghans are proving themselves on the battlefield and I am optimistic that the 2014 date, established in Lisbon by NATO, is achievable for the Afghans to in the lead across the entire country.

The insurgency is less capable, physically and psychologically, than in previous years. The ISAF Coalition has broadly arrested insurgent momentum – limiting insurgent freedom of movement, killing or capturing leaders and fighters, and in many areas effectively separating the insurgents from the population. The enemy’s reliance on high-profile attacks and assassinations of Afghan senior leaders illustrates our enemy’s limited military options against ISAF and the ANSF, and diminished capacity to influence events on the ground. Violence is down in Helmand and Kandahar and enemy efforts to sustain attacks in Kabul have failed. Yet, the insurgency remains both resilient and capable, so we must remain vigilant and resolved as our gains are reversible.

Execution of the major elements of this complex campaign – transition, surge recovery, ANSF growth, evolution to security force assistance (SFA), reconciliation and establishing an enduring force – must be comprehensive, maintain hard-fought momentum, and preserve coalition unity. I appreciate your continued support of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and reintegration authority, which are key to building on our successes. General Allen and his team, in partnership with the Department of State and GIRoA, are carefully examining plans to train, equip and sustain the ANSF and have revised our approach to be appropriate to the situation. Additionally, as U.S. drawdown proceeds, preservation of enablers in terms of logistics, medical evacuation, communications and air support (among others), will be essential for our partners, many of whom have expressed concern over potential loss of these capabilities. As these major efforts proceed, increasingly integrating Coalition and partner-nation plans and insights will be critical to maintaining Coalition support in the lead up to the NATO summit in Chicago in May and

through 2014. This, the largest coalition in recent military history, validates the common interest of our international and regional partners, and we must sustain our “in together out together” approach in our mutually supporting efforts. Continued support of the Coalition Support authorities, to include lift and sustainment, will enable key partners to maintain their active engagement in support of security transition and in training and advising the Afghans to build on the momentum in establishing independent operations.

In **Pakistan**, the threats we face come together in a potentially dangerous nexus. The unstable environment in Pakistan is exacerbated by terrorist attacks and tenuous government control in parts of the country, economic distress, radicalization of segments of the population, a military over-stretched, strained relations with India, repeat natural disasters and more. The United States has a vested interest in Pakistan and, despite challenges to the bilateral U.S.-Pakistan relationship, Pakistan remains a regional partner and must play a constructive role if Afghanistan is to achieve long-term security.

Although 2011's challenges were numerous – from fall-out over Wiki-leaks and the Ray Davis incident to significant tensions following the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, Haqqani Network attacks on our Embassy in Kabul, and the tragic Salala incident in which 24 Pakistani troops were killed in a cross-border friendly-fire incident – our focus must remain on shared strategic interests. A candid, constructive military-to-military partnership can help establish common ground from which to act against our common enemy. As you know, Pakistani intelligence support has been critical to neutralization efforts against Al Qaeda senior leadership even while some aspects of its security policy appear self-defeating. Cross-border coordination is improving

between ISAF and Pakistan's military. Continued support for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and the Coalition Support Fund for Pakistan provides the tools to enable this military-to-military partnership and pursue what are truly shared interests.

Our successful military drawdown from **Iraq** puts the need to develop a new strategic relationship with the Iraqi government at the forefront of our regional policy. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) has been established and testifies to our respect for Iraqi sovereignty. Our relationship going forward will be based on mutual respect between two sovereign nations. USCENTCOM will work to expand security cooperation activities and deepen our military-to-military ties with Iraq while helping to expand its military engagement with key regional partners. Simultaneously, we remain clear-eyed, recognizing Iran's access to and efforts to subordinate Iraq and work to counter that malign influence. OSC-I – working under Chief of Mission authority and with the full support of USCENTCOM – is the lead proponent for executing the military component of our intent. Thank you for your fast action in support of our special authority for OSC-I and for your continued patience as we work through a successful transition. The danger from Al Qaeda in Iraq is still serious and it remains capable of spectacular attacks against the people and the government there even as it takes advantage next door in Syria to mount attacks there.

We witnessed last year the benefit of mature military-to-military relationships as the Arab Awakening unfolded in **Egypt** unlike how it's unfolding in Syria. Although there have been challenges – including the ongoing NGO issue – the Egyptian military continues to facilitate the

transition to democracy and civilian rule. As Egypt makes progress in its democratic transition, USCENTCOM will remain committed to our long-standing relationship with the Egyptian military. Field Marshal Tantawi is enabling the democratic process to unfold, presidential elections are upcoming, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will transition to a freely-elected, civilian government by the end of June. Transition periods are difficult, but this situation presents unique opportunities to reaffirm and enhance U.S. relations with the Egyptian military and emergent civilian government via sustained diplomatic and military-to-military engagements. In a democratic system, everyone is free to share their views, and those views may not always be compatible with our own. But I believe the prospects for a continued close and positive relationship with Egypt – even if it is more complicated than it has been in the past – are better because of the long standing ties between our two nations.

**Jordan** remains one of our staunchest regional allies, ready to stand by us when we need them and one that has deployed side by side with U.S. forces. Jordan has shared interests with the U.S. – and other responsible Middle East nations – in regional stability and reform. We remain grateful for King Abdullah’s leadership in hosting direct discussions between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) leadership is committed to its partnership with the U.S. and understands that in order to stay relevant, they must adapt their forces. To that end, they are conducting a Strategic Defense Review aimed at transforming the military to a lighter, more adaptable force capable of operating against today’s threats.

As the sole multi-confessional institution providing stability in **Lebanon**, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is the principal governmental organization viewed with respect by Lebanese from

across their society. We support the LAF through a variety of programs as they perform a balancing role in maintaining peace and addressing Lebanon's territorial integrity. Over the years, our efforts with the LAF have been crucial in building the capability and capacity to serve as a counterbalance to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH). In that sense, these programs have served security in the country and region, and warrant our continued support. Our shared goal is to offset the influence of LH and malign Iranian influence – which are very strong.

Events in **Syria** will have strategic repercussions throughout the region. The Syrian regime has a substantial chemical-biological weapons (CBW) capability, a significant integrated air defense system, thousands of shoulder-launched anti-air missiles and a wholly unsustainable political hierarchy. The tumultuous security situation continues to deteriorate as the Assad regime escalates the level of lethal force employed upon its own people. As a result, the regime is battling for its survival against a popular uprising, raising the prospect of a civil war. The bravery of the Syrian people is laudable but the options available to address the situation are extremely challenging.

We continue to see growing signs of **Gulf Cooperation Council** unity and cohesion, and a growing appetite for U.S.–GCC multilateral exercises, air, sea and land. The Gulf states have demonstrated a strengthened willingness to work with one another, and with international partners, to counter malign influence in the region. Our State Department is working with the GCC to formalize our security policy coordination among and with GCC member states. GCC member states are stalwart partners and we continue our close collaboration with them, both bi-laterally and multi-laterally.

The **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** has been a valued partner in operations in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan and Libya and we continue to deepen our military relationship. The Emirates recently completed their very successful participation on Operation Unified Protector in Libya and continue their support to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In an effort to strengthen its air and missile defense capability, the UAE recently signed a Foreign Military Sales case for their purchase of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, valued at approximately \$3.5 Billion. The UAE was the first foreign government to purchase this system. The UAE's many contributions today and close military ties over many years marks this partner among our strongest friends.

The deep U.S. – **Bahrain** security relationship is the cornerstone for our collective security in the Gulf region. Home to our sole main operating base in the Mid-East, Bahrain provides key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. Navy's 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet and providing facilities for other U.S. forces engaged in regional security. Bahrain faces a challenge balancing the demands for greater political participation by its citizens and the maintenance of security and stability as it continues needed political reform. In this regard, the small island nation is a microcosm of the tensions sweeping through the region. After the unrest a year ago, the government invited in a group of internationally respected human rights and legal experts to lead the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The government gave full support to its investigation. The BICI findings and recommendations were received by the King on live television and the government's positive response to the recommendations is encouraging. While implementing the recommendations is not an easy task, the Government of Bahrain has taken encouraging

steps on reform, and it is important we support the efforts they've undertaken to date. Dialogue between the government and opposition groups is essential. One of the greatest bulwarks against Iranian influence is a strong and stable Bahrain that is inclusive and respects the rights of all its people. Bahrain is an important partner, and has been a reliable friend through good times and bad. It is showing now, by learning from its mistakes, that it is equally committed to this important relationship.

**Qatar** hosts significant U.S. military capabilities and has taken an increasing role in pursuit of regional stability, supporting operations in Libya with both military and humanitarian aid. Qatar will continue to pursue an assertive and independent foreign policy and is playing an important role in an effort to stop Syrian brutality, including through an Arab League resolution suspending Syria's membership. Qatar has also placed wide-ranging sanctions on Syria in response to the Assad regime's violence against its own citizens.

**Oman** is strategically located along the Strait of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean and has played a steady role and voice of moderation in the region for many years. Internally the Sultan remains admired and he addressed demonstrators' concerns in early 2011 in positive ways. We have shared appreciation of the situation in the Gulf and Oman provides valued military advice for maintaining stability.

**Kuwait** remains a steadfast friend of the U.S. and has been indispensable in facilitating U.S. troop and equipment flow in and out of the AOR. Kuwait's foreign policy will continue to be grounded in its long-standing strategic alliance with the U.S. We maintain a robust security

cooperation program with the Kuwaitis and their support for U.S. forces is essential for maintaining collective regional security.

For decades, security cooperation has been a cornerstone of our relationship with the **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**. As we face ever more sophisticated regional challenges in the Middle East, upgrading Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities sustains our strong military-to-military relations, continues operational interoperability, and helps the Kingdom prepare to meet regional threats. In difficult times, the Kingdom has demonstrated its willingness and capability to use its military capabilities to fight as part of a coalition against regional hegemony. Modernizing the Saudi military and allowing the Kingdom more prompt access to equipment deters hostile actors and ensures the security and stability of the Kingdom coupled with our long-standing military ties.

Following the signing of a GCC-backed plan under which President Saleh handed over his executive powers to the Vice President, a national unity government was formed and a presidential election took place on February 21, 2012. **Yemen** has a new leader after over three decades of rule by President Saleh. Following an extended period of internal strife, Yemen is poised for effective political transition. The GCC plans also provided for the creation of a Military/Security Committee which has played a key role in de-escalating the security situation and will be instrumental in reorganizing the military and security structure in Yemen. The new Yemeni government will need assistance in order to reorganize its military under civilian control and build capacity to deal with critical national security threats. We are supporting military professionalization and look to continue our relationship in the fight against Al Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in accordance with our national policy. We expect increased Iranian malfeasance in an attempt to undercut Yemen's efforts to create a peaceful path to the future.

The **Central Asian States** are key to our Afghanistan campaign because the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is a critical part of ISAF's resupply and retrograde efforts. Over the past two years, the expansion of the NDN for transportation to and from Afghanistan has been one of the most significant areas of cooperation with our Central Asian partners. Central Asia shares similar threats from the Afghan border regions and CENTCOM military assistance focuses on building the capacity to fight against violent extremists. We are committed to preventing violent extremist organizations from using Central Asia as a base for terrorist operations and strengthening relationships based on shared understanding of the terrorist, criminal and narco-trafficking threats. Military assistance is focused on building counterterrorism capacity.

Our relationship with **Kazakhstan** continues to mature. We have recently signed new agreements for five years of defense cooperation and Kazakhstan continues to contribute to the Afghanistan mission. In 2012, Kazakhstan desires to expand the number of nations participating in Exercise Steppe Eagle, a peacekeeping exercise co-sponsored by Kazakhstan and the U.S.

**Kyrgyzstan** continues to be a key partner for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the region. The peaceful transition of power to President Atambayev demonstrated the Kyrgyz Republic's effort to sustain democratic reforms. Our military relationship continues to improve, particularly in the

areas of regional security and military security cooperation. Additionally, the Kyrgyz Republic aims to deploy a U.S.-trained peacekeeping mission within the next two years.

For **Tajikistan** building and maintaining counterterrorism, border security and counternarcotics capability to protect our mutual interests from the threat of violent extremist organizations are paramount to regional stability. In concert with our counterterrorism efforts, we are working with Tajikistan to improve disaster response. Tajikistan is committed to deploying their U.S.-trained peacekeeping battalion on a United Nations peacekeeping mission in 2012. We continue to explore options to facilitate the transit of goods and services in support of ISAF with this important partner.

Our security cooperation with **Turkmenistan** continues to develop along lines consistent with our mutual objectives of countering violent extremists and improving border security to counter narcotics trafficking.

Our relationship with **Uzbekistan** continues to improve in a deliberate, balanced way driven by regional security considerations, expansion of the Northern Distribution Network and mutual benefit. Security cooperation serves to provide increased U.S. access and influence in cultivating engagement for humanitarian and democratization efforts. We recently signed new agreements providing important new capabilities in support of Afghanistan and expect cooperation to

continue to progress in a methodical step-by-step manner that addresses security threats of our mutual concern.

#### **VI. Critical Needs and Concerns**

The improvised explosive device (IED) remains one of the greatest threats to our men and women serving in harm's way. The ubiquitous nature of the IED threat networks, operating in an environment characterized by the easy flow of dual use components through legitimate businesses with access to readily available explosive materials, presents an ominous threat to our nation's security interests at home and abroad well beyond the end of mission in Afghanistan.

An effective counter- IED (C-IED) effort requires specific and focused capabilities to address both the threat networks and their devices. It is critical that DoD maintain an ability to continually identify likely capability gaps and focus our supporting communities of interest to develop viable solutions. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) has been instrumental in coordinating the research and development (R&D) community to provide material solutions, rapidly harnessing the latest technologies and concepts in order to field effective and timely C-IED requirements to the warfighter. The synchronization of JIEDDO's three lines of operation-- Attack the Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force--builds on the experience amassed over the past decade enabling the Combatant Commanders a capability to defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence. Expanding the community of practice to academia and industry in focused pursuit of pre-detonation detection measures is the next step in this important effort.

ISR capabilities remain vital to our ability to operate in denied areas and support multi-intelligence collection across all domains. We must sustain our capabilities and continue enhancements that keep us ahead of threats while supporting all plans and operations. In addition to communications and hardware assets we rely upon, the imbedded intelligence community personnel and liaisons at USCENTCOM provides continuous expert support to the Command and all deployed elements. Sustaining this effort is critical to USCENTCOM's ability to stay abreast of regional dynamics and the changing threats.

Information operations provide USCENTCOM a key non-lethal, traditional military tool to counter all threats and "win" in the strategic messaging campaign. As an example, we conduct Regional Web Interaction Program (RWIP) activities online to degrade violent extremist organizations' recruiting and fund raising. RWIP activities are coordinated with a number of USG Departments and Agencies, focus solely on undermining extra-governmental violent extremist organizations that pose a potentially lethal threat in our region, and do not address the American public nor are they a Public Diplomacy tool to increase popular support for any U.S. policy.

## **VII. Conclusion**

I appreciate your support for USCENTCOM as you fulfill your role as the responsible overseers of the American people's tax dollars. To that end, I would like to extend my personal gratitude for your continued support to our men and women in uniform. We intend to earn your respect by

being the best possible stewards of resources allocated in this challenging time: we will continue to challenge assumptions with cost-saving measures in mind.

## **General James N. Mattis, Commander**

Gen. James N. Mattis serves as commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), located in Tampa, FL.

Gen. Mattis has commanded at multiple levels. As a lieutenant, he served as a rifle and weapons platoon commander in the 3rd Marine Division. As a captain, he commanded a rifle company and a weapons company in the 1st Marine Brigade.

As a major, he commanded Recruiting Station Portland. As a lieutenant colonel, he commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, one of Task Force Ripper's assault battalions in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As a colonel, he commanded 7th Marines (Reinforced).

Upon becoming a brigadier general, he commanded first the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade and then Task Force 58, during Operation Enduring Freedom in southern Afghanistan. As a major general, he commanded the 1st Marine Division during the initial attack and subsequent stability operations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In his first tour as a lieutenant general, he commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and served as the deputy commandant for combat development. He also commanded the I Marine Expeditionary Force and served as the commander of U.S. Marine Forces Central Command. Previous to this assignment, he served as both NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation from 2007-2009 and as commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command from 2007-2010.

Gen. Mattis, a native of the Pacific Northwest, graduated from Central Washington State University in 1972. He is also a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the National War College.



POSTURE STATEMENT OF  
ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  
BEFORE THE 112<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
MARCH 7, 2012

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to address the Committee in my first posture statement as the 9<sup>th</sup> commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). As always, we deeply appreciate your continued commitment and support of United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) around the world.

In response to a rapidly evolving strategic landscape and an increasingly constrained fiscal environment our leadership has recently issued new strategic guidance to focus the efforts of the Department of Defense (DoD). My intent today is to provide a brief review of how SOF will support this guidance while also highlighting USSOCOM's responsibilities, authorities, structure and major programs and initiatives.

**USSOCOM Assigned Responsibilities, Authorities, and Structure**

As the only Unified Combatant Command legislated into being by Congress, USSOCOM has a distinct appreciation for the advocacy and unique authorities given to us since 1986. We are one of nine Unified Combatant Commands and similar to others in many regards, yet USSOCOM is distinct in that we exercise numerous

Service, military department, and defense agency-like responsibilities under guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS), the Unified Command Plan, and Title 10, Section 167 of the U.S. Code.

Unlike Combatant Commands with specific geographic Areas of Responsibility, USSOCOM is a functional Combatant Command with global responsibilities. We are the lead Combatant Command tasked with synchronizing the planning of global operations against terrorist networks. USSOCOM is also responsible for providing, training, and recommending sourcing solutions for combat-ready SOF forces supporting the Geographic Combatant Commands' (GCC) requirements. While these forces normally deploy under the control of the GCCs' Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC), USSOCOM can execute global operations against terrorist networks when directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense.

USSOCOM is also the lead component with executive agent-like responsibilities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) responsible for strengthening the role of NSHQ in fostering special operations capabilities within NATO. This includes advocacy for resources, personnel, and funding within DoD; sharing best practices and lessons learned; and providing the latest releasable U.S. policy, strategy,

operations, tactics, and training for NSHQ-supported SOF. This advances a worldwide network of SOF professionals conducting operations to increase, return, or develop peace and stability in support of U.S. national interests.

Through the foresight of Congress, USSOCOM is empowered by unique legislated budget and acquisition authorities in Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11). MFP-11 allows rapid and flexible acquisition of "SOF-peculiar" equipment and modification of service common systems to meet special operations requirements. MFP-11 funding supports SOF's persistent global presence meeting the SECDEF's guidance for forces "agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies and threats." We appreciate the Committee's authorization of \$10.5 billion for FY 2012. In FY 2013, the command is requesting a total of \$10.4 billion; \$7.8 billion of baseline and \$2.6 billion of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This includes beginning the transition of funds from OCO to the base USSOCOM budget in recognition of the enduring nature of many of our global requirements.

The total FY 2013 USSOCOM budget request is 1.7% of the overall proposed DoD budget. When combined with the Service-provided capabilities necessary to enable our operations we still represent less than 4% of the DoD total.

Unique to Special Operations, our 1208 authority remains critical to funding SOF's work with indigenous forces in support

of counterterrorism operations around the world. We appreciate the Committee's extension of this funding through 2015 and its approval of increasing the annual cap to \$50 million in 2012. Your continued support with 1208 has provided us the flexibility to support current operations today and rapidly address emerging operations tomorrow.

Collectively these funds support a force with a current strength of approximately 66,100 personnel (growing to near 71,100 by FY 2015), spread across five subordinate component commands: the United States Army Special Operations Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations Command.

#### **SOF Support for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense**

As articulated in *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense*, the global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities. By their very nature, SOF are particularly well-suited to respond to this rapidly changing environment, and I fully expect the operational demands placed upon SOF to increase across the next decade, and beyond.

As the current CJCS General Martin Dempsey recently noted, "We're at a strategic inflection point, where we find a different geopolitical challenge, different economic challenges,

shifting of economic and military power." Strategic trends and challenges are producing a distinct change in the character of conflict. Insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states and their proxies exploit gaps in policy developed for the more predictable world of yesterday. Increasingly these threats are networked, adaptable, and empowered by cyberspace to find new ways to recruit, train, finance, and operate. In short, the strategic environment is changing - quickly and constantly.

The decade of war after 9/11 has proffered many lessons; among them, specific to SOF, is the complementary nature of our direct and indirect approaches and how these SOF approaches are aligned to this changing strategic environment. The direct approach is characterized by technologically-enabled small-unit precision lethality, focused intelligence, and interagency cooperation integrated on a digitally-networked battlefield. In today's global counterterrorism fight, U.S. SOF continues to directly degrade Al Qaeda and its affiliates' leadership around the world, greatly reducing their ability to effectively plan and conduct operations. Extreme in risk, precise in execution and able to deliver a high payoff, the impacts of the direct approach are immediate, visible to public and have had tremendous effects on our enemies' networks throughout the decade.

As Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations attempt to franchise their ideology and violence globally, we will likely remain engaged against violent extremist networks for the foreseeable future. As Secretary Panetta recently stated, "We need to continue to put pressure on them, whether they're in Pakistan, whether they're in Yemen, whether they're in Somalia, whether they're in North Africa." The direct approach will remain a hallmark capability for SOF in order to provide the necessary means to disrupt this threat. However, the direct approach alone is not the solution to the challenges our Nation faces today as it ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect approach and broader governmental elements to take effect. Less well known but decisive in importance, the indirect approach is the complementary element that can counter the systemic components of the threat.

The indirect approach includes empowering host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging key populations. These long-term efforts increase partner capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address local needs, and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of violent extremism.

While both approaches build trust and confidence with our partners and assure them of our support and reliability, the indirect approach values local-led efforts to buy down our

partners' security threats. Here, SOF amplifies our partners' capabilities, epitomizing the SECDEF's assertion that "building capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the cost and responsibilities of global leadership."

As for the future, the indirect approach will be critical in the fight to deter, disrupt and deny sanctuary to our enemies. Therefore, we must use this approach to strengthen and foster a network of mutually supporting partnerships that are based on shared security interests. Through this network of relationships, SOF can provide a hedge against strategic surprise by identifying and working preemptively to address problems before they become conflicts.

One way SOF achieves this goal through the indirect approach is through forward and persistent engagement of key countries. Small in scale by design, this engagement directly supports the Country Teams' and GCCs' theater plans to counter threats to stability. This approach directly supports the SECDEF's direction that, "Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities." Throughout the year, SOF conducts engagements in more than 100 countries worldwide. At the heart of this presence is the operational context and access it provides.

Operational context is the thorough understanding of the environment gained through the knowledge and experience built in personal relationships from multiple visits to the same locations. This includes understanding the local culture and society, language, economy, history, politics and leadership, physical and virtual terrain as well as the enemy. It provides insight into the society's beliefs, values, and motivations. The addition of Cultural Support Teams (U.S. females attached to SOF units in Afghanistan) furthers this cause, enabling dialogue and routine interaction with the Afghan females normally isolated from exposure to male SOF personnel. This depth of context makes SOF more precise in enabling early action to maximize desired effects and minimize unintended consequences.

The successful application of the indirect approach is evident in the ongoing relationship between SOF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This effort originally began when SOF deployed to the terrorist safe haven of Basilan Island in 2002 to assist the AFP in operations against the insurgent group Abu Sayyaf. Immediately upon arrival, SOF personnel conducted a series of engagements with the local residents to learn their basic needs and grievances as a precursor to severing their ties with the insurgents. As SOF trained and advised the AFP personnel leading the security efforts, they coordinated a comprehensive interagency and multinational program to address

water, security, medical care, transportation, and education needs. As a result, people in the area continue to support AFP and SOF's presence today facilitating the return of economic prosperity and stability to the region.

Other examples of the indirect approach are SOF's contributions supporting interagency diplomacy and development efforts. Currently, 22 Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) and four Regional Information Support Teams (RISTs) support the Department of State by augmenting and broadening their public diplomacy efforts. MIST elements are requested by U.S. Chiefs of Mission and work under their direction to blend the embassy's Mission Strategic Plan and the GCC's Theater Campaign Plan.

USSOCOM also supports interagency development efforts by deploying civil-military support elements (CMSEs) to address refugees, displaced persons, populations at risk, and humanitarian or disaster assistance. CMSEs are engaged in 17 countries today and are forecasted to expand to 20 countries in FY 2013 and 30+ countries by FY 2017. Today, SOF Civil Affairs (CA) elements are integral to Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) in Afghanistan, the Trans-Sahel, and the Philippines to support population-focused indirect approaches to combat violent extremism. To support these increasing demands, USSOCOM added a fifth SOF CA battalion in FY 2012 to ensure

regionally-oriented CA support is available to each GCC.

These underreported, yet vital, contributions are designed and prioritized to create long-term effects beyond the direct, kinetic actions that are essential for winning the current fight. In the end, it will be such continuous indirect operations that will prove decisive in the global security arena. Of course, both direct and indirect approaches will continue to be necessary and mutually supportive elements of effective SOF employment. Nowhere is this more true than in the emerging SOF requirements for SOF in Afghanistan.

As total forces start to draw down in Afghanistan, SOF's unique ability to simultaneously blend direct and indirect approaches will likely drive increasing requirements for SOF. While the aggregate number of total personnel in Afghanistan will decrease as we approach 2014, the SOF contribution may increase by some small amount. Currently, SOF constitute 8% of the forces in Afghanistan, but has the lead for two major elements of operations; Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) initiatives and the ongoing CT mission. In conjunction with other ISAF elements, SOF have recruited and trained nearly 11,000 ALP who are vetted by our Afghan partners. There are now VSO in 57 districts increasing stability and enabling local governance, development, and security at the village level. Additionally, our Afghan Commando partners are

making significant progress in CT operations. Virtually all CT operations are now partnered with the Afghans and an increasing number are led by Afghan elements with SOF fulfilling an advisory and supporting role. To command and control these efforts, USSOCOM currently provides an operational SOF headquarters and the requisite planning capabilities which directly support the ISAF commander.

While supporting USCENTCOM efforts in Afghanistan remains our top priority, we also recognize that providing SOF capabilities to the other GCCs is critical to mitigating regional threats to stability. Even with the conclusion of operations in Afghanistan, historical deployment data reveals a constant demand for a "steady state" deployed force of nearly 12,000 SOF to support the GCCs' requirements. Continuation of the QDR-directed SOF growth is essential to meeting this current and projected demand for SOF. By FY 2017, we assess our programmed growth will provide adequate capacity to meet contingency demands without having to accept undue risk in global CT operations. Because SOF are uniquely recruited, assessed, selected, and trained to perform these difficult missions, the projected 3-5% growth rate through FY 2017 is the maximum rate of growth that is sustainable.

In the 25 years since USSOCOM's creation, the global environment has undergone, and continues to experience major

change; established powers falling, new ones rising, and the number and scope of threats increasing exponentially. The attacks of 9/11 forced the U.S. to confront the growing danger posed by ideologically-driven non-state actors. As a result, we have been involved in a decade long war that has been costly not only in terms of our fallen and injured, but also financially. These costs, combined with today's constrained fiscal environment, are forcing us to be more innovative and inclusive in the development of solutions to our global security challenges. To effectively address these problems, we must work closely with our allies and partners to effectively build partner nation capacity, integrate forces where appropriate, and improve information sharing.

Europe's NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) serves as an example of how SOF has adapted to the realities of today as it typifies the potential of an integrated multinational approach. Secretary Panetta's recent comment that, "most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it" helps to validate the success of NSHQ and recognizes the contribution that our NATO partners have made to the current fight. Consequently, USSOCOM will continue to bolster and strengthen the vitality of U.S. SOF's contribution to NATO through our increasing role as the NSHQ lead component and advocate to the Joint Staff and Office Secretary of Defense.

Another example of how USSOCOM and the SOF community are adapting to the current environment is exemplified in how we are preserving our force's capabilities to meet the enduring nature of war. My predecessor Admiral Eric Olson initiated a Pressure on the Force and Families (POTFF) study to examine the effects of a decade of continuous combat operations on the SOF community. The study identified core problems, their underlying factors, and captured best practices of Service and SOF support programs. The research included more than 400 non-attribution focus groups, consisting of more than 7,000 service members and more than 1,000 spouses from 55 different SOF units located at home and overseas. The results of the study illustrated two primary sources of ongoing stress. First is the lack of predictability resulting from a demanding operational tempo, exacerbated by significant time spent away from home for training. Second is an increased difficulty for our force when reconnecting and reintegrating into family activities.

Armed with these findings, I have appointed a Brigadier General and my Command Sergeant Major to transition the Pressure on the Force and Families Task Force to the Preservation of the Force and Families Task Force. More than simply a name change, this inter-disciplinary team is empowered to build and implement innovative solutions across the SOCOM enterprise to improve the well-being of our force and families. While we understand that

this begins with increasing predictability, the holistic approach will also ensure we provide responsive counseling, medical, psychological, and rehabilitative care to our SOF warriors and their families.

Many SOF-specific support programs and organizations do exist and are addressing portions of the challenges we face. Resiliency programs are facilitating early identification of underlying SOF issues relating to physical, mental, and spiritual well-being. Programs such as Naval Special Warfare Command's Third Location Decompression Program and the Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning Program (THOR3) are noteworthy. The Third Location Decompression program allows operators time to stop and stand down at an enroute location easing the transition from combat to domestic life. During this time, evaluations are conducted to assess members' well-being and identify early areas of concern. THOR3 is designed to train, educate, and evaluate SOF on human performance, rehabilitation, and nutrition to optimize battlefield effectiveness. THOR3 has improved recovery time and increased return-to-duty rates from acute and chronic injuries.

Additionally, the USSOCOM Care Coalition program provides outstanding support to SOF warriors and their families and is a model advocacy effort within DoD. For the life of a wounded, ill or injured SOF warrior, the Care Coalition tracks and supports

the member through the rehabilitation and reintegration process whether returning to duty or transitioning to civilian life.

But the required solutions go beyond these care programs and rehabilitative services. Based on our findings, we are also focused on improving how our PERSTEMPO (to include time away from home) is used to track and report individual and unit readiness. Ultimately, this will be incorporated into the force generation process to provide us a more accurate picture regarding the health of our force, units' availability for deployment, and predictability as a key element of long-term performance and resiliency.

Additionally, USSOCOM will continue to work with the Services to secure priority access to local ranges and training areas reducing SOF's need to "travel to train." Increasing this priority and access for deploying SOF units will further improve predictability and PERSTEMPO. I have spent much of the last few months visiting each of my component commands to listen and talk with the force and families and address POTFF-related issues ensuring we are on the right track.

We have a resilient force and it remains steadfast in its mission. While SOF capabilities are not in danger of degradation now, we must and will continue to look for ways to mitigate potential problems in the future. We will continue to work with the Services and this committee to develop solutions

to this problem. We recognize and appreciate your long-standing advocacy and funding of support programs for our warriors.

Finally, in order to drive and sustain change within our formations, USSOCOM is forging a comprehensive leadership development program designed to train, educate, and manage the career paths of future SOF leaders. We will develop tailored SOF professional military education to provide the tools required for today's complex environment, and we will work with the Services to more effectively manage career progression of SOF leaders including key combined, joint, and interagency assignments.

#### **Funding and Equipping the Force**

USSOCOM has a solemn obligation to appropriately fund and equip the warriors from whom we ask so much sacrifice. We also recognize the increasingly austere fiscal environment for the Department. To that end, USSOCOM is in compliance with the Department's Savings and Efficiencies guidance and that model has been incorporated into SOF business practices. USSOCOM is in a fiscally sound position, but the force requires continued support. The President's Budget Request for FY 2013, if approved, is an essential step towards meeting the growing demand on our force by providing USSOCOM the resources required to sustain our programs and initiatives.

USSOCOM's funding request for FY 2013 totals \$10.4 billion of

which \$7.8 billion is baseline and \$2.6 billion is OCO funding. FY 2013 begins the directed migration of requirements previously funded with OCO resources into the baseline appropriation. Nearly \$960 million will migrate to the baseline from OCO, supporting approximately 37% of FY 2013 global SOF operations and sustainment costs.

Last year, USSOCOM made a significant investment in Military Construction (MILCON) to better support SOF operations, training, maintenance, and storage facility requirements. This effort was targeted at addressing MILCON shortfalls attributable to new capabilities and missions, force structure growth disconnects, and primarily, inherited antiquated infrastructure. USSOCOM is committed to sustaining a consistent level of funding to satisfy our critical infrastructure needs. As such, the FY 2013 MILCON request of \$536 million equates to 6.8% of USSOCOM's baseline MFP-11 funds and is in line with the command's new Strategic Planning and Programming Guidance of a 6% minimum funding level for MILCON. The FY 2013 budget includes 21 construction projects in nine states, one overseas, and one at a classified location.

Also critical to meeting the demand for SOF capabilities worldwide is USSOCOM's ability to execute rapid acquisition of its material and service programs. USSOCOM's acquisition enterprise remains at the forefront of DoD, continuing to meet

the high demand to deliver and field critical material requirements and new technologies. Key to success is our major recapitalization and modernization effort to incorporate enhanced capabilities in our rotary, fixed-wing, and maritime mobility platforms. We are grateful for strong Congressional support in FY 2012 enabling us to continue with these efforts.

The need for SOF Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) has increased due to programmed operator growth over the past decade. By design, SOF are inherently lean and we have not attempted to grow organic "enablers" that duplicate Service-provided capabilities at the same rate as our operational elements. Therefore, leveraging the logistical support of the Services continues to be important.

The heavy-lift rotary wing MH-47G Chinook has completed the Service Life Extension Program with 61 MH-47Gs delivered. The upgrade of MH-47Gs to a Block 2 configuration is underway and a new program to build eight additional monolithic hull MH-47Gs was initiated to bring the total number to 69 by FY 2015. The MH-60 recapitalization effort to replace the MH-60L/K with the MH-60M delivered six new MH-60M aircraft, bringing the total number delivered to 12.

The vertical mobility of the tilt-rotor CV-22 continues to deliver unmatched speed and range to SOF battlefield commanders. Twenty-three of the planned 50 aircraft are fielded to date. We

completed modification of 12 MC-130Ws with a Precision Strike Package (PSP) which continues to perform superbly in combat. USSOCOM has started the AC-130J recapitalization effort, using the MC-130W PSP as a key risk reducing capability. The MC-130J program is on track to replace our aging MC-130Es and MC-130Ps, with core HC/MC-130J aircraft having successfully completed developmental testing in June 2011.

Our Non-Standard Aviation Program (NSAV) continues to demonstrate great success in operations around the world. Looking forward, we have several initiatives to more efficiently meet demand.

The modernization of our maritime mobility systems is underway with significant developments occurring this year. Competitive prototype contracts for the Combatant Craft - Medium (CCM), as a replacement for the Naval Special Warfare Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) and Mk V fleets, were awarded this fall with development of test articles expected in September 2012. Thanks to Congressional support, the purchase and fielding of 24 High Speed Assault Craft (HSAC) will provide a critical "bridge" capability to SOF until the CCM is complete.

As the land contingent of SOF mobility, the SOF Family of Special Operations Vehicles (FOSOV) provides a variety of specialized combat wheeled vehicles for SOF missions. These vehicles are modified to achieve required performance for global

deployments across a wide range of environments and threats. These SOF-unique vehicles provide enhanced tactical mobility and force protection, as well as platforms to support command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Two specific programs underway are the Non-Standard Commercial Vehicles (NSCV) and the Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV 1.1). The NSCV provides low profile commercial vehicles modified with ballistic protection and communications equipment enabling SOF to operate non-obtrusively supporting a multitude of SOF missions. The GMV 1.1 is the next variant of medium vehicles designated to replace the SOF-modified, service-common High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). This vehicle satisfies the critical need to deploy from the CH-47 aircraft internally.

Protection and casualty care improvements for our SOF warriors continues with research, development, testing, and acquisition of personal protective equipment. Recent OSD ballistic test initiatives have been integrated into the USSOCOM acquisition process and several mission-specific protective systems are now available. Optimization of signature management and camouflage initiatives provide multi-spectral protection for SOF operators.

Continued progress in information communications and networking capabilities with our SOF Deployable Node (SDN) family of Wide Band SATCOM systems is providing increased access

to the SOF Information Environment (SIE) voice, data, and video services for our deployed headquarters and operational elements worldwide. In FY 2013 our command focus areas are providing greater access to the SIE for SOF operators by downsizing system profiles, engineering common and scalable components, extending access through SDN to wireless users, and providing SIE access to maritime and ground mobility platforms.

USSOCOM continues to advance our technical surveillance and intelligence collection programs through evolutionary technology insertions, while making SOF ISR data more discoverable and external information more accessible with our Defense Common Ground/Surface System. Our other investments include a mix of manned and unmanned airborne ISR systems as well as the accompanying Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination capabilities and supporting communications architectures. Although we continue to pursue investments in airborne ISR capability, including High-Definition ISR technology, we also rely heavily on the Services to expand their capabilities and capacity that benefit DoD across the board.

Our effort to identify key emerging technologies beneficial to SOF ensures our forces are equipped with the right capabilities to detect and engage our adversaries. This includes conducting collaborative technology discovery, coordinating research and development activities, and rapidly integrating and inserting

new technology developments for equipment and techniques across the force. This process will align SOF capability gaps with technology enablers to focus ongoing efforts across the Science and Technology enterprise as well as identify additional innovation that is required to address these gaps.

#### **Conclusion**

During 2011, we saw significant emphasis on the employment of SOF. SOF operators, to a degree greater than ever before, performed missions that they were selected, trained, and equipped to do.

Special Operations Forces are a source of deep national pride. Their ingenuity, perseverance, spirit, and skill are unprecedented. In significant ways, our forces are creating visible and dramatic effects of the greatest magnitude across the globe. I consider it a profound honor to lead such an extraordinary group of professionals -- it is a privilege to represent them before this committee.

As always, our success is only possible because of your continued advocacy for Special Operations Forces and our assigned missions. Your support for the President's budget will ensure our continued ability to successfully address the most challenging security demands of our Nation. Thank you.

The logo for the United States Navy Biography. It features the text "United States Navy" in a serif font above the word "Biography" in a larger, bold, sans-serif font. A stylized anchor is positioned to the left of the text, and a horizontal line with an arrowhead pointing to the right is located below the word "Biography".

## United States Navy Biography

### **Admiral William H. McRaven Commander, United States Special Operations Command United States Navy**

Adm. McRaven is the ninth commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. USSOCOM ensures the readiness of joint special operations forces and, as directed, conducts operations worldwide.

McRaven served from June 2008 to June 2011 as the 11th commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C. JSOC is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics.

McRaven served from June 2006 to March 2008 as commander, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). In addition to his duties as commander, SOCEUR, he was designated as the first director of the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre where he was charged with enhancing the capabilities and interoperability of all NATO Special Operations Forces.

McRaven has commanded at every level within the special operations community, including assignments as deputy commanding general for Operations at JSOC; commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group One; commander of SEAL Team Three; task group commander in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility; task unit commander during *Desert Storm* and *Desert Shield*; squadron commander at Naval Special Warfare Development Group; and, SEAL platoon commander at Underwater Demolition Team 21/SEAL Team Four.

McRaven's diverse staff and interagency experience includes assignments as the director for Strategic Planning in the Office of Combating Terrorism on the National Security Council Staff; assessment director at USSOCOM, on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the chief of staff at Naval Special Warfare Group One.

McRaven's professional education includes assignment to the Naval Postgraduate School, where he helped establish, and was the first graduate from, the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum.

*Updated 24 January 2012*

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**Statement of**

**General William Fraser, USAF**

**Commander, United States Transportation Command**



**Before the House Armed Services Committee**

**On the State of the Command**

**March 7, 2012**

**INTRODUCING THE UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND****Mission /Organization**

It is my privilege as the Commander of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to present you my posture statement for 2012. Our Total Force team of Active duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, commercial partners, and contractors leads a world-class Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) that provides unfailing support to our warfighters and their families around the globe. Through efficient and effective execution of our transportation and supply chain distribution mission, the USTRANSCOM team is revolutionizing military logistics to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, while adapting to the President's Defense Strategy. Our team of dedicated and trained professionals working in unison with our joint, commercial, and international partners is ready to meet those challenges today and in the future.

**Supporting Global Operations**

Our Nation's greatest asymmetric advantage is our ability to project and sustain our forces across the globe supported by the political, military, and business relationships that enable this expansive network. To maintain this advantage, the President assigned USTRANSCOM the Global Distribution Synchronizer responsibility to synchronize planning for global distribution operations. This new responsibility enables the Department of Defense (DOD) to shape the distribution environment to meet growing access challenges and ensure sufficient distribution lanes across multiple theaters to underwrite our Nation's ability to successfully project and sustain forces globally. Collaboratively, we will "knit the distribution seams" among multiple Combatant Commands (COCOMs) to ensure support for their theater campaign and contingency plans. To this effort, our vision is to achieve a global network that

anticipates demands, maximizes strategic flexibility, mitigates potential risks, and provides resilient end-to-end distribution.

While USTRANSCOM leads the enterprise, our component commands execute the mission. In 2011, Air Mobility Command (AMC) and its Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard partners maintained a high operations tempo supporting Operations UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP), NEW DAWN (OND), ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and other crises around the world. At the peak of global air mobility operations in 2011, AMC deployed a rotational force of over 60 C-130 tactical airlift aircraft, plus 120 KC-135 and KC-10 aerial refueling aircraft. AMC also employed an additional 21 C-17s in dedicated support of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Additionally, across all COCOMs on a daily basis, at least one third of AMC's air mobility fleet was utilized in support of global operations.

On the surface, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) moved over 19.9 million tons of cargo worldwide. MSC's tankers delivered 1.6 billion gallons of fuel to support global operations. SDDC expanded into multimodal operations by moving over 3,500 pieces of mission essential cargo by commercial liner sealift with follow-on airlift into Afghanistan.

Our newest subordinate command, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), deployed more than 750 personnel to support four Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations and seven contingency operations worldwide. The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and U.S. Special Operations Command employed the JECC's expertise for a variety of real-world missions including ODYSSEY DAWN, TOMODACHI, PACIFIC PASSAGE, CONTINUING PROMISE, ODYSSEY GUARD, OUP, OEF and OND. Though the missions were of varying size, scope, and

complexity, in each instance the JECC provided immediate, short-duration support to increase the effectiveness of joint command and control at the operational level.

#### **Support to USCENTCOM**

In 2011, the President directed the final drawdown in Iraq by 31 December 2011 and the start of the Afghanistan surge recovery. Through partnership with USCENTCOM and aggressive scheduling, USTRANSCOM and its component AMC accelerated the redeployment of over 60,000 troops (over 50,000 from Iraq and 10,000 from Afghanistan) returning 99 percent home by 24 December and 100 percent by the New Year.

Equipment retrograde was highlighted by the aggressive push to redeploy over one million pieces of equipment from Iraq in calendar year 2011. In addition, USTRANSCOM and our interagency partners have received permissions from some governments of European, Central Asian, and Baltic countries to start retrograding materials from Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN).

The Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK GLOC) provide logistical support through the movement of cargo to Afghanistan. In 2011 more than 35,000 containers were delivered on the PAK GLOC by surface transportation. When open, the PAK GLOC remains the quickest and most cost-effective route.

The NDN provides an additional route for cargo to Afghanistan. Over the past year, we moved an average of 40 percent of all cargo in support of OEF through the NDN's multiple truck, water, rail, and air routes in an expanding distribution network. In 2011 a total of 27,000 containers were delivered by surface transportation on the NDN, an increase of 15 percent from 2010. USTRANSCOM will continue to work with the interagency and governments of the NDN countries to expand NDN routes

and permissions. This expansion will increase velocity and the number of new routes into and out of Afghanistan.

**Support to Other Geographic Combatant Commands**

USTRANSCOM supported all GCCs, responding to their unique requirements, often testing the ingenuity of the team to develop new and complex transportation solutions. In March 2011, USTRANSCOM provided a top priority movement to all six GCCs – a USTRANSCOM first.

In U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), USTRANSCOM continues to support the transport and security of detainees during detainee movement operations (DMO). Since 2002, USTRANSCOM in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of State, Joint Staff, and supported COCOMs has successfully completed 88 DMO missions, transporting 1,206 detainees without incident.

In U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM deployed and redeployed more than 3,500 troops and 1,400 tons of cargo in support of the Kosovo Balkan force, providing a safe and secure environment in the region.

In U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM deployed and redeployed 2,491 troops and 1,340 short tons of cargo in support of Commander Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.

Supporting both USAFRICOM and USEUCOM and in response to the United Nations Security Council resolution to end Libya's military advance on its civilian population, USTRANSCOM provided tankers and other lift assets to support Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR. U.S. tankers flew 435 sorties delivering 23 million pounds of fuel to coalition strike aircraft. USTRANSCOM also directed 63 time-critical airlift missions delivering 886 passengers and 2,220 short tons of cargo.

In U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM responded within hours to the immediate needs of the Japanese people, who were devastated from the earthquake and tsunami and follow-on nuclear crisis, with Operation TOMODACHI. USTRANSCOM delivered relief supplies, nuclear response equipment, a 50-person JECC team, search and rescue teams, and disaster response experts totaling over 3,400 short tons and over 6,700 passengers as part of that operation. USTRANSCOM simultaneously supported Operation PACIFIC PASSAGE, the voluntary authorized departure of DOD dependents from Japan, by evacuating more than 7,800 passengers on over 25 missions.

Each year, USTRANSCOM provides airlift and sealift assets to transport personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of the National Science Foundation's (NSF's) research in Antarctica as part of Operation DEEP FREEZE. Using unique capabilities such as the Air National Guard's ski-equipped LC-130s, USTRANSCOM delivered more than 3,250 passengers, 10,000 short tons of cargo, and five million gallons of fuel to McMurdo Station, Antarctica. In 2011, USTRANSCOM assets airlifted the King of Malaysia and the Prime Minister of Norway to Antarctica in recognition of the 100 year anniversary of man's first expedition to the South Pole.

In U.S. Northern Command's (USNORTHCOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM supported training exercises that provided realistic homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities training for joint and interagency partners. USTRANSCOM also deployed the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) equipped C-130 aircraft to fight fires in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and Mexico in support of the National Interagency Fire Center. The MAFFS aircraft flew 396 sorties and released more than 9.7 million pounds of fire-retardant during their 74 days of deployment.

USTRANSCOM's WC-130 Hurricane Hunter aircraft flew 129 sorties into 30 storms to collect valuable hurricane data for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration during the 2011

hurricane season. In addition to collecting storm data, USTRANSCOM airlifted the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region II Defense Coordination Officer emergency response vehicle to Puerto Rico to assist with monitoring Tropical Storm EMILY.

#### **Improving Business Practices**

To reduce transportation costs, USTRANSCOM continues to pursue both military and commercial multimodal transportation solutions. Multimodal transportation solutions use both surface and air assets, e.g., moving Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles by ship to a major port and using cargo airplanes for the final delivery to the warfighter. By embracing multimodal transportation solutions, USTRANSCOM manages the supply chain, controls cost, and creates efficiencies.

In 2011, commercial multimodal operations began in the USCENTCOM AOR. Multimodal operations into theater included contracted sealift carriers and airlift services through the commercial seaports and airports in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Aqaba, Jordan. Commercial multimodal transportation routes maximize the use of commercial carrier capabilities from origin to destination while “freeing up” vital military capabilities. Multimodal hubs proved invaluable when the PAK GLOC routes were no longer available for use in late November. Several hundred containers from 39 different ships bound for forces in Afghanistan were diverted to Dubai and Aqaba where they were stored and then airlifted as needed into Afghanistan to ensure sustained support to combat operations.

Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure require an increased reliance on aerial delivery. In 2011, over 80 million pounds of cargo were airdropped, up 20 million from 2010, making 2011 a record year. We continue to add new capabilities like Low-Cost, Low-Altitude Delivery and to

explore an extracted container delivery system capability to improve aircraft survivability and aerial delivery accuracy.

Piracy continues to threaten our commercial partners, predominantly in the Horn of Africa region. USTRANSCOM and its component, Military Sealift Command, continue to be active participants in interagency and industry efforts to reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. commercial fleet. USTRANSCOM is a strong advocate for the use of private security teams aboard commercial vessels.

#### **Preserving the Joint Deployment and Distribution Process**

The DOD supply chain is a vast, interdependent enterprise reliant on infrastructure availability across the globe. To safeguard this infrastructure, we work closely with entities across the DOD and Intelligence Community to stay apprised of threats to our transportation and distribution assets and to provide global strategic force protection oversight for these assets. Our relationships and planning efforts with GCCs facilitate threat mitigation and risk reduction of vulnerabilities and hostile/criminal activities.

Preserving and improving our strategic en route infrastructure system remains a critical requirement. A relatively small number of en route airfields and seaports are available to support global mobility operations, so we must champion these "enduring bases" that enable seamless movement across the various areas of responsibility. USTRANSCOM advocates for military construction projects that maintain and improve the capabilities and capacities of the military's deployment and distribution infrastructure. Using analytical data, USTRANSCOM's En Route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) identifies construction projects that will improve the military's global routes. Adequate infrastructure and access agreements allow the U.S. to maintain the ability to project forces globally.

With the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), USTRANSCOM continues to lead DOD supply chain transformation efforts through a series of Distribution Process Owner Strategic Opportunities (DSO) initiatives. Since 2009, five focused process improvement initiatives generated \$400 million in cost savings and cost avoidance. The initiatives enhanced readiness, improved velocity, and reduced costs, while delivering higher levels of service to the warfighter.

#### **Building Toward the Future**

As USTRANSCOM continues to improve our processes across the deployment and distribution enterprise, we stand ready to support the President's Defense Strategy that maintains a full spectrum force ready to deter conflict, project power, and win wars anywhere on the globe.

In the Pacific, Guam is critical to U.S. national defense as a strategic security and stability location providing USTRANSCOM access to global lines of communications. Guam is a key multimodal logistics node to mobility success in the region and has been analytically validated in the Global Access and Infrastructure Assessment, USTRANSCOM's ERIMP, and AMC's En Route Strategy White Paper. USTRANSCOM supports infrastructure improvements on Guam to ensure successful distribution operations in East Asia and Oceania. We have partnered with the DLA and, with congressional approval, invested \$101.3 million in the recapitalization of the fuel hydrant infrastructure and \$61 million in a JP-8 pipeline between Apra Harbor and Andersen Air Force Base.

A key element of the President's Defense Strategy is to strengthen defense cyber capabilities to operate effectively in cyberspace and to counter cyber attacks. Because of USTRANSCOM's strong reliance on commercial partners, over 90 percent of the distribution and deployment transactions are handled in cyberspace. USTRANSCOM strives to ensure both the integrity of our data and availability

for our users and essentially serves as an information broker for deployment and distribution operations across the globe.

USTRANSCOM is partnering with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), industry, and educational institutions to introduce innovative new technologies and methodologies to protect our essential command and control systems and information from attack. Collaborating with military and commercial partners to define standards for the process and handling of data allows us to improve the security of our information and its accuracy. Implementation of these standards will streamline our information flow, improve transparency to authorized users, and leverage new technologies. The result is trusted and timely information supporting a more responsive transportation enterprise while reducing costs.

USTRANSCOM's Agile Transportation for the 21st Century (AT21) initiative will use industry best practices plus government and commercial off-the-shelf optimization and scheduling tools to deliver best value, end-to-end deployment and distribution. Business process reengineering will improve transportation planning, forecast accuracy, and on-time delivery of forces and sustainment to COCOMs at a lower cost. Corporate Services Vision will align IT systems with reengineered business processes to create a one-stop IT shop.

USTRANSCOM is DOD's lead proponent for In-Transit Visibility (ITV) of cargo, equipment, and personnel during deployment and distribution options. ITV enables a more effective and efficient supply chain by tracking the total volume of supplies moving through the logistics pipeline. Active Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) remains the primary automatic identification technology for large consolidated shipments in the defense transportation system while incorporation of passive RFID tags provides great benefits in warehousing, prepositioning, and tracking of DOD materiel. We continue to expand capabilities with our ITV systems/portfolio.

**Realigning Organization and Personnel**

The disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command reassigned the JECC to USTRANSCOM on July 1, 2011. The JECC's Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE), Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), and the Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) provide mission tailored joint capability packages to COCOMs. These units facilitate rapid establishment of Joint Force Headquarters enabling Global Response Force execution and the bridging of joint operational requirements.

The JECC employs a Total Force mix to deliver scalable mission tailored packages providing immediate, short duration support establishing and organizing a joint force headquarters. The JPSE is an employment package composed of experienced personnel in the planning and execution of joint military operations. The JCSE delivers secure command, control, communications, and computer capabilities. The JPASE provides an early entry capability enabling the Joint Force Commander to gain and maintain the initiative in the information domain.

**Training and Exercises**

USTRANSCOM Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement (CE2) program directly supports U.S. national security interests by increasing military capabilities, strengthening alliances, and retaining strategic access around the globe. CE2 enables joint force readiness by enhancing interoperability of the JDDE. The CE2 program has maintained strategic access for the DOD in an era where many forward deployed capabilities are becoming CONUS based. The program allows Combatant Commanders to exercise quick deploying contingency capabilities in response to real world crises like contingencies and HA/DR operations and allows DOD's strategic reserve fleet to remain ready, while saving resources by reserving operating capabilities.

USTRANSCOM participated and supported COCOMs in 20 top priority command post and field training exercises, including 147 secondary training events in 2011. During the exercises, USTRANSCOM provided command and control, deployed strategic mobility personnel and assets, and provided ITV, including patient movement tracking systems and global air transport. USTRANSCOM also partnered with USNORTHCOM, federal agencies, and state and local emergency planners in the development and execution of a staff and patient movement exercise as part of the National Level Exercise.

#### **Air Mobility Readiness**

The President's Defense Strategy relies on rapid global reach and rapid global response to deter aggression and deliver worldwide capability. An important linchpin to U.S. military dominance in any conflict is maintaining the airlift and air-refueling capability required for rapid delivery of the Joint Force Team over long distances, guaranteeing access to any location in the world. Our initial analysis shows the planned air mobility force structure meets the strategic airlift and air-refueling requirements for a single large scale operation, while maintaining the flexibility and adaptability to support the Joint Force in another region.

C-17s will continue to meet USTRANSCOM's future requirements through currently funded purchases, upgrade programs, and fleet rotation. The newest C-17s arrive with the latest capability and reliability improvements installed, while the older aircraft enter into the Global Reach Improvement Program to increase their capability and sustainability. Aircraft are monitored and analyzed for stress and rotated to maintain structural integrity of the fleet.

The C-5 fleet is critical to our oversized and outsized air cargo capability and management of the fleet focuses on retirement of some of the oldest aircraft and increased reliability for the remainder. The

Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) increases the C-5 fleet mission capable rate (MCR) from 55 to 75 percent. All C-5Bs and Cs and one C-5A will undergo RERP for a total of 52 C-5Ms. The Air Force's new programmed depot maintenance process changed from a "failure of major components" to a preventative replacement process. C-5A retirements will improve aircraft availability by removing maintenance intensive jets from the fleet.

Last year the Air Force awarded a contract for the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the KC-46A program. The KC-46A will replace a portion of the Air Force's aging fleet of KC-135 Stratotankers and will provide the DOD and allied nation coalition aircraft with more aerial refueling capacity, improved efficiency, and increased capabilities for cargo, passengers, and aeromedical evacuation. These 179 KC-46A tankers are the first increment of a three-phased tanker recapitalization approach driven by fleet size and fiscal constraints.

The C-130 continues as an in-theater workhorse supporting humanitarian, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and combat operations. USTRANSCOM supports DOD and Air Force plans to size the tactical airlift fleet to align with the President's Defense Strategy and to meet the warfighter's demand for intratheater and Direct Support airlift missions. Our initial analysis of the planned total purchase of 134 C-130Js, plus 184 modernized C-130Hs, shows the Air Force fleet of 318 C-130s will be sufficient to support the warfighter's demands.

To operate our mobility aircraft safely in threat environments, I strongly support continued defensive systems such as the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures system and continued development of the Advanced Situational Awareness and Countermeasures capability for operations in low to medium threat environments.

The Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) develops and implements CONUS Operational Support Airlift (OSA) solutions to provide movement visibility for the DOD. The small

passenger aircraft provide quick, cost-effective transportation for senior officials and special cargo. Recently, the JOSAC assumed the responsibility of scheduling OSA aircraft in support of the USNORTHCOM AOR, including parts of Alaska, Canada, and Mexico.

Operational Support Airlift and Executive Airlift (OSA/EA) is a key component of our Global Air Mobility Enterprise. From the President to senior civilian and military leaders, immediate airlift is required to carry out diplomatic and military missions across the spectrum of activities supporting our National Security, National Defense, and the National Military Strategies. While we continue to modernize the OSA/EA fleet, we plan to develop a single scheduling and management system with a common multiservice database and operational picture. The goal is to achieve total and real-time asset visibility of worldwide senior leader and OSA/EA movements to enable all stakeholders, including key leadership to exercise command and control of their fleet assets within their area of responsibility.

USTRANSCOM's Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a force enabler, providing us the ability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment in response to global events. The institution of incentives for commercial carriers directed in the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act have proven successful in transitioning the CRAF to a more modern fleet that increases reliability, improves fuel efficiency, and lowers contract rates. USTRANSCOM continues to incentivize the use of modern CRAF aircraft while eliminating the aging, less efficient aircraft. The CRAF Executive Working Group (EWG) of USTRANSCOM, AMC and commercial aviation leaders has been a continuing success by allowing open discussion of fleet modernization, Federal Aviation Administration flightcrew duty and rest requirements, fleet reliability, and supporting operations.

Routing mobility airlift over the polar ice cap opens an additional corridor to the USCENTCOM AOR mitigating the threat to single lines of communication and saves time, fuel, maintenance, and personnel costs. West coast bases' routing KC-135 swap outs over the North Pole saves 20 percent in

time and costs over the traditional European-Caucasus routing, while long-range cargo aircraft routed over the polar ice caps save up to 14 percent. In 2011, USTRANSCOM directed AMC and its commercial partners to utilize polar routing in order to improve operational experience and capability.

Air Force Contingency Response (CR) forces provide an essential capability to support rapidly evolving contingencies throughout the world. AMC maintains four Contingency Response Groups and additional expeditionary Global Mobility forces to support the airbase opening and Joint Task Force-Port Opening missions. These forces directly support USTRANSCOM and Joint Force Commanders' expeditionary mobility requirements by expanding options for early entry force application and sustainment. Rapid response capability along with opening and operating from distant and austere bases with a small footprint and minimum support requirements is a tremendous force enabler. CR forces can deploy within 12-hours notice to quickly assess airbase capabilities and begin the base opening process to achieve full mission capability in the shortest possible time. CR forces provide Combatant Commanders with initial air base opening and global air mobility support capability during wartime, contingency or humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations.

In 2011, USTRANSCOM performed 24,410 safe and rapid aeromedical global patient movements, transporting 14,678 patients to definitive care. In the days after the liberation of Libya, USTRANSCOM, through the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center, supported a Department of State request and transported wounded Libyan personnel by military airlift to medical facilities in Europe and the United States.

USTRANSCOM continues to increase its ability to meet the DOD's expanding patient movement mission requirements. We have matched advanced in-flight medical care teams to the specific medical needs of our Wounded Warriors, forged and field tested unique DOD Health and Human Services deployable air evacuation staging facilities, and standardized and integrated theater patient movement

regulating centers. These improvements will build a safer, more agile, and efficient world-wide patient movement system.

#### Sealift Readiness

Sealift is the primary means for delivering the preponderance of equipment and sustainment for ground forces, and is essential to building up combat power and seizing the initiative during major combat operations. In a typical operation, over 90 percent of all cargo is delivered by sealift. As one of the largest single shippers of ocean cargo worldwide, DOD spent approximately \$2 billion in fiscal year 2011 (FY11) on commercial transportation through our Universal Services Contract. By partnering with commercial carriers, we gain beneficial access to their global infrastructure. In return, they benefit from our long-term commitment to their ships and networks. When necessary, we activate our government-owned vessels from the Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and MSC's Surge Fleet.

USTRANSCOM's partnership with the U.S. commercial sealift industry and the Department of Transportation (DOT) has been vital in developing new routes for conveying cargo around the globe, particularly to regions with undeveloped infrastructure. Through formal programs such as the Maritime Security Program (MSP), Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA), DOD gains critical access to U.S. commercial capabilities, while ensuring the availability of a viable U.S. flag maritime industry and U.S. citizen mariner pool in times of national emergency.

The MSP was recently extended an additional 10 years to 2025. USTRANSCOM looks forward to working with members of Congress to continue to refine the program between now and its implementation date in 2015. The most critical vessels in our fleets are the Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO)

vessels. USTRANSCOM also looks forward to working with our partners in developing a joint approach to recapitalize our organic fleet through the purchase of vessels available at minimal cost due to the declining worldwide markets. Doing so keeps U.S. citizens operating these vessels, thereby strengthening our maritime base and generating business for U.S. shipyards to complete all conversion and life-cycle maintenance work on these ships. Additionally, preserving DOD's organic fleet of nine Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSRs) and 48 Ready Reserve Force ships is vital to having the surge sealift capacity necessary to meet future contingencies.

USTRANSCOM works closely with DLA Energy to meet DOD's fuel requirements. Early in 2011, MSC assumed operational control of the second of two U.S. built, U.S. flagged State Class tanker vessels. These new double hulled 331,000 barrel ships replaced four older T-5 tankers that have served us well for the past 25 years. The Motor Vessel (MV) EMPIRE STATE and her sister ship, MV EVERGREEN STATE, will carry refined petroleum products primarily between commercial refineries and DOD storage and distribution facilities worldwide. Additionally, I support MARAD's proposed Tank Vessel Security Fleet which, if approved, would replace the VTA and provide incentives for U.S.-flagged tankers to operate in U.S. foreign commerce in return for assured access to DOD in support of worldwide operations.

Finally, I urge continued congressional support of the National Defense Sealift Fund and the MSP. USTRANSCOM is working diligently with Navy, MSC, and MARAD to instill efficiencies and cost savings in the way these critical assets are managed. Support of the MSP, in addition to supporting a U.S. flagged commercial fleet, is critical to maintaining the U.S. merchant mariner base which provides the manpower needed for surge operations.

The delivery of fuel to combat forces is an absolutely critical component to any modern combat operation. As we plan for contingencies we must always consider the possibility that the normal fuel

infrastructure may not be in place or may be unusable. The Offshore Petroleum Discharge System on MV WHEELER is one unique way to ensure fuel support. This system provides up to 1.7 million gallons of fuel from up to eight miles offshore. This one of a kind vessel is programmed for purchase in August 2012, and will become part of the organic fleet to ensure continued support to the warfighter.

#### **Surface Readiness**

The declining condition and operation of our highway infrastructure between military installations and ports is a concern for the DOD. USTRANSCOM will continue to work with DOT to identify DOD's rail, highway, and port requirements so they are thoroughly integrated into the civil sector planning cycle and maintained for the JDDE.

In addition to maintaining the infrastructure, DOD must also maintain railcar capacity to meet military transportation requirements. We are working closely with industry to ensure contracted railcar capacity is available to augment government-owned railcar capacity in the event of any contingency lift requirements.

Infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), in Concord, CA, are essential to USTRANSCOM's support of USPACOM's operational plans and DOD's military capability in the Pacific theater. Due to the nature and size of this military mission, no suitable alternatives to MOTCO exist on the West Coast. We continue to work within DOD to find necessary resources to alleviate any ammunition throughput issues in the Pacific Theater.

USTRANSCOM also manages the Defense Personal Property System (DPS). DPS is a next generation web-based system designed to manage personal property shipments and help improve the move experience for service members through procurement of best value transportation services. In addition, DPS achieves other key Defense Personal Property Program objectives to include: Full

Replacement Value protection, streamlined direct claims settlement between the customer and the Transportation Service provider (TSP), faster automated payments to TSP, 24/7 self-counseling, on-line status tracking, and reduced storage costs. In FY11, DPS executed more than 532,000 shipments and can now accommodate approximately 90 percent of all household goods shipments for DOD military and civilian personnel and their families.

#### **Developing New Capabilities**

USTRANSCOM is overcoming deployment challenges to enhance our global response capabilities. Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) represent a transformational sealift capability by offering an enhanced logistics response to military and civil contingencies around the globe. These vessels close the gap between high-speed low-capacity airlift and low-speed high-capacity sealift. Forward deployment of JHSVs in combination with warehoused stocks of equipment and supplies will leverage their speed and capacity into quick delivery of needed cargos for Service, joint, and interagency efforts. We are analyzing ways to further capitalize on this capability with the Services and other COCOMs.

With delivery by airdrop nearly doubling yearly since 2005, USTRANSCOM's investment in a High Speed Container Delivery System (HSCDS) will increase airdrop accuracy and payload weights supporting forward deployed warfighters. This capability also enhances threat avoidance and tactical maneuverability to aircraft and aircrews. HSCDS has successfully completed technology demonstrations with a summer operational assessment planned.

**Fiscal Stewardship**

The JDDE generated \$786.9 million in cost avoidance predominately through the use of multimodal operations (the cost-effectiveness of ships and the flexibility of the C-17s) and forward based warehousing in FY11. A continuing example of multimodal operations is the movement of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicles (MATVs) to Afghanistan. The vehicles were shipped to seaports in theater then airlifted five at a time aboard C-17s into country. USTRANSCOM delivered the majority of the 850 MATVs from October 2010 through September 2011 using multimodal operations.

USTRANSCOM is committed to being part of the DOD solution to long-term deficit-reduction challenges by continuing to lead the certification effort for alternative fuels. AMC C-17s underwent flight tests and certification on cutting-edge renewable bio-jet fuel blended with JP-8 in August 2011. Additionally, all aircraft in AMC's fleet are approved to fly on a synthetic blend of coal or natural gas-based fuel and regular jet fuel.

Additional efficiency efforts include the Mission Index Flying Tool, the Next Generation Cargo Capability Program, and other mission area enhancements. The Mission Index Flying Tool has allowed AMC to reduce aviation fuel consumption beyond expectations. The Next Generation Cargo Capability program standardizes air cargo build-up from depot suppliers and AMC aerial ports to maximize volume/weight utilization, increasing operational effectiveness, and reducing fuel costs while meeting the end customer's delivery requirements. Collaboration with our supported customers has moved more materiel via surface modes to our CONUS strategic aerial ports, thus minimizing aircraft costs while effectively meeting warfighter requirements. Finally, to optimize over-ocean shipments and reduce enterprise operating costs, we continue to identify opportunities to aggregate cargo at appropriate locations.

**Final Thoughts**

While the Nation and USTRANSCOM face significant challenges at home and abroad, we recognize there are great opportunities for positive change. Such changes will improve effectiveness and efficiency for the warfighters and for the citizens who have entrusted us with the responsible use of our Nation's resources. The dedicated men and women of the USTRANSCOM team take enormous pride in providing the world's best deployment and distribution support to our great Nation. "Together, we deliver."



## BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

### GENERAL WILLIAM M. FRASER III

Gen. William M. Fraser III is commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. USTRANSCOM is the single manager for global air, land and sea transportation for the Department of Defense.

General Fraser entered the Air Force in 1974 as a distinguished graduate of the Texas A&M University ROTC program. His operational assignments include duty as a T-37, B-52, B-1, and B-2 instructor pilot and evaluator. General Fraser has commanded an operations group, two bomb wings and a major command. His staff duties include tours on the Air Staff, Joint Staff, and Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. He has also served as chief of staff for U.S. Strategic Command, as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 34th Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.



General Fraser has extensive wartime, contingency, and humanitarian relief operational experience. During Operation Enduring Freedom he led an intelligence fusion organization that provided direct support to the warfighter.

Prior to assuming his current position, General Fraser was the commander, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va., and Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command, where he led over 130,000 Total Force Airmen.

#### EDUCATION

1974 Bachelor of Science degree in engineering technology, Texas A&M University  
 1977 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 1980 Master of Science degree in management information systems, University of Northern Colorado, Greeley  
 1983 Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Va.  
 1985 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.  
 1987 National Security Management Course, Syracuse University, N.Y.  
 1991 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 1995 Executive Development Program, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.  
 1999 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 1999 Senior Information Warfare Applications Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 2000 National Security Leadership Course, National Security Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, N.Y.  
 2002 Executive Program for Russian and U.S. General Officers, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 2002 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 2002 Senior Intelligence Fellows Program, Wye River, Md.

2003 Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
2005 Leadership at the Peak, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, Colo.

#### **ASSIGNMENTS**

1. November 1974 - October 1975, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
2. October 1975 - March 1976, student, instructor pilot training, Randolph AFB, Texas
3. March 1976 - February 1978, T-37 instructor pilot and T-37 check pilot, 96th Flying Training Squadron, Williams AFB, Ariz.
4. March 1978 - March 1980, T-37 instructor pilot and flight examiner, 82nd Flying Training Wing, Williams AFB, Ariz.
5. March 1980 - October 1980, Operational Support Aircraft Program Element Monitor, Air Staff Training Program, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
6. October 1980 - April 1981, Worldwide Military Command, Control and Communications Program Element Monitor, Air Staff Training Program, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
7. May 1981 - October 1981, B-52H student, 4017th Combat Crew Training Squadron, Castle AFB, Calif.
8. October 1981 - March 1983, B-52H aircraft commander, later B-52G aircraft commander and instructor pilot, 46th Bomb Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, N.D.
9. March 1983 - December 1984, Chief, B-52G Standardization and Evaluation Branch, 319th Bomb Wing, Grand Forks AFB, N.D.
10. January 1985 - June 1985, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
11. June 1985 - March 1986, Chief, European Single Integrated Operational Plan Tactics, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, Offutt AFB, Neb.
12. April 1986 - October 1987, executive officer to the Strategic Air Command Chief of Staff, Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, Neb.
13. October 1987 - July 1990, Chief, Nuclear Requirements Cell, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium
14. July 1990 - July 1991, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
15. July 1991 - July 1993, Deputy Commander, 384th Operations Group, McConnell AFB, Kan.
16. July 1993 - January 1995, Commander, 509th Operations Group, Whiteman AFB, Mo.
17. January 1995 - August 1995, Vice Commander, 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman AFB, Mo.
18. August 1995 - January 1997, special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium
19. February 1997 - May 1998, Commander, 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth AFB, S.D.
20. May 1998 - May 1999, Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
21. May 1999 - December 2000, Commander, 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB, La.
22. December 2000 - December 2002, Deputy Director for National Systems Operations, the Joint Staff; Director, Defense Space Reconnaissance Program; and Deputy Director for Military Support, National Reconnaissance Office, Washington, D.C.
23. January 2003 - October 2004, Director of Operations, Headquarters AETC, Randolph AFB, Texas
24. November 2004 - February 2005, special assistant to the Commander, Air Force Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, Langley AFB, Va.
25. February 2005 - May 2006, Vice Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.
26. May 2006 - October 2008, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
27. October 2008 - September 2009, Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
28. September 2009 - September 2011, Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va., and Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command
29. October 2011 - present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

#### **SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS**

1. June 1985 - March 1986, Chief, European Single Integrated Operational Plan Tactics, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a major
2. October 1987 - July 1990, Chief, Nuclear Requirements Cell, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, as a lieutenant colonel
3. August 1995 - January 1997, special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, as a colonel
4. May 1998 - May 1999, Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a colonel
5. December 2000 - December 2002, Deputy Director for National Systems Operations, the Joint Staff; Director, Defense Space Reconnaissance Program; and Deputy Director for Military Support, National Reconnaissance Office, Washington, D.C., as a brigadier general

6. May 2006 - October 2008, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant general

7. October 2011 - Present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill., as a general

**FLIGHT INFORMATION**

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 4,200

Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, T-1, KC-135R, B-1B, B-2, B-52G/H and C-21

**MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS**

Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters

Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters

Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster

Air Force Achievement Medal

National Intelligence Medal of Achievement

Secretary's Distinguished Service Award, Department of State

Combat Readiness Medal

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal Global War on Terrorism Service Medal Armed Forces Service Medal

Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal

**OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS**

Officer training award, undergraduate pilot training

Top graduate, T-37 pilot instructor training

T-37 Instructor Pilot of the Year

Distinguished graduate, B-52 G/H combat crew training

Air Force Public Affairs Directors Special Achievement Award for commander support

Joseph A. Moller Award, Outstanding Wing Commander, Air Combat Command

Gold Medal, National Reconnaissance Office

Honorary Tuskegee Airman

Order of the Sword, Air Combat Command

**EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION**

Second Lieutenant Nov. 8, 1974

First Lieutenant Nov. 8, 1976

Captain Nov. 8, 1978

Major Oct. 1, 1983

Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 1988

Colonel Jan. 1, 1992

Brigadier General Jan. 1, 2000

Major General Oct. 1, 2003

Lieutenant General Feb. 3, 2005

General Oct. 8, 2008

(Current as of November 2011)

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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

MARCH 7, 2012

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**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN**

Admiral MCRAVEN. I am confident that those objectives, which GEN Allen has outlined in his campaign strategy for SOF, can be accomplished even in the face of GPF reductions. There will be inherent challenges of course, but our collective ability to build capacity in our Afghan partners, assist them in mitigating regional threats, and establish the underpinnings of lasting stability at the village level through Village Stability Operations (VSO), will continue undiminished. Ultimately, enduring security and stability will rest on the shoulders of the Afghans and our commanders and operators in the field will do everything possible to provide them the opportunity and conditions for this to occur. But we cannot and will not do it alone. Our NATO and coalition SOF allies, as well as our critical interagency partners will have an equal hand in it. GEN Allen's and GEN Mattis's staffs are working hard to ensure SOF and the aggregate effort are sufficiently supported and enabled. [See page 29.]

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**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI**

General MATTIS. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates it needs \$88.5 billion in FY13 OCO funding of which \$85.6B is to conduct military operations for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. \$2.9B is for our activities in Iraq, primarily for the repair and replacement of damaged equipment and for the operation of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq. Since the DOD budget is a bottom-up budget prepared each year to support current military operations and strategy, the Department does not have the information necessary to predict its FY14 or beyond OCO requirements. The President's budget request does however propose a binding cap on OCO spending of \$450B from 2013 through 2021. Based on the need for flexibility in budgeting for overseas contingencies, this is a multiyear total cap rather than a series of year-by-year caps. [See page 23.]



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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

MARCH 7, 2012

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### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Mattis, I've asked this question of other Combatant Commanders and would appreciate your thoughts as well—I have been very concerned over time about the capabilities of our bases here in the United States to withstand a cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical grid. Have you examined the ability of bases in CENTCOM to operate in the event of such an attack?

General MATTIS. Yes, continuity of operations is a primary concern for all of our CENTCOM bases and I am confident that our bases will continue to operate in the event of conventional attack, a natural disaster or a cyber-attack even against outside supporting infrastructure. We have assessed the more modern and enduring bases in the western areas of CENTCOM's area of responsibility may have interruptions in the commercially leased infrastructure for utilities that include power and communications. To mitigate this concern, we resourced sufficient on-site backup generators and military satellite capability to continue our critical missions. The tactical bases in Afghanistan are much more self-sufficient with respect to all their utilities based on the design of the combat-portable systems that provide the daily operating utilities to those locations. Bagram Air Base, for example, generates all of its power on-site, has multiple satellite communications systems in addition to the commercially leased fiber optic connectivity to that post. We practice our ability to continue operations even if a cyber-attack interrupts our connectivity.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral McRaven, in the aftermath of 9/11, much of SOCOM's attention and abilities have been focused on the counterterrorism mission. With the unsettled politics of many countries in possession of nuclear materials, are you confident that SOCOM can still undertake its counterproliferation contingencies?

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM maintains an unsurpassed capability to counter global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Despite a counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency operations (COIN) focus since mid-2003, Special Operations Forces have continued to increase their capacity to conduct counter proliferation (CP) activities. We are working towards balancing our counter terrorism operational requirements while increasing our capacity to counter the global proliferation of WMD, all of which contribute towards posturing SOF to respond to the Nation's most challenging contingencies and mitigate the risks associated with counter WMD operations.

Moving forward SOCOM must continue to work across DOD and the USG to ensure SOF develops global access and placement from which to counter WMD threats, gains visibility of and has access to WMD intelligence and has the authorities to enable or conduct CP activities. Finally, USSOCOM must continue to exercise CP capabilities across the entire WMD pathway. Additional national-level exercises and war games are required to ensure all parts of the Government and levels of command are prepared for CP contingencies.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there capability shortfalls with regard to your counterproliferation mission that require investments in R&D?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Executing the SOF counter proliferation (CP) mission requires USSOCOM to have a strong and active relationship with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense Advanced Research and Projects Agency, and the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense as our Research and Development (R&D) resource sponsors. This interagency partnership is the primary enabler which provides SOF the required agility, flexibility, and readiness to respond to counter proliferation contingencies. With the current constrained fiscal environment this approach is leveraged to mutually support the closely related SOF counter terrorism mission.

For all counter proliferation R&D efforts that support the SOF mission, USSOCOM is dependent on our resource sponsors to support SOF in advancing CP and to rapidly develop material solutions to address our Nation's most demanding security challenges. While gaps exist in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) detection capabilities and in timely, usable intelligence on upstream development activities, there are several funded programs that are attempting to close these gaps.

USSOCOM continuously assesses SOF capabilities in the CP mission area to identify and prioritize requirements. We are continuing to review global manpower and equipment levels throughout the SOF enterprise in order to fully leverage emerging technologies to counter current and future CWMD threats.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. You stated you have a large number of contractors conducting training in Iraq associated with the Office of Security Cooperation. Is that the most cost-effective means of providing that training or could, or perhaps should, civilians be providing that training?

General MATTIS. While uniformed personnel are preferred as the most cost-effective option, we are limited by authorities, host nation acceptance of uniformed boots on the ground and the number of available specialized (high demand/low density) uniform personnel. This leaves contractors as a suitable alternative. In addition, the Security Assistance Team contractors in Iraq conduct a range of duties associated with the ongoing Foreign Military Sales cases in Iraq, including provision of the equipment, training, maintenance, and sustainment. Their breadth of engagement in Iraq encompasses air, sea, and land functions. Additionally, the variety of systems the United States is providing to Iraq requires a multitude of special trainer skills not maintained by the military or Department of Defense civilians, which results in a significant need for contractors who have these skills. In summary, I think civilians provide the viable option in light of the competing factors.

Ms. BORDALLO. The GAO released a report last week regarding the excessive reliance on contract support, and associated risks, in using contractor personnel to train Afghan police. The GAO stated that "After assuming program responsibility from State in 2009, DOD did not assess the advantages or disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel for the ANP training program and has not assessed the potential impact of transferring responsibilities to USG personnel for the ANP training program since awarding the contract to DynCorp in 2010." Is there any plan in CENTCOM to conduct such an assessment, consistent with the requirements of DOD workforce mix guidance and other Federal policies and statutory requirements?

General MATTIS. A drawdown plan is currently under development that will reduce the number of Afghan National Police (ANP) training sites and associated personnel, from approximately 32 current sites to approximately 11 permanent sites. As part of this review, we are also analyzing how to optimize the workforce mix of personnel to meet all the various objectives while still delivering training. Taken together I think we are gaining the advantages of an assessment.

Ms. BORDALLO. How does the decision to rely on DynCorp to provide these services reconcile with Secretary Gates' January 2011 memorandum which directs the Department to "assess opportunities for insourcing contracted capabilities that represent high risk . . . consistent with budget and force-mix policy"?

General MATTIS. Our plan to reduce Afghan National Police training sites will provide an assessment inclusive of an evaluation of insourcing high-risk contracted capabilities. As our force posture draws down, we will continue to apply due diligence in ensuring our remaining force mix is optimally balanced to address mission requirements.

Ms. BORDALLO. The GAO also stated that "DOD officials considered the use of government personnel to perform the mission and found that the ANP training program did not include any inherently governmental functions." Did CENTCOM consider other factors other than simply consideration of inherently governmental consistent with its own policies on workforce mix—such as risk mitigation, critical or discretionary nature of the work, or cost—as required by 10 USC 2463?

General MATTIS. As noted by the GAO, the Department of Defense assumed the police training mission from Department of State in 2009 and assessed the function should not be considered "an inherent governmental function." While uniformed personnel are preferred as the most cost-effective option and DOD units retain the organic capability to perform some tasks required to adequately develop ANP officers (such as weapons handling, conduct of patrols, and basic survival skills), we are limited by the number of uniformed boots on the ground we can have in Afghanistan and the number of available specialized military personnel. As a result, and in accordance with 10 USC 2463, specifically per paragraph b.2, DOD decided to augment police training teams with contracted police trainers to fill these critical skills.

Ms. BORDALLO. DOD officials also told the GAO that there the Government did "not have sufficient personnel with the needed skills in civilian policing available . . . contractor personnel were used to fill skill and resource gaps." What is

CENTCOM doing to remedy such shortfalls and skill gaps within your area of responsibility?

General MATTIS. Due to the scope and limited duration of the police training mission in Afghanistan, DOD chose to utilize specialized contractors to remedy the shortfalls for qualified trainers. Contractors serve as a valuable resource in the absence of sufficient U.S. Government personnel with the needed skills in civilian policing available to provide all the trainers and mentors needed by the Afghan National Police (ANP) training program. CENTCOM also draws on DOD capabilities, when possible, to support training, such as the Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment Train the Trainer Course taught by Soldiers from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command, in support of the Afghan Senior Leader Protection Program. This type of specialized training provides a great opportunity to leverage the skills of our military personnel over a short period of time and does not count against our mandated force limit requirements in theater.

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current CENTCOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.

General MATTIS. The current workforce construct reflects an appropriately balanced work force for this Headquarters and enables this command to perform its shaping and missions to achieve theater security objectives. To enable an improved balance of constrained military resources, CENTCOM converted 57 military positions to civilian billets between 2009 and 2011 and also converted 247 contractor full-time equivalents to civilian positions between 2010 and 2011. Currently, our civilian requirements consist of 468 civilian billets, including 388 in the management headquarters and another 80 throughout our area of operations working hand-in-hand with their military counterparts. While it is difficult to capture workforce and cost data, we estimate a savings of approximately forty thousand dollars for each conversion.

Ms. BORDALLO. Did CENTCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians?

General MATTIS. Yes, following the decision by DOD to freeze civilian manpower levels at the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 levels, CENTCOM asked for an exception to convert 98 billets in FY 2011 and 31 billets in FY 2013. The exception for the 98 billets in FY 2011 was approved. The request to convert 31 billets in FY 2013 was denied citing the necessity to remain at the FY 2010 manpower levels and emphasizing that any insourcing actions must be implemented within the civilian cap.

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has CENTCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies?

General MATTIS. Since 2008, we have converted 247 contracting equivalents to civilian billets resulting in a \$145.7 million reduction in contract funds over the future years' defense plan (2010–2014).

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting CENTCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor?

General MATTIS. We endeavor to use the existing military force structure and capabilities to meet operational requirements within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. However, since we are at times limited by authorities, host nation acceptance of uniformed boots on the ground and the number of available specialized uniform personnel, contractors are often the only option. I am never completely comfortable with our use of contractors and persistently assess our operational requirements to leverage only the contract servicing we need. I insist on a process that is as flexible and responsible as possible for CENTCOM operating forces with the critical skills they need, while balancing this emphasis against cost and limited resources.

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within CENTCOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?

General MATTIS. We have not experienced reductions in the civilian workforce because of the approved military to civilian and contract-to-civilian conversions. Currently, the workload is balanced across the major labor sources, but CENTCOM will continue to assess any future reductions that emerge.

Ms. BORDALLO. In the CENTCOM plan for the inventory of contracts for services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's appropriations act, signed by your

Chief of Staff on October 4, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, CENTCOM planned to begin modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011?

General MATTIS. CENTCOM has executed no contract actions with the new requirement because the Army's Contract Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA) website application is still under development and expected to be fielded in the next several months. CMRA will gather the contractor information in accordance with section 8108(c) guidance. CENTCOM will insert the appropriate language in existing and new contracts once the CMRA website becomes functional.

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the "exceptions" to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions CENTCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.

General MATTIS. The Department approved five (5) exceptions and disapproved two (2). A detailed list follows:

1. Approved 10 military-to-civilian conversions. In 2007, USCENTCOM programmed the conversion of 57 military billets to civilian over the 2009–2012 programs as part of the Defense Manpower Review Process. During implementation, 10 of these 57 positions were delayed due to budget consideration. The subsequent approval allowed the 10 positions to convert in 2011 and 2012. This conversion was directed by the Defense Department in order to return military billets to the Services for reallocation to units.

2. Approved growth of one civilian and 3 military for Special Operations Command, Central's Cultural Engagement Group. The 2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed development of a sustainment plan for the Cultural Engagement Group. This is an enduring mission that meets compartmentalized SECDEF objectives throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The unit requires specialized operational and tactical level logistic support in order to accomplish highly classified, SECDEF directed operations.

3. Approved 9 full-time Counter Narcotics equivalents as civilian billets. The Department approved funding in 2010 for an increase of eight Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) positions in 2010 and one additional in 2011. They will also provide continuity of expertise and oversight for the contractors supporting the newly assigned mission area. The positions establish a rotational presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and provide savings in contractor expenses.

4. Approved Afghanistan/Pakistan Center of Excellence 221 civilian billets. The SECDEF approved 221 new civilian billets in the President's 2011 budget for our Afghanistan/Pakistan Center of Excellence. The Defense Intelligence Agency authorized our Intelligence Director to begin advance hiring personnel against provisional billets in June 2010 and withdrew \$64.6 million in 2011 in Overseas Contingency Operations funding.

5. Approved insourcing 98 positions planned for 2011. This contractor to civilian conversion initiative saved the Department ~\$80M over the Future Years Defense Plan. Allowing USCENTCOM to continue on this cost savings track not only provided better continuity and expertise in critical mission areas across USCENTCOM's mission set but facilitated the civilian hiring actions then in progress.

6. Disapproved insourcing 31 positions planned for 2013. The directed SECDEF freeze of civilian manpower at 2010 levels halted our remaining Future Years Defense Plan programmed contract conversions. The command identified 31 as critical to achieving manning objectives within funding constraints. The SECDEF's policy now requires such requests be validated through the Chairman's Joint Manpower Validation Process.

7. Disapproved 144 (28 Defense civilians, 30 foreign national civilians, and 86 military) permanent Office of Security Cooperation, Iraq (OSC-I) billets. USCENTCOM requested permanent manning to establish OSC-I to reach full operational capability as validated by the Joint Manpower Validation Process. The Department denied the request to fund OSC-I in the base budget and instead funded it through the Overseas Contingency Operations budget and is using temporary Joint Individual Augmentation for staffing.

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across CENTCOM, is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?

General MATTIS. Yes, we are tracking efficiency initiative implementation using the Defense Enterprise Performance Management System (DEPMS). In addition, Departmental guidance for annual inventory of inherently governmental and com-

mercial functions, issued 24 October 2011, required us to identify and provide rationale for all major changes to both civilian and military workload. This includes identification of any difference resulting from the implementation of organizational efficiencies and budgetary reductions as a result of USCENTCOM's efforts to streamline business operations, reduce redundancies and/or overhead functions, and maximize shared services. We submitted our data sets to Joint Staff and OSD in February 2012.

Ms. BORDALLO. You stated that you while contractors are expensive there are places and times where having a contract force works well for us as opposed to putting uniformed military? In this era of constrained budgets, why would we pay more for contractors and not use military or even civilians, to do the necessary work of the Department?

Admiral MCRAVEN. While military and civilian personnel can be utilized to perform a myriad of functions and roles there are, inherently in any organization, specific skill sets and workload requirements that are best fulfilled through the use of contract personnel. Skill sets not available in military/civilian workforce must be procured. Contractors, when utilized in a specific and targeted manner, facilitate the holistic mission completion and serve to maintain a balanced work force. We have discovered that Contract personnel are a preferred approach to meet periodic and surge requirements.

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current SOCOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM's workforce is approximately the right amount, but the mix between military, civilian, and contract support will continue to flex based on current demand and mission requirements.

Ms. BORDALLO. Did SOCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians?

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM did not seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels. SOCOM has met the mandated contract service levels and civilian cap. Both of these levels are being closely monitored during each fiscal year to ensure that SOCOM and its Components do not exceed these levels. The Command is analyzing the impact these caps have placed on work load and cost in an effort to determine and degradation in efficiencies. Currently the impact of these restrictions is manageable.

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has SOCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Insourcing is a statutory requirement/mandate, rather than solely a policy-driven action. We try to refrain from using the term "contractor-to-civilian conversions," because we are insourcing work/services, not necessarily converting contractors. Also, we do not have contractor requirements, we have requirements determined to be commercial in nature and choose to meet them with contract support. In an effort to meet Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance, USSOCOM has continued to analyze the benefits of contractor-to-civilian conversions as a continuing process each fiscal year. The long-term requirements, we expect to be enduring, are placed on a list of potential contractor-to-civilian conversions. This list is reviewed and approved by USSOCOM senior leadership to ensure all criteria are within the established guidelines provided by OSD. This process is utilized every year as a best practice for future solutions to long-term or enduring contractor requirements. In some cases the benefits are not in line with the best use of contract requirements, such as periodic or surge requirements which can be better met by the use of continuing contract services. This provides a much more flexible approach to rapidly changing requirements, which is much more difficult to satisfy with civilians.

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting SOCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, USSOCOM has established a two-phase process to ensure that all service contract requirements are cost-effective. First, the Command established a senior level review board to validate all new and annual service requirements. This senior level review board determines whether any proposed effort can first be met by internal or other Government resources. The board also ensures

that service requirements reflect the minimum needs of the Government. Second, the Command established a Service Acquisition Management Office (SAMO) to assist in the development of those service requirements that have been validated. For these requirements, the SAMO determines the most risk averse acquisition strategy and ensures to the maximum extent practical that all service requirements are performance-based and contracted on a firm fixed price basis.

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within SOCOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?

Admiral McRAVEN. SOCOM has instituted the "SOCOM Efficiencies Compliance Effort." This initiative tracks the reduction in the civilian workforce, as dictated by DOD guidance. The work load associated with the reduction has been eliminated in most cases, but in some instances, specific tasks have been transferred to other labor sources until those tasks can be eliminated.

Ms. BORDALLO. In the SOCOM plan for the inventory of contracted services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's appropriations act, signed by your Senior Acquisition Executive on September 29, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, SOCOM planned to begin modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011?

Admiral McRAVEN. USSOCOM was prepared to include language requiring the collection of direct labor hour/related cost data from contractors in both new and existing service contracts when it was determined that public comment was necessary on this DOD reporting requirement. Once this process is completed, USSOCOM will immediately begin implementing this requirement. In the meantime, the Acquisition Executive has developed a portal based Services Acquisition Management site in order to ensure increased transparency and accountability of all service acquisitions. In accordance with USSOCOM's original response to Congress, the Services Acquisition Management site is currently under development to include the capability for direct labor hour/related cost data required under 8108(c) to be collected and reported in the Inventory of Contracts for Services (ICS) on a yearly basis. Initial Operating Capability is expected by the end of fiscal year 2012.

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the "exceptions" to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions SOCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.

Admiral McRAVEN. Exceptions were granted for 133 USSOCOM positions (no requested exemptions were disapproved):

a. Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center (SORDAC), 91 positions. One of USSOCOM's Title 10 authorities is to ensure the interoperability of SOF equipment throughout Department of Defense (DOD), including the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services. This activity requires a substantial acquisition workforce to properly execute. These efforts are in line with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Growth Strategy to rebalance the acquisition workforce outlined in Resource Management Decision (RMD) 802. Additionally, they afford SORDAC the opportunity to transition its internal acquisition capabilities from contractor based support, establish a more stable mix of acquisition resources, and provide better management of acquisition programs. The exemption includes acquisition, contracting, finance, administration, logistics, and engineering positions.

b. Communications Systems Directorate (J6), 17 positions. J6 provides continuous support for the operations and maintenance of USSOCOM's Information Technology environment, supporting 74,000+ personnel around the world, through the Special Operations Forces Information Technology Contract (SITEC). This is managed by the 17-person Information Technology Management Office. The freeze on Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) full-time hiring was determined to adversely affect the implementation of this office and the \$572M SITEC contract. The SITEC contract consolidated multiple task orders into a single contract as part of USSOCOM's Program Objective Memorandum 12 efficiencies effort with an approximate savings of \$60M a year.

c. Financial Management Directorate, 3 positions. USSOCOM is the only Combatant Command (COCOM) with Service-like responsibilities which require management of a Major Force Program and the submission of financial statements. This exception converts 4 contractors into 3 civilian positions to meet the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) direction to achieve efficiencies and have civilians accomplish inherently governmental work. Conversion to Federal civilians is required for the

continual manning, long-term stability and expertise in providing accounting support for over \$2B executed by USSOCOM.

d. Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC), 22 positions. These positions provide support to, and operate with and through USSOCOM and the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Additionally, they work closely with the interagency to support efforts to combat violent extremism. As the only DOD Command organized to provide transregional and strategic military information support to the United States Government's efforts in countering violent extremist organizations, these 22 positions, were determined to be critical.

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across SOCOM, is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?

Admiral MCRAVEN. In response to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), programs were either eliminated or reduced to meet financial targets mandated and funds were transferred to higher priority or operationally oriented activities. Workload and functions associated with these reductions were not directed to be tracked in the annual inventory of functions; however, USSOCOM internal processes are in place to maintain continued compliance with the direction of OSD.

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current TRANSCOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.

General FRASER. Given the constraints placed on the size of the military and civilian positions, the TRANSCOM workforce is appropriately balanced across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements. TRANSCOM is currently reviewing its Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS) to identify economies of scale or scope, potential areas of risk, overreliance on contracted services, and opportunities for efficiencies. The ICS will be used to make decisions regarding workforce rebalancing to include the potential realignment of contracted workload to civilian performance.

Ms. BORDALLO. Did TRANSCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians?

General FRASER. Yes, in Sep 2010 memo to DEPSECDEF, TRANSCOM sought exceptions to the manpower cap in order to continue with insourcing initiatives. All TRANSCOM insourcing initiatives included workload that would be more cost-effectively performed by civilians.

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has TRANSCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies?

General FRASER. Although TRANSCOM was not specifically targeted for insourcing, the Command made the decision to examine its reliance on contractors and explore the possibility of converting selected contract workload to civilian performance. Potential candidates were nominated for insourcing, and we conducted a feasibility assessment, market research, and cost benefit analysis for each nomination. Based on this analysis, TRANSCOM insourced 80 FTEs in FY11 and FY12. The insourcing initiatives involved nine different contracts and included functions such as training, administration, public affairs, planning, analysis, and program management support. As a result of its insourcing efforts, TRANSCOM reduced its reliance on contractors, realigned resources, and generated efficiencies within the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF). TRANSCOM saved approximately \$3.5M by converting contract FTEs to in-house performance. Cost savings were determined IAW Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-007, "Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract Support." This represents an average savings of 20% over contract labor costs. TRANSCOM is now reviewing its Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS) to identify potential insourcing opportunities for the future.

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting TRANSCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor?

General FRASER. I am confident that the contracted services supporting TRANSCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor. TRANSCOM, like so many other DOD organizations, often relies on contracted services in order to be responsive to our customers. In some cases, it is also less cost-effective and more risky to use a civilian workforce due to the length of time required to justify, source, and hire additional civilian positions. TRANSCOM is cur-

rently reviewing its Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS) to identify economies of scale or scope, potential areas of risk, overreliance on contracted services, and opportunities for efficiencies. The ICS will be used to make workforce shaping decisions such as the potential realignment of workload to civilian performance.

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within TRANSCOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?

General FRASER. The Manpower and Personnel Directorate documents all manpower increases/reductions on the TRANSCOM Joint Table of Distribution (JTD). In addition, a narrative description is kept to explain the historical manpower changes throughout the Command since 1987. These documents allow us to track the reductions made in the civilian workforce and to ensure that eliminated workload is not absorbed by other labor sources. However, in the case of arbitrary reductions, COCOMs are forced to downsize their workforce without the elimination of workload. As a result, we are then forced to absorb the remaining workload within our existing resources.

Ms. BORDALLO. In the TRANSCOM plan for the inventory of contracted services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's appropriations act, signed by your Director of Acquisition on September 26, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, TRANSCOM planned to begin compliance in October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011?

General FRASER. TRANSCOM is compiling the FY2011 Inventory of contracted services in accordance with the aforementioned plan. Our FY11 inventory will be provided in time to meet the June 30, 2012 submission date. Beginning October 1, 2011, our plan called for our contractor full-time equivalents for airlift services (the new requirements) to be based on actual cost data submitted by our airlift carriers. As described in our plan, TRANSCOM will use the methodology of calculating contractor full-time equivalents for the FY12 inventory of contracted services based on actual cost data submitted by airlift carriers. Preliminary analysis depicts from 1 October 2011 through 16 March 2012, TRANSCOM has executed 2,089 centralized airlift contract actions totaling \$2.6B. In addition 1,552,120 decentralized actions were executed totaling \$316.5M.

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the "exceptions" to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions TRANSCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.

General FRASER. The TRANSCOM Chief of Staff sent a memo to DEPSECDEF on 17 Sep 2010 entitled, "Exception to the FY10 Cap on Authorized and Funded Manpower Billets." In this memo, TRANSCOM requested exceptions for 190 billets for programmed increases and identified insourcing goals. Of the 190 exceptions, 155 were approved and documented in RMD 703. However, TRANSCOM did not receive detailed information outlining the specific exceptions that were approved/disapproved. The following is a summary of all exceptions that were requested by TRANSCOM. Of these exceptions, all were for Air Force civilian Full Time Employees (FTEs). A total of 155 were approved; 80 for insourcing initiatives and 75 for programmed growth in new mission areas. Position Type of Resource Series Quantity  
 Security Specialist Air Force Civilian 0080 1 IO (General Military Analysis) Air Force Civilian 0132 4 HR Specialist Air Force Civilian 0201 4 Misc Staff Positions Air Force Civilian 0301 17 Misc Tech/Support Positions Air Force Civilian 0303 6 Administrative Air Force Civilian 0318 7 Management/Program Analyst Air Force Civilian 0343 8 Logistic Specialist Air Force Civilian 0346 11 Financial Mgt/Cost Analyst Air Force Civilian 0501 7 Accountant Air Force Civilian 0510 6 Budget Analyst Air Force Civilian 0560 13 Civil Engineer Air Force Civilian 0801 1 Computer Engineer Air Force Civilian 0854 11 Attorney Air Force Civilian 0905 2 Paralegal Air Force Civilian 0950 1 Public Affairs Specialist Air Force Civilian 1035 1 Visual Info Specialist Air Force Civilian 1084 2 Acquisition Program Specialist Air Force Civilian 1101 9 Procurement Analyst Air Force Civilian 1102 6 Contract Specialist Air Force Civilian 1102 15 Operations Research Analyst Air Force Civilian 1515 9 Transportation Specialist Air Force Civilian 2101 15 Transportation Asst Air Force Civilian 2102 1 Computer Tech Air Force Civilian 2204 2 IT Specialist Air Force Civilian 2210 31 TOTAL EXCEPTIONS 190

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across TRANSCOM, is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?

General FRASER. Although TRANSCOM has not been targeted in DOD's recent round of reductions, the Command is proactively examining its capabilities and functions to identify efficiencies. We have just begun the process of rewriting the TRANSCOM Strategic Plan in light of the dynamic global environment and shifting National/Departmental strategies. During this process, we will be looking at TRANSCOM's capabilities and functions to determine how the Command will evolve over the next five years and how to effectively realign and refocus our resources. As decisions are made to realign workload, the data will be tracked through the annual inventory of functions. In addition, as TRANSCOM reviews its Inventory of Contracted Services, we will identify potential areas of risk and opportunities for efficiencies. The results of this review will be used to make strategic decisions regarding the composition and potential rebalancing of the TRANSCOM workforce.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS

Mr. FRANKS. Over the past 3 years Iran has steadily and significantly developed and perfected its nuclear programs and weapons delivery platforms. We know that Iran is now capable of producing its own domestic fuel rods and that it has been enriching its low-enriched uranium to a fissile concentration of about 20 percent. Weapons grade material would merely require further enrichment. We also know that Iran has been perfecting its launch vehicle technology and may be about to use a Simorgh-class launch vehicle to place a satellite into orbit. The Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told this Committee that the Simorgh design "could be used for an ICBM-class vehicle." Iran's leadership has repeatedly threatened to destroy the nation of Israel and drive the U.S. from the region. If we had the political will to do so, are we prepared and able to assist Israel militarily if Israel finds it necessary to carry out a strike against Iranian facilities and how will our announced strategy to pivot to the Pacific as we continue to draw down in the Middle East impact our ability to defend our allies and interests in the Middle East as Iran continues to develop its nuclear programs and perfect its launch vehicle capability?

General MATTIS. We are ready to provide the President with military options to protect our allies and United States interests should he chose to do so. We continuously assess the strategic environment and adjust our forces and posture, in close coordination with our partners, to ensure we are prepared to defend our interests and deter potential aggressors. We will retain the ability to defend our allies and interests throughout the Middle East as we shift emphasis according to our broader defense strategy.

Mr. FRANKS. As you know, hard-line Islamists and Salafists have come to power in Egypt in the past year, and it is the Administration's intention to continue to provide foreign aid to Egypt despite the Islamist and Salafist government's anti-U.S. and anti-Israel sentiments and interests. What are we doing to ensure that this assistance will not be used to undermine U.S. interests in the region, how do you see the U.S. and Egypt relationship evolving over the next few years, and what challenges do we need to be prepared for as we continue to withdraw our forces from the Middle East?

General MATTIS. The cornerstone of our relationship with Egypt has been the military-to-military ties developed over many years through our security assistance and various exercises and engagements with the Egyptians. The recent Secretary of State action to release security assistance funds to the Egyptian Armed Forces will help to secure United States interests in Egypt by sustaining the high level of military to military interaction we value. At this time, we have no reason to believe this assistance will be used to undermine our interests in the region. We are seeing the emergence of a new Egypt. No one can be certain of the course that Egypt will take, but the character of the Egyptian people is unlikely to embrace policies as radical as past Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist statements indicate. In particular, I believe we can sustain our military ties through continued engagement, training and exercises like BRIGHT STAR, and foreign military financing program. The reduction of United States troops in forward presence in the Middle East will challenge our reaction time to potential regional events requiring military intervention. Rapid deployment and sustainment through the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace is vital to force projection. Our continued security assistance programs with the Egyptians will help to secure these privileges while sustaining our military linkage as Egypt transitions through this uncertain time.

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY**

Mr. CONAWAY. What are the utilization rates and average cargo loads (# of pallet positions and load weight) of C-27Js in Afghanistan and what are the utilization rates of C-130s in Afghanistan?

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. CONAWAY. What are the utilization rates and average cargo loads (# of pallet positions and load weight) of C-27Js in Afghanistan and what are the utilization rates of C-130s in Afghanistan?

General FRASER. The C-27s have flown 108.5 hours/month while deployed to Afghanistan (Aug 11–Feb 12) while the fleet averages were 32.8 hours/month in FY11 and 46.5 hours/month in FY12. The number of deployed aircraft has been two aircraft for the entire period.

The C-130 utilization rate in Afghanistan has averaged over 100 hours/month the last 3 fiscal years (FY10–124.3, FY11–105.3, FY12–108.1) while the whole fleet has stayed below 50 hours (FY10–47.0, FY11–46.3, FY12–45.1).

The average cargo load information is not available to USTRANSCOM or AMC. The information for Afghanistan cargo loads should be requested from CENTCOM.

Mr. CONAWAY. The MCRS-16 study recommends using C-17s for intratheater airlift but several senior mobility leaders in the past have been concerned that we were overusing the 30 year/30,000 hour life expectancy of that airframe too quickly. Can you tell me what the average age and number of hours our C-17 fleet currently has on them?

General FRASER. The average age of the fleet is 8.9 years (as of Mar 2012); per tail average flying hours is 10,105 hours. As operations change and either increase or decrease the average hours over time will follow accordingly.

Mr. CONAWAY. What percentage of TRANSCOM's airlift requirements for inter-theater and intratheater airlift is flown by foreign contract airlift contractors? How much money do we spend annually on foreign airlift contracts for both intertheater and intratheater airlift?

General FRASER. In 2011, approximately 7% of the intertheater cargo airlifted on 618 Air Operations Center, Tanker Airlift Control Center missions was airlifted on foreign aircraft. USTRANSCOM does not have data on intratheater airlift under the operational control of other COCOMs. The amount USTRANSCOM spent for charter contracts with foreign airlift contractors is as follows:

FY11 Intertheater and Intratheater CRAF Contracts: \$372.2M

FY11 Intratheater rotary wing contracts: \$213M

FY11 Intratheater Korean Airlines contract: \$1.9M

**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN**

Mr. LAMBORN. General Mattis, if possible to answer at an unclassified level, how many deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iraq can be linked to Iranian-supplied explosives?

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN**

Mr. WITTMAN. General Mattis, with regard to AQAP and Yemen, you said “the new Yemeni government will need assistance in order to reorganize its military under civilian control and build capacity to deal with critical national security threats. We are supporting military professionalization and look to continue our relationship in the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in accordance with our national policy. We expect increased Iranian malfeasance in an attempt to undercut Yemen's efforts to create a peaceful path to the future.” In light of recent events in Yemen, how do you manage the situation there and mitigate the spread of the AQAP influence across the Peninsula and in to Eastern Africa?

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. WITTMAN. ADM McRaven, with the pending drawdown and decrease of conventional forces in Afghanistan and the strategy to increase SOCOM's manning, budget, and operations, it is certain that Special Operations Forces (SOF) will remain in Afghanistan well past 2014. Who will enable these forces that are left behind in training, advisory, and key direct action roles? What types of enablers has SOF had to rely on from conventional capabilities that are currently deployed in Af-

ghanistan? Have these enablers been as available as needed, and, if not, what must SOCOM do to ensure it has the capability needed to execute its missions effectively in the future? General Mattis stated that “the insurgency remains both resilient and capable, so we must remain vigilant and resolved as our gains are reversible.” The fear here is that if we spread SOF too thin in Afghanistan, due to the desire to withdraw conventional forces. How do you see SOF executing their missions throughout Afghanistan against a resilient and capable insurgency if we have a decreased conventional footprint? What level of risk are your commanders on the ground assuming with this plan?

Admiral MCRAVEN. The road ahead in Afghanistan is undoubtedly complex and daunting with recent events highlighting this fact. However, SOF, General Purpose Forces (GPF), NATO and Coalition SOF and our Afghan partnered forces are uniquely postured and capable of addressing these challenges. International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has laid out a balanced and comprehensive strategy that identifies and addresses the resulting impacts of this scheduled force reduction. In that strategy Counter Terrorism and Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions remain dominant SOF lines of effort now and into the future. SOF command teams and planners across Afghanistan and here at home are working diligently to mitigate risk at every level. They are working closely with ISAF, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the interagency community to ensure sufficient logistical, aviation, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, medical and Explosive Ordnance Disposal support remains consistently available. We are managing this very closely to preclude our forces from being arrayed too thinly and to ensure we maximize their results. We must also remember that Afghan security forces will remain in many of these areas where our GPF are drawing-down. Additionally, there are approximately 20K Afghans partnered with U.S. and Coalition SOF. These capable and evolving forces will offset the impact of scheduled Phase II U.S. force reduction. By 2014 this partnered force will substantially grow as well as their collective capability, allowing for further U.S. force off-ramps and risk mitigation.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING

Mr. SCHILLING. You have mentioned the need for USCENTCOM to be flexible and able to balance interests and needs. What type of flexibility is most needed in our forces—manpower, platforms, or training in different capabilities in our troops?

General MATTIS. The end of Operation NEW DAWN and the ongoing evolution and transition of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan provide a strategic opportunity to re-evaluate our requirements for conventional forces and “boots on the ground.” We see the USCENTCOM Area of Operations requiring a sustained joint presence with a pronounced naval character—supported by embarked troops, agile special operations forces, strong aviation elements and an expeditionary Army and Marine Corps with an increasing interdependence, working by, with, and through our regional partners. These forces and capabilities are developed and provided by the Services.

Mr. SCHILLING. You point to Iran being a major factor of destabilization and violence in the region. How do you view the success of the recent sanctions on Iran and how do you see them changing their strategies if at all because of these sanctions?

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCHILLING. We are in a situation where fiscal constraints must be brought to every decision. Will our partners and allies be able to pick up where we can no longer act due to fiscal constraints?

General MATTIS. I believe the United States and its Coalition Partners, as the state of affairs currently exists, will be capable of overcoming the challenges presented by fiscal constraints. Our allies have been very supportive of our efforts in the region and have provided a considerable number of troops, resources, and/or money over the last decade. However, many of our Coalition Partners are experiencing the same fiscal constraints the United States is experiencing, and in some cases, even worse. In the face of debilitating deficit spending, monetary support from our allies for our efforts in the region—especially beyond 2014—will likely decrease. Therefore, I expect some support will be scaled back in the near future. Nevertheless, our broad alliance is composed of nations with varying advantages that can be leveraged to overcome fiscal challenges. For example, the United Arab Emirates have the fiscal resources and will to provide similar or expanded levels of support for our efforts. Other allies, like Jordan, have demonstrated a strong political

will despite their monetary constraints by providing highly trained special operations forces and capabilities funded by wealthier nations like the United Arab Emirates.

It is critical that our partners and allies contribute to the responsibility for ensuring the long-term peace and security of Afghanistan and the region; they can do so in five key areas. First, our partners and allies can and have provided adequate financial support to the Afghanistan National Security Forces. Second, they can continue funding their troop levels necessary to achieve a complete, conditions-based withdrawal from Afghanistan. Third, they can resource robust security assistance and cooperation efforts with the Afghanistan National Security Forces in areas of common interest, to include training and exercises, equipment, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, air defense, and border security. Fourth, they can provide adequate funding for Afghan infrastructure beyond those projects currently funded by the United States Commander's Emergency Response Program and the Afghan Infrastructure Fund. Lastly, our partners and allies can take increased financial responsibility for facilitating regional economic development and integration, to include properly resourcing such critical efforts as the New Silk Road Initiative.

Finally, although we are facing a reduction in available resources, our efforts will also cost less. General Allen's Campaign Plan not only recognizes the fiscal realities the Coalition confronts, but also the anticipated reduction in costs thanks to the transition to Afghan lead and a smaller coalition footprint. This is already manifested by our Fiscal Year 2013 Afghan Security Forces Fund submission.

Mr. SCHILLING. In this new technical age we are seeing that cyber conflict is a new realm of conflict and you specifically mentioned Regional Web Interaction Program activities that the U.S. is doing to address extremist organization recruiting and fund raising. We also have examples of what cyber attacks can do as we saw with Stuxnet, the computer worm that greatly damaged Iran's nuclear enrichment infrastructure. Are there other cyber efforts that we are pursuing and how will these capabilities affect U.S. posture in the Middle East?

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCHILLING. You state that currently Special Operations currently constitutes 8% of the forces in Afghanistan and is the lead for two major elements of operations. What is your opinion on the continued success of these operations as we draw down in Afghanistan? What are the difficulties you face when ensuring this continued success?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Success is achievable if our strategic aims in Afghanistan remain centered on precluding the reemergence of transnational terrorism and fostering governance stability. In pursuit of these objectives SOF's center of gravity encompasses Afghan empowerment, consistent pressure on insurgent networks and organizational adaptability and innovation. We must remain focused on governance development in key rural areas through Village Stability Operations (VSO) and nest this effort with a comprehensive Counterterrorism effect, necessary to create the time and space for governance and security capacities to evolve at the district level. Today, we have achieved relative stability in a majority of the 74 VSO locations where we are employing this strategy. Recently, during both the Koran burning incident and the tragedy in Southern Afghanistan, there have been no protests near village stability platforms or those that have occurred have been resolved by village and district leaders without incident. This strategy of empowering traditional governance structures, connecting it to formal governance at the district level, and supporting it by limiting the effects of insurgent networks, is positively influencing four million Afghans (13% of the population), which has definitely improved their perception of the Government of Afghanistan. Challenges affecting success will be defined in terms of interagency support toward governance development, national policy direction and any evolving security priorities.

Mr. SCHILLING. You said that you have been addressing issues of fiscal constraint by working with our allies and partners. With our drawdown and with the cuts to our budget, can our allies and partners take on enough of the work to still make our missions viable, capable, and successful?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Our coalition partners have been instrumental to our efforts in Afghanistan. Our coalition partners are contributing nearly 8,000 troops to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, making up over half of the 15,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan at ISAF. Coalition forces have made significant contributions in the war against terrorism across the spectrum of operations. Specific contributions include, but are not limited to: providing vital intelligence, personnel, equipment and assets for use on the ground, air and sea. Coalition members also have provided liaison teams, par-

anticipated in planning, provided bases and granted over-flight permissions, as well as sizable contributions of humanitarian assistance. Yes, our allies and partners have been and will continue to be key factors in making our missions viable, capable and successful.

Mr. SCHILLING. You specifically mentioned that the transportation infrastructure in the U.S. is a concern for TRANSCOM. Can you speak to the savings the DOD would see if the U.S. took a long-term approach to a transportation bill that allows for improvements to our infrastructure?

General FRASER. As the DOD does not invest in civilian highway infrastructure, we would not see any costs or savings in this area. The DOD works in partnership with the United States Department of Transportation to identify DOD's requirements for the civil sector transportation infrastructure and integrates these requirements into the civil sector planning cycle. DOD relies on the civil sector's highways, railroads, and ports to efficiently deploy our military forces for our National Defense Programs. This partnership ensures our transportation infrastructure is capable of deploying our military forces. Operationally, the DOD does not associate any increased costs based upon condition or operation of the highway infrastructure.

Mr. SCHILLING. How will your networks and distribution chains be altered to address the new force structure? Will you be requiring further MILCON expenditures to make this shift? How will the Pacific/Asia focus affect your usage of Guam and other overseas transportation routes?

General FRASER. We continuously analyze our network to maintain a measure of agility and align with the current force structure used to sustain distribution operations anywhere on the globe. We will continue our partnership with Pacific/Asian nations to ensure our network remains effective and efficient to support global mobility needs. In terms of MILCON expenditures, USTRANSCOM continuously collaborates with global stakeholders to ensure that vital en route locations are developed and maintained to support global mobility operations. This collaboration has been ongoing in advance of the shift in focus; therefore we do not see a major increase in MILCON beyond what already exists in our En Route Infrastructure Master Plan. USTRANSCOM has always viewed Guam infrastructure as vital to the successful execution of distribution operations in South East Asia, North East Asia, and Oceania, and will continue to advocate for infrastructure improvements. For example, USTRANSCOM continues to partner with USPACOM and Defense Logistics Agency—Energy (DLA-E) to advocate for numerous infrastructure improvements. Anderson AFB and Apra Harbor combine to provide Guam with a highly capable multimodal option that can be used to efficiently and effectively satisfy warfighter needs and requirements. Guam will continue to be a much needed and important Pacific/Asia en route location; vital to USTRANSCOMs and USPACOMs global mission.

Mr. SCHILLING. You state that routing mobility airlift over the polar ice caps will mitigate a number of issues for routes to CENTCOM. Have the other Arctic nations, including Russia, been helpful in this or have there been roadblocks to this work?

General FRASER. Our Arctic overflights to and from Manas and Bagram Air Bases are routed through Russian and Kazakhstani airspace. Both countries have been very helpful in providing overflight permissions, especially when we are moving passengers and changing out KC-135 aircraft for routine maintenance. We have had no unnecessary roadblocks, and do not anticipate any at this time.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN

Mr. RUNYAN. As had been noted in the FY13 Posture Hearing before the Committee, U.S. Air Force officials have elsewhere stated that we are literally "flying the blades off the 47," referring to Chinooks. Even our strategic airlift fleet has dramatically exceeded its planned program of record. Since 2002, C-17s have exceeded their program by 103,581 hours, and C-5s have exceeded theirs by 151,570 hours, according to Committee research. a. Can you then explain to the Committee how Air Mobility Command can overfly these levels, nominally for training purposes, when CRAF carriers would have been cheaper, reduced the tremendous recapitalization costs we will soon face, and would have enabled these American carriers to re-invest in more fuel-efficient aircraft to support the Department?

General FRASER. Since 2002, the C-5 overfly was 30% over the programmed hours and the C-17 overfly was 6% over programmed hours. Both overfly conditions were the result of wartime and contingency operations. In 2002–2005, C-5 and C-17 units were activated to support deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and constitute the overfly for that period. In 2010–2011 the overfly was driven by the surge requirements in Afghanistan, coupled with Haiti operations, OPERATION

TOMODACHI tsunami response, movement of large mine resistant vehicles, and Libya operations. The use of CRAF carriers would not have reduced the C-5 and C-17 overfly. The need to operate in potentially hostile areas often precluded the use of commercial aircraft in many missions. Additionally, the inability of CRAF aircraft to carry the larger pieces of oversize and outsize equipment frequently dictated the use of military aircraft.

Mr. RUNYAN. As had been noted in several news sources last month, one of our Nation's largest CRAF carriers, Global Aviation Holdings, has unfortunately declared bankruptcy. Among the reasons cited by the company includes a decrease in sales due to our withdrawal from Iraq. Though the Department is not expected to bail-out one defense contractor, this announcement seems to contradict Committee research which indicates that the Air Force spent \$2.2 billion on strategic airlift for foreign, non-CRAF carriers in just the last five years. Can you reassure the Committee that the Air Force has maintained its commitments to America's CRAF carriers when billions of taxpayer dollars are being diverted to foreign air carriers?

General FRASER. In the last 5 years, more than 98% of the \$2.2B was contracted through CRAF carriers who then subcontracted to foreign companies. Normal practice and policy require that contracts for the use of foreign carriers be made through CRAF carriers. Policy limits the use of foreign carriers to situations in which CRAF carriers are either unavailable or unable to perform the missions. For example, U.S. carriers may be restricted from operating at locations due to political constraints or FAA flight prohibitions.

Mr. RUNYAN. As part of the Air Force's Mobility Capability & Requirements Study 2016, the DOD will now use the least intensive contingency scenario as the baseline for our strategic airlifter fleet. However, this will not change the requirements of our Services to accomplish their mission, and so this report actually compensates for the reduced size of the U.S. military strategic airlift fleet by increasing Department use of commercial carriers by 5 million-ton-miles per day. What steps need to be taken to ensure that American commercial CRAF carriers are ready for this significant increase in strategic lift requirements? The Department has approved a significant number of non-CRAF freight forwarders as DOD air carriers for operations in support of Department cargo movements. Some of these non-CRAF air carriers are also foreign companies so how can we expect American commercial carriers to have the capital to sustain and modernize their fleets when DOD air cargo is being moved outside CRAF carriers?

General FRASER. Mobility Capability and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) increased the required bulk cargo capability for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to 25.5 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) from the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05) requirement of 20.5 MTM/D. The current CRAF bulk cargo capability is 29.34 MTM/D, which exceeds the requirements of all MCRS-16 cases. It is DOD policy to preserve commercial business for CRAF carriers, whenever possible. In the last 5 years, more than 98% of \$2.2B of contracted lift was through CRAF carriers who then subcontracted to foreign companies. Normal practice and policy require that contracts for the use of foreign carriers be made through CRAF carriers. Policy limits the use of foreign carriers to situations in which CRAF carriers are either unavailable or unable to perform the missions. For example, U.S. carriers may be restricted from operating at locations due to political constraints or FAA flight prohibitions.

Mr. RUNYAN. Defense contractors who provide logistics support to U.S. forces are required by Congress to use the DOD's Defense Transportation System for ocean transportation through VISA carriers. DOD policies also mandate air transportation with CRAF carriers but many major DOD and DLA contracts do not require CRAF air movements. Two of the main contract vehicles which require large air movements are DLA's Prime Vendor contracts and the Army's LOGCAP. With that said, and as the Distribution Process owner, can you confirm your actions to maximize CRAF use rather than allow Government contractors to decide if they use CRAF or foreign flag carriers? To what extent are foreign carriers being used in these contracts even when US-based CRAF carriers are available?

General FRASER. CRAF participation is a mandatory prerequisite for award of all USTRANSCOM airlift contracts utilizing CRAF-eligible aircraft. Additionally, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation states that: "For contracts that will include a significant requirement for transportation of items outside CONUS, include an evaluation factor or subfactor that favors suppliers, third-party logistics providers, and integrated logistics managers that commit to using carriers that participate in one of the readiness programs (e.g., Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement)." To emphasize the importance of this regulatory requirement, on 28 Jul 11, OSD AT&L issued a memorandum to DOD emphasizing the importance of promoting the use of CRAF and VISA carriers within DOD supply

contracts where the vendor arranges significant transportation outside the United States. Regarding the DLA Prime Vendor contracts and the Army's LOGCAP program, USTRANSCOM does not have visibility into DLA and Army contracts/programs.

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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT**

Mr. SCOTT. How would you assess the performance of the E-8C JSTARS within CENTCOM in 2011?

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCOTT. What were the accomplishments of the U.S. Coast Guard in CENTCOM in 2011?

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCOTT. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting any countries within CENTCOM? If so, which countries?

General MATTIS. Military travel for all ranks to Iran and Syria is currently banned due to perceived threats and the lack of diplomatic or consular relations with the United States. Military travel to the other countries within our area of responsibility is also restricted to mission-essential visits only, including flag and general officers. CENTCOM closely follows the Department of Defense (DOD) Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG) which directs policy and restrictions for military personnel traveling outside the United States in addition to observing Department of State travel warnings.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of military bands within CENTCOM and are they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering greater understanding?

General MATTIS. This question is better answered by the Services because there are no bands organic to CENTCOM.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Special Operations Command?

Admiral McRAVEN. The Coast Guard and U.S. SOCOM enjoy a close and special relationship. Through its post-9/11 authorities, SOCOM has a Special Operations Support Team Chief positioned at Coast Guard Headquarters. Similarly, there is a Coast Guard Captain stationed at SOCOM HQ in Tampa. Both headquarters enjoy the benefits of global synchronization, interaction of their specialized maritime forces, and exchange mutually beneficial tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as tactical flotation and boarding contacts of interest. The Coast Guard is the only service to send active duty candidates to the Navy's SEAL training program, graduating four officers who serve with Naval Special Warfare Commands.

Mr. SCOTT. How much a year is spent berthing Military Sealift Command Ships at private docks instead of U.S. Navy piers?

General FRASER. In FY11, Military Sealift Command spent \$5,358,630 on berthing costs for 11 ships at 5 different commercial layberth locations. The \$5.3M is for the fixed price of the berth itself and does not include reimbursable expenses for things such as shore power, security, water, additional soundings etc.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Transportation Command?

General FRASER. We collaborate with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) on a number of significant issues, including piracy, the Arctic, port opening and inspections for our reserve fleet. From an operational standpoint, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) works closely with the USCG on antipiracy/counterpiracy capabilities and best practices. Additionally, we worked together to craft the Department of Defense/Department of Homeland Security Arctic White Paper, which was recently approved by both General Jacoby, Commander, United States Northern Command and Admiral Papp, Commandant, USCG. USTRANSCOM and the USCG have both advocated for additional icebreaker capability to ensure security and peaceful exploitation of economic opportunities in the Arctic domain. The USCG also partners with USTRANSCOM and the Geographic Combatant Commands in providing Port Security Units for port opening in theater and in providing domestic port security during out-load operations at our U.S. strategic ports. Finally, the USCG inspects vessels during the activation of our reserve fleet. During contingency operations, USCG manning at USTRANSCOM can be augmented with additional USCG Reserve personnel assigned to our Joint Transportation Reserve Unit. In addition, USTRANSCOM and our transportation component commands, Military Sea-

lift Command and Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have agreements with the USCG to provide mutual support in areas of common interest.

Mr. SCOTT. How much was spent in FY 11 on leasing foreign transport aircraft?

General FRASER. We do not lease foreign transport aircraft. We contract for charters of foreign transport aircraft through our contracts with our U.S. Flag CRAF carriers when the material to be shipped will not fit on a US-flag carrier's aircraft or transportation is required into an airport where US-flag carriers are restricted from flying. For FY 11 we spent \$372.2M for charter of foreign transport aircraft through the CRAF program. An additional \$1.9M was spent directly with Korean Air Lines due to transit agreement requirements from the Uzbekistani Government.

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**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS**

Mr. BROOKS. I am glad to read that the Administration is fully funding the Maritime Security Program. As your staff will report, MSP is a highly respected, cost-efficient way for the American Government to obtain assured sealift assets during these troubled times. My concern is the level of foreign involvement in the Maritime Security Program. I am concerned that over time the program has come to be dominated by foreign companies. I am informed that 49 of the 60 MSP contracts are controlled by foreign companies, that is about 80% of the program. When the program started the percentage was reversed—only 20% were foreign companies. My question is simple and a simple request—What is TRANSCOM doing to ensure that firms owned and operated U.S. citizens have greater access to this program? The fact is that one day the military may have a mission and a cargo for a certain port or region and the foreign firms may refuse and we will have not grown and sustained a sufficient U.S. maritime capacity to accomplish that assignment. Having said that, I was told that the MARAD Administrator David Matsuda, in his hearing with the House's Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, stated that he considers MSP one of his most important programs. This leads me to my request—General Fraser can you please send me a report on initiatives TRANSCOM will consider to improve U.S. citizen participation in MSP.

General FRASER. Currently, all 60 MSP vessels are owned or operated by U.S. citizens. Any vessels whose ownership is affiliated with a foreign parent company have provided statutorily required assurances in writing the parent company will not interfere with the operation of the vessel and there are no legal impediments by law or treaty which would have a negative impact on the interests of the United States in such vessel. U.S. citizenship participation is an important aspect of the MSP due to the impact on the U.S. mariner community. While MARAD maintains authority to manage the MSP, I support their efforts in maintaining U.S. citizenship participation in MSP either through ownership or operation of participating vessels. I will be happy to coordinate with MARAD in developing initiatives which facilitate participation in MSP.